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Abstract 
In the first chapters, the prevalent conception of the nature of similarity 
is shown to be too narrow, and the argument is developed that models of 
similarity must encompass both analytic and synthetic components. Some 
general problems of measurement and the testing of psychological models 
are also discussed. 
A review of the philosophical treatment of the concept of similarity is made 
in order to understand the origins of the models found in the present 
psychological literature. These are then analysed in terms of their implicit 
object representations and cognitive processes. The distinction between the 
'class inclusion' and 'distance relation' models of similarity is shown to 
be qualitative in nature, and to correspond to the analytic-synthetic 
distinction in terms of cognitive process. 
A functional model of the psychological processes and object representations 
involved in similarity judgements is then proposed. The fundamental idea 
involved in this model is that the global properties of referents are 
synthetically evaluated in terms of their contextual relations, whilst an 
analytic 'pattern matching' of local properties is made. Various theoretical 
aspects of the model are examined experimental1y, and its general applicability 
is indicated in a series of applied studies. 
The scope of the argument is finaJJy broadened to encompass a development of 
Torgerson's (196.5) conception of the nature of the dimensions resulting from 
MDS analysis. Dimensions may be considered as 'virtual' artifacts of the 
experimental task and the individual's conception of it. This possibility 
allows the methodology to escape the dominating influence of its 
psychophysical tradition, and become a conceptuaJJy deeper tool for 
cognitive psychology. 
To Mary and Richard Whalley 
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CHAPTER ONE Introduction 
1.1 An Overv iew 
"The truth is that Experience is trained by both association and 
dissociation, and that psychology must be writ both in synthetic 
and in analytic terms." William. James (1890, p487) 
The concept of similarity is of fundamental importance to psychology. 
However it will be shown that an over narrow, and purely analytic, 
conception of its nature has been adopted in the literature. A general 
model of similarity, and a better understanding of the nature of the 
cognitive processes involved in similarity comparison tasks, is developed. 
The essential argument of this thesis is that similarity jUdgements must 
be seen as incorporating aspects of both analysis and synthesis. It is 
also found to be necessary to examine the implicit representation systems 
of the existing theoretical models of the psychological literature. 
The philosophical literature has always paid some regard to both the 
holistic and analytic aspects of similarity, and in some languages there 
may still be found clearly distinguished expressions. For example the two 
Sanskrit terms for similarity, sadrsya and sadharmya, explicitly 
refer to 'way of being' and 'common property' relations respectively. 
The early psychological literature also allowed for other than a purely 
analytic perspective. Herbert Spencer defined a form of 'imperfect 
similarity' in terms of the "likeness of nature in the relations" of 
objects (J881,p259). William James also attempted to examine the 
representational implications of the judgement process, 
"Is the 'resemblance' which we predicate of two objects due in the 
last resort always to the operations on our mind of qualitatively 
identical elements contained in each? Or, may we, on the other hand, 
1 
admit the existence, amongst our minds's objects, of qualities or 
natures which have no definite 'point' in common, but which we 
perceive to be, although numerically distinct, yet like each other 
in various degrees and ways?" (1893, p333) 
The various models of similarity judgements in the present psychological 
literature may be usefully dichotomized as being concerned either with 
'content' or 'dimensio!"s'. This distinction was first proposed formally by 
Ekman and Sjoberg (I965), and wi111ater be shown to correspond to the 
operation of analytic and synthetic cognitive processes. The conceptual 
distinction between the forms of models is illustrated in Attneave's widely 
referenced review paper: , 
"It is obvious that when things are similar they are similar with 
respect to something. The characteristics with respect to which 
objects are similar may be conceptualised either as more or less 
discrete and common elements or as dimensions on which the objects 
have some degree of proximity." (1950, p519) 
In the dimensional or 'geometric' models, similarity is considered to be 
the complement of distance in a space of one kind or another. The 
.individual's cognitive structure is implicitly conceived of as objects 
distributed within a 'psychological space'. The origins of these models may 
be traced back to the early Gestalt psychologists, and conceptually they 
have not developed from the original concern for psycho-physical phenomena. 
The reason for their dominance of the psychological literature was the early 
development of the multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) algorithms (Shepard, 
1962). This meant that a wide range of problems could be tackled with easily 
realised data. However in a recent, and extremely influential paper, Tvers~y 
(1977) has challenged the dimensional-metric assumptions that underlie the 
geometric approaches to similarity, and developed an alternative 
'feature-theoretic' or 'contrast' model. His model may be characterised as 
being of the 'content' type, and a detailed review of both the claims made 
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for this approach, and their refutation by other authors, will be made 
later. The tenor of his argument may be gained from the following: 
"_ the similarity between two objects is expressed as a feature-
matching function (i.e., a function that meaSUres the degree to which 
two sets of features match each other) rather than as the metric 
distance between points in a coordinate space. - the similarity of 
a to b is described as a linear combination (or a contrast) of 
the measures of their common and distinctive features. NaturaJly, 
similarity increases with the measure of the common features and 
decreases with the measure of the distinctive features." 
Tversky (1977, p79) 
A qualitative distinction between the content models with their concern for 
'class inclusion', and the 'distance relation' models can be made in terms 
of their implicit analytic and synthetic cognitive processes. Synthesis 
can be regarded as the search for resemblance, whilst analysis is concerned 
with the isolation and disjunction between elements of the objects. The 
appreciation of both of these aspects of similarity estimation has a long 
history, although in both everyday speech and the present psychological 
models, the analytic tradition is dominant. We shall argue that this 
distinction is central to an understanding of the reasoning behind the 
different models, in that it has implications for the implicit representation 
of the individual's personal meaning for concepts. Underlying the various 
models of relational judgements are quite different conceptions of the 
representation of knowledge, imposing distinct constraints on the possible 
cognitive process involved. Furthermore it will be shown that the 
experimental material, choice of knowledge domain and task constraints 
may also have important effects. It is found that these may cause subjects 
to switch to more or less appropriate styles of thought, and significantly 
change the outcome of judgements that they may make. 
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The essential weakness of the early psychological models which carried some 
implication of holistic or synthetic process, is that they make an almost 
immediate reference to atheoretic innate or metaphysical faculties. For 
example, Binet wrote criticalJy of the reductionist approach to similarity, 
but in order to avoid the epistemological traps noted he merely writes, "-
we repeat that similarity is a simple final and irreducible notion" (I 907, 
p117; translation from Reeves, 1969, pI89). This thesis is an attempt to 
develop the ideas of Spencer and James within a framework of sufficient 
correctness to bear comparison with the formal models of the present 
day. The development proposed here is a greater understanding of the 
necessity to postulate both analytic and synthetic processes in 
similarity judgements. This is made in terms of the 'qualitives' and 
'relatives' of the objects being considered; judgements of the 'qualitives' 
being related to analytic, and the 'relatives' to synthetic thought 
processes respectively. These terms, derived from the philosophical 
literature are related to the equivalent expressions of the cognitive 
psychology literature, i.e. Gardner's (I978) 'content' and 'configural' 
aspects_ ~f the stimulus. A mor.e general model of comparative judgements 
is put forward, and proof of the central argument, and the various 
developments, is offered in terms of a series of experimental and applied 
studies. In these experiments manipulations are made in terms of complexity 
and general context, and various measures are consequently developed of the 
resulting cognitive processes. 
Part of our general argument will be to indicate the problems associated 
with attempting to define objects merely in terms of discursive lists of 
attributes; an important consequence being the inability to deal with their 
configural and relational aspects. Viewing, and attempting to make a 
definition of the similarity relation in terms of a process model, appears 
to be the most satisfactory way to deal with the possibility of such 
emergent properties. Following Torgerson (J 965), the argument is also 
put forward that experimentally elicited judgements of similarity should 
be viewed not as a basic, intuitive or perceptual, relation but as a 
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derived cognitive relation. Torgerson claims that whether the essential 
representation of objects is multi-attribute or multidimensional, it is 
always possible to conceive of the structural aspects of the problem space 
as being embedded in an appropriate space. A consequent development that 
'we shall later consider is that the 'dimensions' resulting from an MDS 
analysis, are most usefully conceived of as being no more than derived 
functions of the implicit representations and manipulations of the 
experiment. In this role they may be seen as measures of emergent configural 
effects. These cannot be accommodated within the simple feature-theoretic 
framework, and the forms of dimensional analysis appear best suited to their 
systematic evaluation. 
1.2 The parts of this thesis 
The original motivating force behind this thesis was the wish to validate a 
theoretically and empiricaJJy sound methodology with which it might be 
possible to make investigations of the growth of human knowledge. Such 
studies were to be in subject domains of 'knowledge with belief'; where the 
values, and perhaps prejudices, of the individllPl must be taken into account 
and one could not expect consensus of view. Furthermore'the development of 
knowledge was to be viewed as more than the mere 'accumulation of more 
content'. The basis of any psychological investigation of the growth of 
knowledge is the methodology adopted for measuring change. For the topics 
chosen, it was found necessary to map the individual's concept relations at 
intervals in the learning process. The analytic procedures available to the 
researcher interested in mapping concept relations had generaJJy evolved 
from the concerns of the psychometric community to obtain 'hard', in the 
sense of being statistically sound, data. An unfortunate consequence of this 
quite legitimate desire, were methodologies involving complex relational 
judgement tasks that may take place over many hours and often involve 
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completely context free judgements; these constraints being imposed in an 
effort to reduce inconsistent or intransitive responses. Psychometric texts 
invariably deal with the 'meaningfulness issue'. However, this is always 
taken to refer to the scale or dimension which is being created not the 
meaningfulness of the task to the subject; the source of the -data upon which 
so much analytic effort is later expended. 
An essential component of procedures for making mappings of the internal 
representation of knowledge is some form of relational judgement between 
items in a knowledge domain. The emphasis of this thesis therefore became 
directed towards the theoretical issues underlying similarity estimation. A 
set of small scale applied studies are developed later to provide some 
indication of the soundness and generality of the model of comparative 
judgements proposed. It is intended that the presence of these applied 
studies should not confuse the development of the main argument, although 
it will be apparent that their general nature has strongly influenced the 
direction and development of the theoretical parts. 
Figure 1.1 represents an attempt to make clear the relationship between the 
individual's world knowledge and the possible 'mappings' of portions of this 
knowledge. Our intention here is to delimit the main theoretical issues of 
our argument from other issues that are implicitly related, but only of 
importance in an applied context. Changes in the inferred knowledge domain 
K to K' might involve providing an individual with more or different 
information on a particular topic. It could also take the form of a group 
difference in perception or experience. The mapping from K to 'elicited' 
knowledge E is the product of some testing procedure, and focus A therefore 
deals with the validity of the mappings provided by the various elicitation 
procedures. The tasks studied within focus A involve the learner in making 
relational judgements and are therefore implicitly dependent on some model 
of similarity. It is this dependency and the theoretical consequences of the 
validity and accuracy of the elicited mappings of the individual's knowledge 
that is the main concern of this thesis. 
6 
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Figure 1.1 Mapping concept relations 
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The issues involved in focus A are dealt with in a set of theoretically 
orientated experiments in Chapter 4. These demonstrate the necessity for a 
more general model of similarity estimation. Although a particular 
underlying model can be shown to be theoretically more general or adequate 
in some weiy, it is necessary to look to applied studies to give some context 
to these differences which are necessarily purely qualitative. Thus changes 
in .focus B might be viewed as a measure of 'adequacy of explanation', and 
the 'power to generalise' of focus C as an external measure of validity~ The 
set of applied experimental studies in Chapter 5 are intended to cover some 
of these issues. For example if it can be inferred that an individual has a 
known level of precision of definition at level K then the elicited level E 
is inadequate in some way if it is not also capable of such differentiation. 
It is also preferable that an elicitation technique should meet this 
criterion of adequacy in as wide a range of topic domains as possible, and 
not be restricted to subdomains of experience; from which generalizations 
of only doubtful validity may be made. 
The effects on the individual of change over time, restructuring and 
learning would be contained in focus B. A text manipulation experiment 
concerned with the role of play and mathematics in the primary school was 
included to test for the enVisaged effects of 'knowledge with belief'. Focus 
C.is concerned with the problems of 'creating' sub-domaips of knowledge, and 
with the ability to generalise of the various testing techniques. An attempt 
was made to tap the 'growth' of knowledge of individuals; and to cover a 
range of knowledge domains. A study of the concept relations involved in a 
micro-computer course was included to cover aspects of descriptive 
knowledge, and a domain where language could be presumed to play only a 
minimal role, the perception of painful experiences, to represent aspects of 
knowledge best considered in some non-declarative form. 
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1.3 Measurement 
"TraditionaJIy psychometrics has had its fair share of simple nonsense; 
now like any other branch of applied mathematics, it is in danger of 
having its share of complicated nonsense." Gregson (197.5, pI86) 
Measurement as a problem. 
Gregson is critical of the contentment within the psychometric tradition 
with attempts to fit mathematical equations to psychophysical functions, 
rather than seeking to understand the processes involved. Historically this 
desire to remain outside the 'black box' may be seen as a carryover from 
the rodent experiments and the subconscious physiological processes tackled 
in the 'building bricks' approach to psychology. For .example Lingoes takes 
the contrary view that Fechner's tnathematisation of Weber's law, "laid the 
foundation for all the important methods of psychological measurement", 
(1979, p5) in that it represented the first successful attempt to describe a 
psychological process in functional terms. Lingoes regards measurement as 
being the most "pervasive and fundamental problem for any discipline that 
aspires to be a science" (pI). Furthermore he takes the view that the 
"sophistication, generality and power of a science can be judged on the 
basis of its measurement procedures and its use of mathematics" (p2). The 
general claim is made in this thesis that the detailed concerns of 
experimental psychology have often led to a quest for mathematical accuracy 
at the expense of psychological validity. It could be argued that the 
present 'zeitgeist' of context dependent psychological studies might well be 
only a temporary phenomena, but there is no a priori reason why they should 
be invalidated by the lack of suitable analytic techniques. 
The nature of error 
As discussed previously our main emphasis will be directed towards an 
evaluation of the validity and accuracy of similarity judgements. The 
detailed analysis o,f such relational data can become fairly involved, but 
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essentially takes the form of a dimensional or hierarchical analysis. The 
actual·form of the analysis is bound up with the implicit model of 
. 
judgement, but this too is to be developed. A comparison of such analyses is 
made in Chapter 2, and the various techniques developed for determining 
which algorithm best 'fits' the data are outlined. However it will be noted 
that these algorithms optimise their final configurations on quite 
different aspects of the data. Thus ruling out strong claims as to the 
possible processing strategy or knowledge representation, of individuals in 
the original experimental setting. The dimensional scaling analyses make 
most use of information 'concerning those objects which are least similar 
whilst the hierarchical cluster analyses are dependent on information about 
the most similar objects. Claims as to causality would be significantly 
weakened if the individual is found not to produce errors in the form of 
Gaussian noise, but is being consistently biased by some artifact of the 
experimental design or setting. 
Another important form of error, intransitive judgements, is 
conventionally treated in a similarly atheoretical fashion. Despite the 
possible psychological significance of such relations, they are either 
discarded or 'averaged out' by all the generally available algorithms; where 
the experimental procedure does not already constrain their occurrence. 
Explicit predictions concerning the nature, source and implications of 
'error' should therefore be included in any theory of relational judgements. 
These problems are dealt with after our own model of relational judgements 
is developed. One hopeful sign in this context is the 'maximum-likelihood' 
algorithms as developed by Takane (I 98 1), and used in the later sections. 
These permit the investigator to make and test theoretical predictions 
concerning the way in which similarities data is generated in different 
contexts. This will obviously be a powerful tool for the concerned 
investigator, particularly when thes.e algorithms are extended to all 
forms of relational judgement data. 
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Making inferences from the real world 
"Quite generaJJy (despite the cant of some of the more hardnosed 
philosophers of science), we can, within certain limits, paraphrase 
Humpty Dumpty to mean by measurement whatever we choose it to 
mean, sometimes more and sometimes less, depending upon what 
purpose we have in mind." Lingoes (I979, p6) 
A synthesis, or at least the source of disagreement, of the contrary views 
concerning measurement can be found in the way that Coombs distinguishes 
between the two common uses of the term 'data' in the social sciences. It 
may refer to either the recorded observations that the scientist has chosen 
to observe or to "that which is analysed" (I964, p4). Coomb's representation 
of the 'scientists' inferential process is shown in Figure 1.2, and it is 
interesting to note the different emphasis accorded to each phase. From 
the universe of potential observations the scientist selects 'some few 
things to record in Phase 1. An interpretive step in Phase 2 involves a 
'classification of observations'. However the optional decision as to which 
'kind of data' the observations represent is adjudged to be the creative 
step in 'collecting the data'. 
Coombs discusses the restricting effects on lower phases in his model of 
decisions made at a higher level, but, does not mention the limiting effect 
on the higher levels that a dominant model of 'data' and the availability of 
analytic techniques might induce. Coombs' work of course is primarily 
concerned with the different kinds of data and their interrelations, and 
Figure 1.2 would appear to represent a model emphasising the collection of 
data acquired for its own sake. A 'problem driven' model of the data 
acquisition process is indicated in Figure 1.3. The goal of the experimenter 
is here taken to be in some way concerned with elucidating the individual's 
thought processes. To achieve this, a subgoa! of a judgement task is 
introduced which may be considered as a constrained mapping of K. Also a 
data elicitation procedure is set up, with the data generated taken to be a 
11 
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Figure 1.2 Flow diagram relating inferential classification to the real world. 
(from Coombs, 1964) 
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Figure 1.3 Flow diagram relating thought to data. 
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weak mapping of K'. The contention is that the conventional psychometric 
concern has been with the accuracy of mapping [B], that this has led to 
artificiaJJy constrained judgement tasks, and to mapping [A] being 
effectively ignored. The intention of this thesis is to move the level of 
concern back to the primary mapping and to evaluate the consequences of 
accepting psychometricaJJy 'weaker' data in a less constrained, and 
therefore psychologically richer, situation. The implications of making 
contextual judgements of complex entities are discussed in Chapter 3, in 
terms of a general model of relational judgements, and in Chapter 4 in terms 
of the necessary changes in data coJJection and analytic techniques. 
1.4 Models 
The required accuracy of models 
The social sciences often appear to have an uncertain perception of the 
worth of the conceptual framework employed by the natural sciences. At times 
it is dismissed as inappropriately naive 'scientific absolutism' and yet at 
others viewed as the touchstone of 'proper' methodology. Putnam develops the 
idea that models associated with the 'higher-level laws' of psychology need 
only to be true within the accuracy of psychology and that "the model 
associated with higher level laws need not at aU be compatible with the 
model associated with the lower-level laws." 0981,p214). He concludes this 
argument with the suggestion that "oversimplified models may well be the 
best possible at the higher levels" (p214). The implication of this reasoning 
is ,that experimental exploration in the higher level sciences such as 
psychology must resemble a satisfycing process, optimising descriptive 
detail with explanatory power at a psychologically interesting level. It is 
possible to 'contemplate a 'utility theory of measurement', with aU-curve 
relationship between psychological interest of the outcome and the detailed 
accuracy of the data. For example it will be claimed in Chapter 3 that an 
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apparently less parsimonious 'process' model provides a realistically more 
detailed insight into the way in which similarity jUdgements are made, th~tn 
the equivalently more detailed but 'static' feature analytic models. 
Pylyshyn argues just this pOint in advocating the pursuit of 'top-down' 
research strategies rather than the traditional 'building-bricks' approach. 
He contrasts the empirical and rational sources of understanding with their 
"two corresponding loci of rigor". (I979, p427) If the researcher's 
intuitions and personal knowledge are not employed in rigorously ensuring 
"that one's theoretical ideas are complete, consistent, and logically sound" 
(p427), then the consequence of rigorous operational definition of 
constructs and experimental control may still be incoherent and 
contradictory theories. It is claimed that the researcher must achieve a 
balance between the precision of isolated theories ("mechanisms") which 
might account for a limited set of experimental results and the "deeper, 
more general and therefore more complete, explanation" (p428) to be 
gained from a 'top-down' approach, such as the functional analysis implicit 
in viewing complex systems as interconnecting 'black-boxes'. It is 
unfortunately the case that most of the theories of similarity discussed in 
later chapters consist of little more than operationally defined properties 
and parameters. They are able (and were so intended) to 'predict' 
experimental results, "while postponing the expl~nation of how these 
properties come about~ or what more general role they might have in 
cognition". (p428) 
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Reductionist arguments 
"We often think that when we have completed our study of one we 
know all about two, because 'two' is 'one and one'. We forget that we 
still have to make the study of 'and' - that is to say, of organisation." 
L von Bertalanffy (1973) 
It will be argued in the next chapter that the primary distinction between 
the various models of similarity judgement is really at the 'theory of 
science' level, and stems from the reductionism implicit in the feature 
analytic models, such as Tversky's. Such models have been criticised for 
being too prescriptively normative. However as with the formal AI models in 
psychology they appeared to be 'powerfully' explicit, and it has been taken 
that if they fitted the scaling data even only slightly better than the more 
general dimensional models, that they were therefore more correct. 
A general problem for any reductionist argument is that the proponent is 
obliged to provide an a-priori explanation of the decomposition imposed, and 
to prove that the inherent simplification involved in the reduction will 
still leave an adequately descriptive model of the original complex. Also it 
is necessary to show that the conventionally simplistiC additive rules 
employed provide a valid recomposition, whose product is formally equivalent 
to the individual's decision processes. The contention here is that the 
feature models have to prove that they have not just artifactuaUy optimised 
a few features of the experimental setting, and that they therefore could 
always be tuned to give 'better' results. Katz and Fodor's (1963) ideas 
concerning a feature analytic theory of word meaning similarly appeared to 
work well when dealing with simple concrete concepts, but are extremely 
difficult to generalise to more abstract ideas; whose meaning is derived 
from a pattern of relations built up from their use in context. 
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The grain problem 
The other fundamental flaw to which reductionist models are liable is that 
they are likely to represent, and be concerned, with the wrong level of 
organisation of the data. There is a means-end reversal common to much 
cognitive psychology theorising, of delimiting the world to manageable 
proportions and then expecting to be able to generalise to more complex 
situations. The more reductionist the model employed, the more likely the 
theorist is to lose track of the purpose of things and merely indulge 
himself in precise but meaningless quantification. The effects of such 'data 
driven' research frameworks was mentioned earlier, and it is a common theme 
within this thesis that the dominance of certain data elicitation techniques 
has effectively circumscribed the form of later studies. 
Putnam argues that current 'data flow' representations, such as production 
systems within the Artificial InteUigence paradigm, are good examples of 
this problem. If AI is seen as concerned with the organisation of cognition, 
then production systems, even when they can be made to appear to work, are 
psychologically uninteresting in that they are a formal description of the 
wrong level of description of the data. Indeed it has been suggested that 
the hidden command structures that are required to make such systems 
'work', are their sole psychological point of interest. 
Breaking models down. 
The inability to distinguish between essential and accidental features 'of a 
model may result from the problems outlined above. However as Gregson 
points out in the context of theories of similarity judgements, the most 
important consequences for psychological theorising arise when such models 
break down, "The most complex set theoretic notions (of similarity) 
provide no more information than the operationalists notions of response 
identity." (1975, pIa). The essence of a good analogy (or psychological 
theory) is the amount of information it provides when disconfirmed. 
Essentiall~ normative models that are little more than data fitting 
16 
exercises, and in addition severely delimit the field of experimentation, 
are not the obvious way to acquire new knowledge. 
1.5 A perspective 
This chapter has been intended to highlight the implications for theories of 
relational judgement of the general move towards more realistic, 
perspective-dependent experimentation. A particular concern of this thesis 
is the use of such judgements in attempts to 'tap' the individual's 
knowledge states. If it is accepted that the individual will attempt to make 
use of prior knowledge and wiU be influenced by the general context of 
experiments, then any complete model of human judgement must make explicit 
predictions concerning the effects of such 'top-down processing'. The 
contention is that for the more complex domains which are tackled in the 
chapter detailing the applied studies, it is important to make a proper 
evaluation of the psychometric techniques employed to gain insight into such 
states of knowledge. 
A detailed treatment of the concept of similarity is made in the next 
chapter. A philosophical perspective is employed in an attempt to clarify 
the confusion in the psychological literature, and an alternative to the 
presently dominant feature matching models is developed. This model is 
intended to more adequately deal with the complex, 'synthetic' relational 
judgements which are the likely consequence of realistic experimentation. 
Various theoretical aspects of the proposed model are examined in Chapter 4, 
and its general applicability is then indicated in a series of applied 
studies in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER TWO Similarity 
2.1 Overview 
"Assuming that we can - get rid of all universals except similarity, it 
remains to be considered whether similarity itself could be explained 
away." Russell (1940,346) 
Philosophers have always regarded similarity as a fundamentaUy important 
relation. However they have tended to make use of the relation in terms of 
theories concerning universals and the nature of reality, and not to have 
addressed it as a problem for investigation in its own right. As might be 
expected, psychological theorists have shown more concern for how the 
individual actually makes such judgements, but have generally adopted a 
rather narrow conception of the nature of the relation itself. Various terms 
introdu~ed in this chapter are to be developed further in a latter attempt 
to address the representational issues that underlie the perception of 
similarity. However before attempting to set up a framework for a review of 
the psychological literature, it is necessary to provide 'working definitions' 
of the key terms analysis and synthesis. The philosophical framework 
constructed here does not pretend to scholarly depth or detachment, in that 
it is primarily directed towards an understanding of the origins of the 
different models of similarity found in the present psychological 
literature. In the later review of the psychological literature, we shall 
examine the important distinction made between the 'class-inclusion' and 
'distance-relation' models of similarity. The primary purpose of this review 
is to indicate the source of this distinction, to show that it is truly 
qualitative in nature, and that it corresponds to the analytic-synthetic 
distinction in terms of ~ognitive process. 
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2.2 Analysis and synthesis 
The term 'analytic' is used in the psychological literature to refer to 
forms of cognitive processing involving resolution into simple elements. 
For instance, Brooks (I978) writes, "Let us take analytic concept 
identification to mean a process whose direct effect is to separate aspects 
of the stimulus and evaluate their ability to prrdict category membership" 
(pI80). The contrary term 'synthetic' is defined in terms of building up 
separate elements into a connected whole. Brooks consequently regards 
non-analytic concept formation as resulting from some inferred 'overall 
similarity'. It should be noted that within the literature, 'synthetic', 
'non-analytic' and 'holistic' are usuaUy regarded as equivalent. 
Psychologists have generally adopted this natural language distinction 
between analytic and synthetic cognition, whose actual origins lie in the 
concern of the early philosophers with methods of argumentation. Aristotle'S 
'Prior Analytics' is concerned with the development of a theory of 
inference and the 'Posterior Analytics' with a theory of proof. He 
contended that we have a demon~trative reasoning capacity that might act 
as a counterweight to our dialectical pattern of reasoning. There is a 
clear correspondence between this dialectic-demonstrative distinction in 
reasoning and the analytic-synthetic distinction in judgement process. 
Within modern logic the terms have become more narrowly defined, and 
analysis is n9w identified with 'induction' and synthesis with 'deduction'. 
Following Kant, philosophers conventionally use the terms 'analytic' and 
'synthetic' to refer to judgements concerning the truth or falsity of 
statements being a logical or a factual matter respectively. It is 
probably known to the reader that there are various problems underlying 
their use in this way. However for the moment we shall only attempt to 
consider them in terms of a possible processing distinction within judgement 
tasks. It is intended to discuss the conceptual problems in Chapter 3, when 
attempting to address the various representational issues that underly the 
main argument. Within this simplifying context then, analytic judgements 
19 
can be defined as making clear the meaning of their terms, but not going 
beyond them. On the other hand synthetic judgements are about something 
which is, has been or will be the case; they are practical contextually 
bound judgements. 
2.3 A philosophical framework 
Introduction 
We have already noted that philosophers have treated the concept of 
similarity as an important, but conceptually difficult topic. The usefulness 
of their treatment is sometimes not immediately apparent from a 
psychological perspective. For example, philosophers have even appealed to 
the indefinability of similarity to prove the existence of other complex 
ideas. Butler (1910) claims that although we cannot define similarity (or 
equality) we know what they are by 'acquaintance with instances'. The 
existence of the similarity relation is then used to prove our awareness of 
the existence of personal identity. This is experienced "Upon comparing the 
consciousness of oneself or one's own existence inoany two moments -". As 
it is difficult to exactly delineate the impact of one philosopher's ideas 
upon another, the various works are detailed in historical sequence and only 
the correspondence to our own argument is noted. 
Aristotle 
Guthrie (1967) describes the Greek philosophers as struggling to express new 
and difficult conceptions. He points out the problems that "- Aristotle's 
logic only overcome with difficulty because it is rooted deep in the Greek 
consciousness: even their language has only one word for same and 
similar" (p230). This is evidenced in Aristotle's Metaphysics where 
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although 'other' is treated as being the opposite of 'same', he writes 
'IIThe same has several meanings; (1) - the same numerically - (2) - one 
both in definition and number - (3) - the definition of its primary' 
essence is one _" (1054b). 
This last case, the matching of qualities, is effectively what Aristotle 
means by similarity and is later expanded, 
"- things are called like if the qualities they have in common are more 
numerous than those in which they differ: either the qualities in 
general or the prominent qualities; e.g. tin is like silver, qua white, 
and gold is like fire, qua yellow and red" (1054b) •. 
It is interesting to note that other translations of this same work use the 
term 'similar' in place of 'like'. Aristotle's other discussion of 
similarity in this sense, that is now thought of in terms of 'class 
inclusion', is to be found in The Categories Here he attempts to 
differentiate amongst forms of substance, employing the terms 'quantity', 
'quality' and 'relatives': 
\ . . 
"- most distinctive of a quantity would be its being called both equal 
and unequal.~' (6a26) 
"Relatives seem also to admit of a more and a less. For a thing is 
called more similar and less similar, and more unequal and less unequal; 
and each of these is relative _" (6b19) 
"- it is virtue of qualities only that things are called similar and 
dissimilar." (lla15) 
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Aristotle's treatment of concepts such as qualities and relations is 
"embedded within Western language and thought. In our later development of 
these terms it wi1l become apparent that Aristotle's discussion is more lucid 
than anything to be found in the modern psychological literature. 
The alternative to 'class inclusion' is the 'distance relation' model of 
similarity. The ideas behind this model will be developed later in this 
section and also in Section 2.4, and our main argument is that the 
distinction between these two models corresponds to the analytic-synthetic 
distinction in terms of cognitive process. In Chapter 6 we shall attempt to 
show how the distance-relation models, and synthetic cognitive processing 
are related to the use of metaphor in natural language. Aristotle's work is 
important in the context of this argument both because his views on metaphor 
have been so influential, and also because of the nature of his perceptions 
of the process. 
"- the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is one 
thing that cannot be learnt from others; and it is also a sign of 
genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the 
similarity in dissimilars." (The Poetics, 1459a) 
The Sanskrit tradition 
The Indian philosophers of the equivalent era would appear to have had a 
quite different problem. To them, the perception of differences did not seem 
to have any intrinsic validity, because of the inherent difficulties which 
follow from the notion of negation that it implies. These philosophers have 
tended to take similarity as a primitive relation generated by our 
conceptualizing activity, which projects our classifications into the world. 
As with most schools of philosophy, the notion of similarity is found to be 
intimately -bound up with the notion of 'universals', in the sense of 
abstract generalities: 
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"There is not, however, much difference between Ramanujacarya's 
definition of universals and Venkata's definition of it, for though the 
former defines it as any assemblages that are similar and the latter as 
similarity, yet the very conception of similarity of Venkata involves 
• 
within it the assemblage of parts as its constituent; -" (Oasgupta, 
1968, vol III p355). 
Oeshpande (I972) details the fundamental importance of the concept of 
similarity in Indian poetics, and shows how it forms the basis of many 
classifications and definitions. The two most important terms used in the 
Sanskrit works to denote the relation of similarity are sadharmya and 
sadrsya. These are conventionally abbreviated to SOH and SDR 
respectively. A Sanskrit philosopher of the 12th century, Mammata Acharya 
defined SOH in formal terms as a 'relation of the object of comparison and 
the standard of comparison to the common property'. In contrast, he regarded 
SOR as a 'relation of the object of comparison with the standard of 
comparison', and considered it to be caused by or based on the common 
property. Deshpande rewords this definition in 'plain language' as, 
"it may be said that the fact that two entities have some common 
property corresponds to the relation of SOH, whereas the cognitive 
result that those two entities appear similar to each other" on account 
of that common property corresponds to the relation of SOR". (p23) 
In some sense the relation of SOR is based on SOH, but is considered to be 
different in nature. The relation of SOR involves the cognitive factor of 
samana-darsana 'same or similar appearance', and can be distinguished from 
, , 
SOH in that for SOR the observation of com~on properties is only a necessar1 
preliminary stage in having a synthetic vision of similarity: 
-
"In this vision, which is a state of cognition, the two entities appear 
similar as two wholes, irrespective of the differences they have" (p24). 
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Entities may have some common properties, and also some characteristically 
individual 'non-common' properties. The relation of SOH corresponds to the 
common properties, while the opposite relation of VOH (vaidharmya, the 
'relation of having non-common properties') corresponds to the non-common 
properties. In that they do not depend on any subjective factors, SOH and 
VOH can logically be considered as the direct complement of each other. 
However the realisation of common properties is not the only causal factor 
in the case of SORe The term corresponding to SOR, VOR (vaisadrsya, the 
'relation of having dissimilar appearance'), is therefore not its direct 
complement. This is a consequence of the fact that although the cognitive 
relation of SOR is a product of the realisation of common properties, it 
does not only consist of such common properties. Oeshpande describes SOR as 
being synthetic in that 
"it is of a generalised nature in which the data of common and 
non-common properties are de-emphasized, and are psychologically 
synthesized to give rise to a uniform opinion or judgement" (p24). 
He makes further use of the conceptual distinction between SOH and SOR to 
examine the various other terms that may also signify the similarity 
relation, and also to look at other relevant judgement processes, such as 
making comparisons. However for our purposes it is most appropriate to 
conclude with a distinction that he draws in terms of analysis and 
synthesis, the key terms of our exposition: 
"Thus SOH is analytical in character, while SOR is synthetic. While SOH 
and VOH are derived through collection of data, SOR and VOR depend upon 
the choice and taste of a person. SOH is a logical relation, while SOR 
is a cognitive or psychological relation." (p26) 
Boethiu5 of Dacia 
Skipping to the 14th Century, and a continent, we find Boethius noting the 
effects of context upon similarity. From the time of the Greeks, 
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philosophers concerned with the validity of rhetoric have criticised the use 
of 'argument by analogy'. However Boethius explicitly detailed this as a 
problem in terms of making similarity judgements. Within the framework of an 
analytical model of similarity, he showed that the common concepts on which 
the 'class match' were being made, are a function of relative context; and 
used this argument to explain various forms of rhetorical error. Boethius 
was concerned with the possible definitions of entities, and their use in 
arguments. He considered things to have 'certain modes of being'; from which 
common concepts might be drawn. Such common concepts are relatives and 
"- because a common concept is only accidentally related to the 
thing of which it is a concept, the Topic drawn from it is not a cause 
of the conclusion of a dialectical syllogism". 
Peirce 
The 'softness' and changeability of language are conventionally accepted as 
a condition for its development. Analytical philosophy translates the 
question of vagueness into the extensional-intensional problem of meaning. 
However, to Peirce, vagueness is a question of representation and not some 
peculiarity of the object being represented. Vagueness is defined as an 
impliCit part of any sign process, and thought to constitut~ a universal 
principal. Peirce would therefore claim that vagueness is not the result 
of a defect in thinking or knowledge, and developed the notions of 'breadth' 
and 'depth' to distinguish it from ambiguity; the logical deficiency of 
meaning. Underlying Peirce's philosophy is the 'doctrine of continuity', or 
synechism, which corresponds to the Sanskrit philosophers' concern with 
'unity'. It will be necessary to return to Peirce's ideas when we attempt 
to address the representation problem. However the importance of his work 
for our present argument is that, as Nadin (1980) points out, his ideas 
concerning the continuity and process nature of reality were later 
taken up by Wittgenstein in his idea of the gradual nature of 
similarities. 
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RusseJI 
It will be noted later that Russell's work is the key philosophical reference 
for the class-inclusion, or in our terms analytic, models of similarity in 
the psychological literature. Whilst attempting to set up a definition of 
cardinal numbers he writes, 
"When two classes have the same number, they are said to be similar" 
(190.3, pll.3) 
and later, 
"We have already seen that, if two classes be called similar when 
there is a one-one relation which couples every term of either with one 
and only one term of the other, then similarity is symmetrical and 
transi tive, and is reflexive for all classes" (p.305). 
This definition of similarity in terms of class inclusion is that adopted by 
those psychologists who have chosen to use set theoretic terms to describe 
their theories, or have fitted their theories into the formalism of set 
theory. It is clearly not original to Russell, although he is the source 
cited in the psychological literature. What is missed in these references is 
Russell's treatment of the problems that follow from this definition of 
similarity as a form of partial identity; namely those of context and 
relevance. He showed that if similarity is understood to be a matter of 
degree, then the statement that things similar to A are always followed by 
things similar to B may not be true, even jn cases where A is the cause of 
B. This 'causality problem' is illustrated by the case of two pairs of 
matches. The pairs are taken to be 'similar' to each other in all respects 
except for colour in the first case, and dampness in the second. The degree 
of similarity between the members of each pair is identical in that they 
differ in only one respect, but quite different in respect to whether the 
matches will ignite in the same way; a matter of the relevance of an aspect 
within a particular context. 
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Russell's work is important in respect of the development of both classes of 
modell? of similarity to be found in the psychological literature. In the 
same volume that the concept of similarity is defined in terms of, or 
perhaps more accurately is used to define class relations, Russell also 
develops the notion of similarity as a distance relation. In attempting 
to distinguish between qualitative and quantitative comparisons, he 
describes 'sweetness' and 'brightness' as genuinely quantitative but regards 
terms denoting colour such as 'ruddiness' as indicating, 
"- not more of a given colour, but more likeness to a standard colour. 
Various shades of colour are supposed to be arranged in a series, such 
that the difference of quality is greater or less according as the 
distance in the series is greater or less" (p·l71). 
Russell describes the idea of an 'ideal ruddiness' and notes that for all 
such colour terms, "The true quality involved seems to be, in all these 
cases, a relation, namely the relation of similarity" (pI7!). Russell 
regards the difference between shades as one of quality rather than just 
of magnitude. However in that the difference of quality is itself a matter 
of degree, this is a case of relations which have magnitude; and the 
relation between any two of ' them may "in a generalised sense be called a 
distance" (pI7!). Russell notes that each shade of colour appears to be 
\ , 
simple and unanalysable, and describes such relations as being of 
'immediate resemblance'. 
Again these ideas concerning distance relations are not original to Russell, 
he references the work of the early German psychologists that we shall 
review later. However his analysis is important in that he explicitly 
relates the concept of similarity to distance relations, and also because 
his ideas appear to have influenced Torgerson; one of the founding fathers 
of the 'scaling', or distance relation, model of similarity judgements. We 
therefore have the apparent paradox of Russell being referenced as an 
original source by both opposing camps! 
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1V i ttgenstein 
We have already noted Nadin's (l980) claim that Wittgenstein's model of 
similarity was influenced by Peirce's notions of 'continuity'. The essence 
of Wittgenstein's model is the notion of projection rules which are not 
absolute, 
"Things are similar only with reference to a rule of projection. This is 
often obscured by the fact that we generally use only one rule, that of 
the portrait which must be similar to its original. But traffic 
movements are similar to the red, amber, green of the traffic lights." 
(1968, p4l) 
and, 
"The shadow is supposed to be similar to the fulfillment. But there 
is no absolute similarity. Similarity varies according to the mode of 
projection; but we tend to assume, when we use the word, one particular 
mode of projection, the mode we assume in looking at a photograph." 
(p44) 
Similarity judgements are thus taken to be made of an abstract 
projection of the entities in terms of their functions. The notion of a 
'projection rule' of course directly corresponds to the implicit cognitive 
operations of the distance models of similarity; and this connection will be 
developed further in the latter part of this chapter. Another aspect of 
Wittgenstein's ideas, whose development is also postponed, concerns his 
discussion of the criterion of a 'good' portrait. He points out that this 
criterion is not similarity per se, but involves intention. The problem 
remains that there is no simple explanation for intention, "You cannot 
anticipate the result which you project" (p32). 
It is unfortunate that Wittgenstein's innovative ideas have not been taken 
up in the psychological literature, although the development of our model 
will partly remedy this ommission. Significantly for our argument, 
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Wittgenstein also addresses the representation problem in relation to the 
concept of similarity. Playing a piano from a score is cited as an example 
of understanding a thought in terms of being able to translate it according 
to some 'general rule' (p44). However Wittgenstein points out that, "- the 
score does not cause us to playas we do; if it did there would be no 
right and wrong way of playing" (p44). As an example of such a translation 
process, Wittgenstein defines the letters a, b, c and d as arrows; as in the 
key to Figure 2.1. The sequence 'a a dab c' then becomes cell [meaning 1, 
grammar 1] of the same figure. Wittgenstein points out that "At first sight 
we would say there was no similarity between the letters and arrows" (p44). 
The translation rules correspond to the rules of a grammar and, "No 
description of the world can justify the rules of grammar" (p44). 
The complete figure can be seen as an extension of Wittgenstein's argument, 
with the two entities shown having different meaning and being transformed 
by two different grammars. The source of the transformation is of course 
already at an arbitrarily symbolic level, in that letters are symbols of 
. some order. This figure provides the rationale for an experiment in Chapter 
4 which entails the encoding of numeric data into alternative symbolic 
representations, and the evaluation of consequent perceptions of them. The 
representational implications of these ideas will be developed further in 
the final chapter. The important point for our argument here, is that 
judgements of similarity made of the projections resulting from grammar 1 
might differ legitimately, in psychologiial terms, from those made with 
grammar 2. We will argue that the nature of judgements made concerning the 
projections made with grammar 1 would correspond to a synthetic cognitive 
process, and those from grammar 2 to an analytic • 
. . 
Conclusion 
The notion of the similarity relation is of great importance to many 
philosophical and psychological theories. However the definition and usage 
of the term both in the literature and everyday life is seldom clear cut or 
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Figure 2.1 Transformations by different grammars 
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without confusion. The purpose of this review has been twofold: to make 
clear "the origins of various psychological models of similarity that we are 
to review; and to indicate how the domlnance in natural language of the 
analytic view of similarity relations is likely to have influenced its use 
in the psychological literature. Gregson, an influential author in the 
psychological literature, describes similarity as a "pervasive, useful and 
treacherous idea" (1975). However, he argues that experimental investigation 
only is useful, and decries the necessity for any philosophical inquiry. 
Rather than merely bemoan the arbitrary usage of a complex term in this waY' 
it may be beneficial to examine its origins and use in natural language. A 
detailed study of the etymology, or even the present use, of the English 
terms 'similar', 'like' and 'resemblance' is unrewarding. We have already 
shown that the Sanskrit language has two carefully delineated terms for the 
analytic and synthetic aspects of similarity, although the difference has 
apparently been lost in common language. However it is of some interest to 
note that in both present day German and Arabic, there still exists a 
, . . . 
distinction between analytic forms of similarity related to notions of 
simple equality, and synthetic forms concerned with the sameness of 
function. Further details are contained in Appendix G. . 
It is not clear whether the distinction that we are claiming is maintained 
in general speech, although it is certainly not in the German psychometric 
literature; only the analytic term 'gleich' appears to be used in 
experimental instructions requiring a similarity response. For the purposes 
of our argument, 'similarity' will be used as a generiC term. Its analytic 
and synthetic aspects may then be distinguished by the use of the terms 
'likeness' and 'resemblance' respectively. 
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2.4 Psychological models of similarity 
2.41 Overview 
liThe notion of similarity is a remarkably pervasive one in 
psychological theory, of both discursive and formalised sorts. Like 
most powerful and widespread ideas, it is not amenable to a ready 
and precise definition _." Gregson (1975, p3) 
A historical and philosophical perspective on the meaning of similarity has 
been developed, and a distinction derived between analytic and synthetic 
forms of similarity judgement. An important categorization of models of 
similarity in the psychological" literature was provided by Ekman and Sjoberg 
(1965). The basis of this dichotomy was a concern for the underlying 
definition of similarity implicit in the various models. The 'content' 
models, which would include Tversky's set-theoretic formalism, are taken to 
assume a heuristic definition of similarity as the quotient of common 
stimulus content divided by the total content. The epistemological origins 
of the content models are clearly based on the notion of similarity as a 
form of partial identity. The 'distance' models are those taken to assume an 
isomorphism between similarity and distance within some cognitive space. A 
formal description of such models is that they treat similarity as a 
monoto'nically decreasing function in n-space, and yield a representation 
with no fixed origin. Although the analytic-synthetic distinction may be 
considered directly with 'respect to the different cognitive processes that 
the terms imply, it also has implications for the representational aspects 
of the objects being considered. It is intended to take Ekman's concern for 
the model of similarity implicit in the various theories a stage further, 
and examine the underlying representational implications of the models. We 
shall therefore use the terms 'content' and 'distance' to describe the 
models in the psychological literatlire, but with this widened scope of 
differentiation. 
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A central problem for any review of this literature, is that the universal 
nature of the concept of similarity has caused it to be used and defined 
differently in many sub-fields. The most important source for this review 
has been the series of articles on this topic that have been published at 
regular intervals in the Psychological Review, since its inception in the 
1890's. These appear to reflect the changes in the disciplines working 
'Zeitgeist', the most obvious trend being a continually narrowing 
perspective on the subject. Recent articles are often little more than 
detailed expositions of a particular formalism. The desire to present a 
'coherent structure', and for 'the clarification of logical status' of the 
various models of similarity, is reflected in Gregson's (1975) major work in 
this field, and is our second principal source. We argue that attempts such' 
as Gregson's to distinguish between the various theoretical models have 
tended to take an insufficiently general initial perspective of the problem. 
Gregson's 'clarification' for instance is only made within his own formal 
'logical' definition of the task. 
2.42 The literature 
"The question 'What makes things seem alike or seem different' is one 
so fundamental to psychology that very few psychologists have been 
naive enough to ask it". Attneave (1950, p516) 
Early approaches 
The origins of the conceptual distinction between 'content' and 'distance' 
models of similarity are clear from our review of the philosophical literature· 
The writing of the early psychologists also indicated an awareness of this 
possible distinction in similarity judgements. Herbert Spencer described 
similarity as the basic relation underlying reasoning and classification, 
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"Of all relations the most complex is that of Similarity - that in 
virtue of which we range together objects of the same species, 
notwithstanding their differences of magnitude, and in virtue of which 
we group under the same head, phenomena of causation that are widely 
contrasted in degree." (1881, p2.56). 
He described 'ordinary' similarities between natural objects as being made 
up of many 'component' or 'simple' similarities; essentially of the 
attributes of the object. He also writes of 'similarities of sequence' and 
thus derives the two classes of 'similar coexistences' and 'similar 
sequences'. Instances given of these classes are 'similar triangles' and 
'the uniform sequence of heat upon compression' respectively. By the latter, 
Spencer meant the similarity between the various cases in which compression 
produces heat (and was presumably as topical an example 100 years ago as are 
our present day computer metaphors!), 
"Two triangles may be similar, though any side of the one is a score 
times as great as the homologous side of the other; and though to-day a 
small disengagement of heat results from the pressure of a hundred 
pounds, while to-morrow a great disengagement results from the pressure 
of a hundred tons, the cases are classed as similar." (p258). 
From the two classes, Spencer derives, "the two orders of Similarity -
perfect and imperfect: the similarity on which mathematical reasoning 
proceeds and the similarity on which the reasoning of daily life proceeds." 
(p258). To Spencer, 'perfect' similarity is concerned with the matching of 
relations. whilst, "In imperfect similarity, however, the only specific 
implication is - likeness of nature in the relations." (p259). It would seem 
legitimate to describe this as a synthetic similarity judgement, involving 
the process of 'perception in context'. 
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William James was more explicit in his delineation of the problem. The 
quotation in section 1.1 concerns his comparison of a theory of 'immediate 
resemblance', which he attributed to Stumpf, to a model of likeness 
'dependent on partially identical content'. The importance of the treatment 
of the perceptual component of any general model of similarity 'judgement' 
will be argued later. James' model would appear to have been strongly 
influenced by Herbart's notions of 'schematic implicit apperception'. 
Describing a botanist examining a flower, Herbart's (translated in McDougall, 
1923) writing suggests a 'top-down' model, 
"The whole system is excited from the first; and the systematic 
relation of the parts governs the order of the perceptual activity. The 
parts may be said to be implicitly appr~hended throughout the process, 
while each part in turn becomes explicitly apprehended." (p259) 
Gregson (1975) dismisses James' argument as 'facile', arguing that because 
simple impressions are undecomposable James' 'immediate resemble' or 
similarity measure is therefore unanalysable. Despite providing a theory 
that does not fit into Gregson's formal notatio'n scheme, James' incisive 
criticism of the partial identity or content models is equally relevant 
ninety years later in relation to the present 'contrast' models of 
similarity; with their set theoretic basis. The argument he puts forward 
stems from the philosophical distinction between the 'essential' and the 
'accidental' features of an object. In the real world, this of course 
depend~ upon the context of the object and the perceptions of the individual 
rather than the arbitrary decision of the experimenter. James introduces the 
intriguing term 'Mind":'dust theory' to describe such models, presumably in 
contrast to associationistic ideas. 
Kulpe is critical of the simple associationist view that "~contiguity is the 
sole incentive to association, and that all apparent cases of reproduction 
by similarity or contrast must really be referred to it." 0895, p192). He 
provides an equivalent but more formal classification of similarity types 
35 
which would also indicate an awareness of the content-distance distinction, 
"The similarity of two simple qualities may consist (a) in the 
slightness of the difference that exists between them - (b) Or 
similarity may be defined as partial identity. - (c) Or, lastly, 
similarity may be predicated of two qualities which stand in one and 
the same relation to a third. - Only the second of the three possible 
meanings of similarity can be at all precisely formulated." (p 192) 
Kulpe gives as an example of his first definition, "two just discriminable 
shades of indigo blue". He would almost certainly have conceived of it in 
distance terms, although present day psychometricians might formulate it in 
set-theoretic terms. The second definition clearly describes a 'content' 
model, he refers to the partial match of colour tones in terms of their 
attributes of saturation, extension, duration and quality. Kulpe's third 
definition resembles the formal description of a distance model, and Gregson 
appears to treat it as such. However from the concrete example that he 
provides it is not clear what was-meant, "Thus red and green are similar, 
because both reproduce the word 'colour'." 
Ink blots and handwriting 
Dearborn (I 91 0) attempted an analysis of the mental processes underlying 
Similarity and dissimilarity, the discernment of likeness and unlikeness. 
One hundred inkblot cards were arranged in a 10 x 10 matrix and the subjects 
were required to pick out the ten most similar, or diSSimilar, to a norm 
card. It is noteworthy that this procedure is conceptually very similar to 
the 'reference ranking' task that will later be discussed in the 
experimental section, in that it permits the analysis of the subjects 
unconstrained ranking procedure. Dearborn's choice of ink blots as stimuli 
unfortunately presented problems in terms of the formal rigour with which 
any analysis of the subjects' judgements might have been made. Also it would 
have been preferable if he had relied on the assessments of several judges 
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rather than, as he apparently did, just on h~s own. However in relation to 
the range of stimuli currently being employed in experimental studies it is 
interesting to note that he writes, 
"Only very rarely, moreover, would the actual objective similarity in 
life be as narrowly confined as in the conditions of these simple 
exper iments" (p61). 
Dearborn reported that only one subject, a music student, claimed to have 
any true 'feeling' of likeness or of unlikeness, and this subject's judgements 
were considered the best. Some subjects attended only to the actual visual 
sensation, whilst others attended to specific characteristics of them. 
Dearborn describes this as 'looking at' versus 'thinking about' the blots. 
In the sense of our argument, Dearborn explains the more 'satisfactory' 
choices of the student who experienced some 'feeling' for the blots, a~d 
. , . - . 
also those who 'looked at' them, in terms of their attributes and relations, 
"Even these simple bluish-black forms in only two dimensions have so 
many characters that to specify one, or two, or three, and compare' 
them by these leads to imperfect and misleading results. On the other 
hand, the "feeling" of likeness or of unlikeness implies a much wider 
acquaintance with the blots and is; therefore, the basis of a better 
comparison." (p60) 
Following Dearborn's study, Hollingworth made a study of similarity and 
dissimilarity judgements between different samples of handwriting. His reSlJJt~' 
. also suggested the existence of different judgement processes (as had previoUs 
'handwriting' studies in France by Binet, and other researchers in the U.S.A.), 
"Judgem~nts within each type or category involve each its own peculiar 
psychological processes and criteria. The 'most similar' is not by 
virtue of that fact, the 'least different' _" (1913, p289). 
37 
Hollingworth made correlational analyses of the accuracy of similarity and 
dissimilarity judgements over repeated trials, and found similarity 
judgements to be best. Hollingworth's main claim from an analysis of 
subjects protocols is, "the greater ease and naturalness which is felt to 
characterize the judgements of similarity." (p287). His subjects found it 
difficult to define adequate criteria for detecting differences, and also in 
using any such analytic criteria consistently, "The judgement of difference 
- is largely or often based on the comparison of fine points and minor 
details." (p287). 
Hollingworth suggests that similarity is a more fundamental judgement than 
dissimilarity, "- in real Ufe, it is similarity that most interests us." 
(p275). He takes issue with Dearborn who he claims had put forward the idea 
that dissimilarity is the more fundamental relationship. Gregson too 
misunderstands Dearborn on this point, misquoting his argument. Dearborn 
distinguishes between judgements involving 'feeling for a wider 
acquaintance' and the 'specification and comparison of characters'. His 
actual claim is that only in the latter case, the analytic matching of 
attributes, are dissimilarity judgements easier to make, 
"Some ideal criteria were obviously more essential than others and led 
to the selection of a set of blots evidently like each other and the 
norm. Ideal criteria gave more accurate results in the dissimilarity 
choices than in the similarity choices. This is, as we should expect, 
on logical principles. The awareness of unlikeness is an easier, if not 
a simpler, process apparently than that of likeness, for the change 
of consciousness is greater and so easier to appreciate. At any rate, 
the sets of blots chosen as unlike the norm were much more certainly 
unlike it than were the "similar" blots chosen like it." (1910, p61, 
Gregson's quotation emboldened) 
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Given his previous comparison between judgements involving 'feeling' as 
against articulated characterizations, the meaning of Dearborn's phrase 
'more easily appreciated, change of consciousness' is quite clear. 
Hollingworth does not seem to consider thvat unlike his own subjects, many of 
Dearborn's were able to differentiate characteristic attributes of the 
stimuli. An interpretation of Hollingworth's results in terms of the 
. . , 
framework being put forward here, is that it is clearly easier to make 
synthetic similarity judgements than analytiC dissimilarity ones. 
Gregson appears to willfully misunderstand Dearborn's argument, perhaps 
because the conceptual basis of his own analytic framework assumes an 
underlying unitary process. In misquoting Dearborn as we have noted, he 
. appears to be attempting to create the situation where he may then dismiss 
all the important issues raised in the early literature either because of 
formal inadequacy or disagreements, "The assertion that likeness is more· 
basic than unlikeness has been flatly contradicted by other writers of the 
time with even less evidence." (197.5, p33). We have already remarked 'on 
Gregson's unwillingness to examine more than superficially any philosophical 
issues. His cavalier attitude to the early literature is also clear, "One is 
hardly obliged to subscribe to the views of any of the earlier writers as 
almost no experiments on similarity with a coherent structure were reported 
by them." (p27). What Gregson does not appear to consider' is that the early 
psychologists may have been more aware of, and more willing to consider, the 
underlying conceptual problems. It is now difficult to conceive of a 
Psychological Review article examining different philosophical doctrines in 
an attempt to understand the nature of perceived relations in similarity 
judgements, as did Dunlap's in 1912. We shall later note that modern 
psychological texts (e.g. Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976), do little more 
than 'hand wave' at such seemingly intractable' problems as the correspondenCe 
between the relations and the attributes of an object. In the present 
literature, the deeper problems concerned with judgements of similarity have 
effectively been trivialized to the form of simple mathematical matching 
! 
operations, in order that experimentation of a seemly rigour may be undertal<e~' 
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La ter Approaches 
One of the most thoughtful and influential reviews of this topic has been 
provided by Attneave (1950). He indicates the importance of the concept of 
. 
similarity to major areas of psychological inquiry and suggested that a 
'comprehensive analysis' was necessary. Although individual studies might 
'attack no more than a small segment', Attneave considered it unfruitful to 
adopt arbitrary operational definitions or various forms of 'similarity' 
for the various sub-problems. It is unfortunate that Gregson does not 
discuss this work in any detail, because Attneave's treatment of similarity 
models is perhaps the most clear in the whole literature, 
"It is obvious that when things are similar they are similar with 
respect to something. The characteristics with respect to which 
objects are similar may be conceptualised either as more or less 
discrete and common elements or as dimensions on which the objects 
have some proximity." (Attneave, 1950, p519) 
The main part of Attneave's paper is concerned with a discussion of the 
problems of representing a possibly complex 'psychological space' within a 
simple physical Euclidean space. Further detailed discussion of this study 
will be made in a later section .. 
Wallach's (1958) review paper was the last in the literature to seriously 
examine the philosophical and representational problems of models of 
similarity. He delineates three definitions from the literature. The first 
is traced back to Hume's discussion of similarity as partial identity. 
Similarity is consequently defined in terms of common environmental 
properties. An alternative approach noted by Wallach is to "reorganize the 
organism's selective functions" (pl05). This leads to a definition of 
psychological similarity as the making of a common response to common 
environmental properties. He shows that the third view, of similarity as a 
primary stimulation gradient follows from associationist conceptions. 
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Neural traces are thought to be laid down along various dimensions when a 
I 
stimulus impinges, and 'psychological similarity' depends on how far a new 
stimulus is from an old stimulus on such a dimension. This is effectively a 
physiological exposition of a cognitive 'space' model. Wallach also develops 
a fourth model of his own, which is really only a more complex version of 
the second. He suggests that "recognition of similarity depends on applying 
a rule which leads one to assign items to a common category" (pl06). He 
likens the idea to Kohler's term distinctive similarity, which denotes 
particular items that resemble each other more than they resemble the rest 
of the situation. This is one of the few papers in the literature of which 
Gregson is not critical and appears to form the conceptual basis of his 
classification scheme. 
Following Attneave and Wallach, the only attempt to take a general 
perspective on this topic has been the book by Gregson (1975). The most 
common role of similarity in the psychologicalliterature has been its wide 
use as an explanatory principle; e.g. in association theories of memory and 
transfer phenomena such as stimulus generalisation and retroactive 
inhibition. It is in this historically primary role that imprecisely defined 
measures of similarity measurement have caused the greatest problem. 
Attneave pointed out the "confusion and ruin" that had come to psychological 
theori~s built on such imprecisely defined similarity measurement. Gregson'S 
detailed work also indicates how ill founded many of these ideas are, and he 
puts forward various categorisations in an attempt to overcome the problems, 
He proposes a formalism for describing similarity judgements in terms of 
'levels' of relative judgement.His categorisation scheme appears to rely 
heavily on 'information' and 'set' theoretic axioms; the first two major . 
assumptions being, 
"1.31 Similarity is a function from pairs of stimuli onto the 
closed real interval [0,1], which empirically we will treat 
as a continuous variable in the context of models of 
behaviour. 
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1.32 A similarity response is made to a pairwise comparison of two 
stimuli, each of which is a- complex presentation of the form 
Signal with Noise." (I 97.5, p16) 
Another important assumption underlying Gregson's formalism is a fundamental 
split between perception and judgement. Within the process of a subject 
'making a similarity response' he considers that errors might occur "either 
because the stimulus properties are incorrectly perceived or because his 
similarity judgement process is in some way inappropriate" 097.5, p16). 
However his treatment is concerned only with judgement processes. Although 
Gregson makes a wide ranging review of literature concerned with similarity, 
as we have remarked earlier, he is dismissive of attempts to examine the 
philosophical and general use of the term. Indeed it is difficult to see how 
he might have made use of any such possible insights within the strictly 
formal model that he develops. We shall later note that Gregson's work 
clearly falls within the 'purist' psychophysical tradition. Gregson's most 
original contribution to the subject would appear to be the derivation of a 
formal notation for classifying the level of complexity of relative judgements, 
L 0: absolute judgements; a stimulus compared with the null stimulus 
noise 
L': pairwise comparison judgements i.e. between two stimuli. 
L 2: relative pairwise comparison judgements i.e. a judgement made 
between a pair of pairs of stimuli. 
L': etc 
The following operators are defined within Gregson's classification system, 
Sj is the jth signal 
N is the noise 
+ is a concatenation operator a;nd thus the jth stimulus is Sj + N 
./. represents "binary relational judgements operations" 
./1. represents an operation of relative comparison 
The levels of judgement then become, 
L O = 5 + N.I.N 
L' c 51 + N.I. 52 + N 
L2 := 51 + N.I. 52 + N.II. 53 + N.I. 54 + N 
etc 
Gregson's theory is based on the idea that judgements directly map the· 
physical correlates of stimuli, the fundamental operation is therefore of 
discrimination at L o. Gregson contrasts his model with that of Krantz 
(1972) who had ear Her developed a 'relational theory' in which a judgement 
equivalent to L' is taken as primitive instead of L o. Gregson also 
refers to another well known classification of psychological data, Coombs' 
(I964) 'Theory of Data'. Coombs' model of similarity will later be developed 
in more detail, but essentially his classification system is based on a 
distinction between single stimulus or event situations and dyadic 
situations. Similarities data is here defined as a relation observed, "on a 
pair of distances where each distance is between a pair of stimuli". Gregson 
claims this definition to be more "restricted" than his own and writes that, 
"It is clear that in Coombs' system similarities data is L 2 with 
.1. replaced by a psychological distance measure and .//. replaced by 
a distance comparison operation -." (1975; p21). 
Gregson's formal axioms require the fundamental relational function to be a 
binary operator between pairs of stimuli. This appears to be quite coherent 
in terms of 'discrim ination' at L 0 , but causes great problems when he 
comes to discuss in detail the more complex forms of similarity judgement 
tasks. In a section of his book concerned with problems in experimental 
studies, Gregson refers to similarities data derived from triadic 
comparisons to be, " L' over pairs within triples" (1975, pl04). The 
literary theories that he so decries then become quite clear in contrast to 
his consequent discussion of the "suppressed similarities" between 
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non-referent items, and the necessity to conceptualise levels" intermediate 
between L 31 and L J " (1975, p 161); which are of course logically 
impossible within his formalism. It is clear that Coombs' simllarity model 
cannot be described in several fundamental respects by Gregson's L 31, and 
should not be thought of as being 'more restricted'. In the same section 
concerned with experimental studies, Gregson writes of the many reported 
studies that are imprecise in' stating what subjects are actually asked to 
do. Gregson notes that studies "may be ostensively at L' in terms of 
instructions, but in terms of the task given at L 31, or the other way 
round." (1975, p159). This appears to be precisely the error that he makes 
himself when attempting to define his various levels. H is attempted 
description of a possible L' experimental situation is itself quite 
confused as to whether the process is one of discrimination or similarity 
judgement, and the subjects perception of the task that he describes is 
clearly at L 31 (1975, pIS). 
Whilst he recognises that 'context effects' are likely to occur with 
experiments at L 2, Gregson's formal system is not sufficiently general 
to deal with them. He notes that such considerations of context and strategy 
create difficulties, "which are enhanced as the complexity of experiments 
increases", and is forced to conclude that "it can be easier to analyse 
judgements with a model at L 2, permitting L' as a degenerate case, 
rather than the reverse" (1975, p160). Furthermore Gregson admits that 
subjects may be asked to judge on either "undefined overall similarity" or 
"with regard to specific dimensions of variation". Whilst noting these 
important effects, Gregson again cannot address them properly as they are, 
"independent of the distinction between L' and L 2 " (1975, p 159). 
The principle concern of our argument is of course to deal with just such 
problems; in particular the individual's use of 'overaJI' or 'specific' 
jUdgement strategies in their perceptions of similarity. Accepting L' as 
being a 'degenerate' case in terms of experimental specification, also does 
not support Gregson's earlier claim for greater generality over Coombs' 
model of similarities data • 
• 
44 
The main reason for the influence of Gregson's work, and our detailed 
treatment of it here, is that he was the first to propose that the 
'conte~t-distance' dichotomy is an unsatisfactory classification for 
models of similarity. It has already been made clear that the 
content-distance distinction is an important aspect of our argument in terms 
of contrasting the existing models in the literature, and putting forward 
improvements. Gregson (1976), and later Junge (1978), claimed that it is 
possible to distinguish a class of psychometric models, the 'normed 
distance' or 'point projection' models, which can be written equally well in 
'content' or 'distance' forms. Gregson has argued that Eisler's definition 
is not sufficiently restrictive in that he has shown "a wide diversity of 
ways of defining common and total content" (I976, p143). This is not 
difficult, because in representational terms it is of course quite arbitrary 
for the systems of binary attributes that Gregson wishes to assume. The 
principle argument against Gregson's claim is that it is not necessarily 
psychologically significant that, under certain constraints, two models can 
be shown to be mathematically isomorphic. For example, Roskam (I979, p224) 
shows that Tversky's set theoretic 'contrast' model of similarity can be 
.. shown to have the formal 'distance' properties of the 'city-block' metric; a 
dimensional model. Yet the psychological assumptions underlying this model 
as to what constitutes a judgement, what similarity means, and the implicit 
representation of cognitive objects are quite different to those made by the 
'distance' models of similarity. 
For further evidence that Gregson's claim is not well founded in relation to 
general models of similarity, it is necessary to examine some of the basic 
assumptions of the 'psychophysical' and the 'scaling' approaches to 
psychometrics. In the scaling approach the investigator assumes he knows 
the appropriate spatial model, or that the particular spatial model will 
not grossly distort the assumed cognitive representation. The judgements of 
similarity are treated as distances in the ,assumt;!d n-dimensional 
psychological space, and a possible specification is extracted in some 
sufficiently low dimensionality. Authors such as Gregson, and also Beals et 
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al (1968) are critical of the scaling approach which is "committed a priori 
to spatial representations of hypothetical processes underlying relational 
judgements." (Gregson 1976, pI40). However this is not a substantial 
argument in that 'data reduction' as a form of analysis is not necessarily 
atheoretic. We shall discuss later Takane's work, using the recently 
developed maximum-likelihood scaling algorithms to test alternative 
hypotheses of both representational structure and judgemental process. 
In the psychophysical approach the investigator assumes he knows the 
component dimensions or attributes, 
"- the physical specification of a set of M stimuli is known and each X in 
M can be written as a vector of measures of components xl,x2, ••• ,xt the 
components or dimensions being numbered 1 to t. The associated M x M 
similarity measures, each of which is P(X, V), a number between zero 
and one, are known empirically and can be predicted, theoretically, from 
some model Cs which takes as arguments the physical specifications of 
the stimuli." Gregson (1976, p140> 
The investigator then attempts to directly decide which combinatorial rule 
best describes how the subject uses these 'known' dimensions or attributes 
in making an overall judgement. The psychophysical approach is comparative 
in that the data is used to decide between alternative models for describing 
judgements. The term 'model' being regarded simply as some form of 
parameterized combination rule. Thus the core a priori assumption of the 
psychophysical approach is that it is possible for the experimenter to 
provide an objective description of all possible aspects of the subject's 
perception of the stimuli. It is from this very limited perspective of 
knowledge representation that Gregson extols the 'formal' over the 
'literary' models of similarity judgement. In comparing the two approaches, 
it might well be argued that the a priori restriction of possible knowledge 
systems, as against the a priori assumption of spatial representation, is 
the more serious limitation. Therefore with regard to general models of 
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similarity we shall not accept Gregson's argument that, "The simple content 
distance dichotomy is a historical mistake, best discarded" (1976, p143), 
but instead continue to regard it as an important criteria for determining 
. 
the interrelations of the various models in thE" literature. 
2.43 Distance models of similarity 
Introduction 
Due to their concern for what can be regarded as synthetic judgements of 
similarity, it is clear that many of the models in the early psychological 
literature may be characterized as distance models. With regard to the more 
recent literature, it is impossible to separate the development of distance 
models from the development of the multidimensional scaling (MDS) analyseS 
of multivariate data. The essence of MDS analysis is a distance model of 
similarity, .. 
"We conceive, then, of a psychological space with .one set of points in 
. it corresponding to the set of stimuli, and with the relations among 
these points to correspond, in some sense, to the relations among the 
stimuli as given by behaviour. In particular we conceive of a distance 
• between every pair of points in the space which is a measure of the 
similarity of the corresponding stimuli." Coombs 0964, p433) 
Critics of MDS have often rightly pointed out thesometimes circular 
relation between MDS analysis and cognitive structure models. It is 
important to note that much of the literature concerned with MDS analysis is 
not primarily concerned with psychological models of similarity. Many of the 
scaling algorithms were effectively developed as forms of data reduction, or 
for the analysis of the 'pure' scales of psychophysical phenomena. The 
underlying distance model of similarity received little consideration. We 
shall later note that psychometricians are becoming more concerned with the 
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actual processes of data generation, and with the development of adequate 
models for the analysis of more complex forms of data. The main part of this 
section wUJ be concerned with detailing the MDS models. However it will be 
useful to first broaden the discussion and examine the general use of 
notions of cognitive 'space' and 'distance' in the psychological literature. 
Cognitive space and the metaphoric use of 'distance' 
The first explicit use of the concept of 'psychological distance' can be 
traced back to Isaac Newton's use of the colour 'circle' in 1704, and the 
German psychologists of the early nineteenth century probably developed 
their use of the notion as a consequence of their studies of perceptual 
phenomena. However, Bertalanffy (1973) points out that the Indo-European 
languages have often employed spatial metaphors to express nonspatial 
relationships: long and short for durations; heavy, light, high and low for 
intenslty; and approach, rise and faU for tendencies. He quotes Lorenz as 
having pointed out that the concept of time is also represented in terms of 
a visualisable model of space. Spatio- temporal processes are implied in 
expressions such as 'the course of time', our use of the prepositions 
'before' and 'after' and the nouns 'past', 'present' and 'future'. Lorenz 
also apparently proposed the intriguing notion that the tactile space still 
has a particular preponderance over the visual. We have 'grasped' a 
'connection' only if we can 'comprehend' (begreifen, i.e., seize) it. Even 
the idea of object, (Gegenstand, that which stands against us) originated in 
the haptic perception of space. 
Some theorists in the psychological literature make explicit formal claims 
regarding the nature of psychological 'space', whilst others either 
impJicitlyor expJicitly make use of it in a purely metaphoric role. For 
example the 'dichotomy corollary' of Kelly's (1955) personal construct 
theory assumes the individual's 'construction system' to be composed of a 
finite number of dichotomous constructs; with an organisational structure of 
\ 
constructs. KeUy claims that this corollary assumes a structure of 
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psychological processes which lends itself to mathematical analysis, 
although it is not clear whether this circumstance is purely fortuitous. The 
assumption of the dichotomy corollary itself is also suspect, in that the 
Heraclitean principle of thinking in opposites has long been rega~ded as a 
limiting feature of many languages (Ogden, 1967). 
There is a general problem, in that theorists tend to describe psychological 
space purely in terms of their own analytic technique, even though it 
appears fatuous to consider that any necessarily limited set of dimensions, 
classes, chunks, etc might provide more than a partial representation of 
knowledge. In some models, the mistake is also made of confusing an 
operational definition of the measure of cognitive space with the definition 
of the concept itself. Gregson (1975) points out just such a "classic 
mistake" in the Semantic Differential theory of Osgood, Succi and 
Tannenbaum. They do not explicitly define the meaning of similarity but 
instead write, "In this representation we can 'see' the similarity between 
various concepts on all factors simultaneously in terms of their closeness 
in the space." (I 957, p89). Gregson's argument is that they have taken a 
spatial model as axiomatic, and superimposed a metapsychological explanatio~ 
after the factor analyses had been found to 'work', "The meaning of a 
concept to an individual subject is defined operationally as the set of 
factor scores in the column representing that concept." (1957, p87). 
It is interesting to note that several publications have explicitly 
addressed the issue of the spatial metaphor relating the concepts of 
similarity and distance. Cunningham and Shepard (1974) identify two distinct 
objectives in the attempts to formalize the implicit connection between 
similarity and distance. The central objective in applications of MDS has 
been to infer the structure of the underlying space. The second, which is 
Cunningham's concern, is the determination of the shape of the underlying 
psychophysical function. To this end he develops a method of analysis which 
he terms 'non-dimensional' scaling. This form of analysis may be used to 
determine whether a particular data set will be least distorted, or best 
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represented, by the assumptions of the hierarchical or scaling analysis 
algorithms. Shepard and Arabie (1979) developed a non hierarchical additive 
clustering model which is explicitly not based on any notion of distance. 
Unfortunately in order to 'escape' the distance metaphor they have to posit 
a rather simple representational system of discrete binary valued 
properties. 
l11ustrative of the communicative power of the distance metaphor is the fact 
that even those theorists who are most critical of the acceptance of the 
metric axioms, nevertheless treat similarity as a complement of distance. 
Thus Tversky writes "Similarity is a relation of proximity that holds 
between two objects." (1977, p347, my emphasis). Psychologists have often 
attempted to incorporate novel mathematical formalisms into their theories, 
in the form of explanatory metaphor e.g. the use of field-theory and fuzzy 
set theory. An illusionary enlightenment often follows from the purely 
metaphoric use of notions of cognitive space in the psychological 
literature. The power of the metaphor can give an apparent sense to an 
inherently unsound model. Several of the more reflective researchers 
concerned with the application of multi-dimensional scaling models as a 
cognitive representation have expressed concern about this issue. In a paper 
primarily devoted to questioning the formal existence of the factor model, 
despite its use for 50 years, Schonemann ends, 
"it would be unfortunate if, a few years hence, someone were to 
discover that multidimensional scaling does not exist because the' 
concept of a distance was not understood well enough." (1977, p812). 
Multidimensional scaling 
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a powerful mathematical procedure which is 
used to systemize data. MDS procedures represent objects which have been 
judge.d to be similar to one another as points close to each other in a 
spatial format. The problem that they have generally been directed at is to 
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measure and understand the relationship between objects when the underlying 
, 
dimensions are not known. The first scal~ng analysis was made by Richardson 
(1938), using psychophysical data. These 'metric' scaling procedures were 
later further developed by Torgerson (1958), but made very strong formal 
requirements of the data. The perceptual or cognitive structure of the set 
of stimuli had to be Euclidean in nature and the observations of similarity 
of pairs of stimuli had to be linearly related to distances between points 
in space. The next development in scaling analysis was the nonmetric 
'unfolding' approach originally developed by Coombs (I964). This procedure 
was most useful for describing the interrelations of the judges and provided 
little information concerning the spatial configuration of the objects. 
Ekman (19.54) ha,d also'suggested a vector model for MDS, where similarity was 
interpreted directly as a scalar product angle, an approach "that seemed to 
. , 
give complex solutions for rather simple data." (Torgerson, 196.5, p380). 
The most significant advance came with the development by Shepard (1962) of 
an 'interactive' algorithm for finding the appropriate' monotonic transform 
, . 
of the original data to the 'best' fitted dimensional structure. The 
nonmetric procedures make the weaker assumption concerning similarity, 
. 
"- that it be the complement of distance in a space of one kind or 
another." (Torgerson, 196.5, p379). This implies a monotonic decreasing 
function f, so that 
s(x,y) = f[d(x,y») . 2.43.1 
where s(x,y) denotes the observed similarity between x and y, and d(x,y) 
denotes the distance between the corresponding points in the stimulus 
configuration. The generalised distance function is given by, 
lIr 
. 2.43.2 
where the distance between points is specified in terms of K-dimensional 
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space of Minkowski r-metric. For r=2 this represents ordinary Euclidean 
distances. For r=l the distances are known as 'city-block', and for 
r=infinity the formula gives the maximum of the absolute coordinates, the 
'dominance' metric. The non-Euclidean cognitive. 'space' implied by the 
'city-block' and 'dominance' metrics is more difficult to conceptualise. 
Attneave (19.50) and Torgerson (I96.5) have shown that these metrics are most 
suited to occasions where subjects are consciously aware of the dimensions 
that they are manipulating, and in this sense, they can be considered to be 
degenerate spatial models. Arnold (1971) showed that the simple dominance 
metric provides a better account of data collected by means CD procedures 
which impose severe information-processing constraints on the subject. 
The importance of the data-collection process in this context is pointed olIt 
by Coxon and Jones, "it suggests that methods which are more attuned to the 
analytic rather than the synthesising aspects of information-processing will 
differentiate and break up the apparently refractory nature of sociological 
concepts such as 'prestige'." (1979, p39) In an introductory text concerned 
with the use of MDS analyses, Schiffman et al (I981) write, "For various 
technical reasons, however, we generally recommend that dissimilarity data 
be gathered, and that the user convert similarity data into dissimilarity 
data in whatever way seems reasonable." (p77). These authors would appear to 
be biased by the form of stimuli with which they are most concerned, the 
taste and odours of food and drink products. The advice is likely to have 
unfortunate consequences, except where the stimuli are 'simple'; i.e. they 
reaJ1y can be described in two or three dimensions. For more complex 
stimuli, the most probable outcome is for subjects to be directed towards, 
and adopt, an analytic decompositional approach to the task. Our argument is 
that they may have been thus directed towards an inappropriate strategy, 
even though the results may appear to be more consistent. 
The operation of the scaling algorithms is essentially one of statistical 
fittin~. A configuration is found, by an iterative process, whose distances 
best fit the data. The process being controlled by the minimisation of 
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some general loss function. Kruskal (1964) was the first to formally specify 
such a 'badness of fit' or 'stress' formulae, 
s = 2.43.3 
Kruskal introduced new fitting quantities dhat (x,y), which are referred 
to in the literature as 'pseudo distances', 'disparities' or 'discrepancies'. 
They are the best squares fit to the distances d(x,y) and are as close as 
possible to having the same ordinal structure as the data. There has been a 
continuous development of the MDS analyses, providing not only more powerful 
algorithms than can cope with 'noisy' data, but which also suggest greater 
insight as to the possible underlying judgemental processes. Following 
Tucker ,(1960), various methods have been developed for bringing out 
individual differences in judgement. In the INDSCAL model of Carroll and 
Chang (1970), individual differences are parameterised by individual sets of 
'importa~ce weights' for the dimensions of a common space. The PINDIS model 
of Lingoes and Borg (I978) makes fewer restrictions upon the position and 
relative rotation of the axis of each individual's 'space', but can treat 
only metric data. Ramsay (1977) and also Takane (1981) have developed 
algorithms using maximum likelihood estimation techniques, which enable the 
analyst to test both hypothetical data structures and hypothetical judgement 
processes. De Leeuw and Heiser (1980) have also recently detailed a method 
of 'constrained-MDS' which, given a testable hypothesis, is capable of 
differentiating small inter-group differences in fairly 'noisy' data. 
The implicit models of similarity in MDS 
Having charted the development of MDS as an analytic technique, we can nOw 
examine it in terms of the changing conceptualizations of the underlying 
distance models of similarity. We have aiready referenced Schonemann et aI'S 
(1979) discouraging analysis of the exploratory use of MDS as 
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"mechanical data reduction". The authors of the new confirmatory scaling 
methods (e.g. Lingoes and Borg 1978) would appear to be actively attempting 
to discourage such "blind" misuses. Roskam (1979) provides an account of the 
implications of the axiomatic propositions underlying data theory and 
mathematical models. Roskam argues that multidimensional scaling is a form 
of 'derived measurement'. He points out that there are no rules for choosing 
the right model to analyse ones data and that, 
"the domain of validity of a model has to be determined from empirical 
testing, that is: by goodness of fit (which expresses the risk 
we are willing to take) and by the criteria of plausibility and 
interpretability of results." (p228). 
Both the proponents and opponents of the spatial models have tended to 
assume that the correspondence with distance must imply continuity, that 
dimensions and directions within a space must be interpreted as 
continuous variables. However several distance models exist which allow 
more 'complex models of similarity to be examined. The idea of unfillable 
'holes' in space is not intuitively obvious, but Torgerson (1965) first 
showed how relatively simple structures underlying a set of stimuli might 
cause a 'U' shaped surface containing a space that cannot be 'fitled'. 
Torgerson has proposed an alternative structural analysis to that of MDS, 
factor analysis, and cluster analysis. 
"In the ideal type model, the spatial location of a given ssimulus 
point is given by its distance from each of a number of ideal types. 
Thus the degree of dissimilarity, i.e. the dista,nce, between a pair of 
stimuli depends on how close each is to the various ideals. The 
rationale of the ideal type model leads to representation of the 
stimuli as points in a multidimensional hyperspherical space, where 
observed dissimilarities are interpreted as angular distances in the 
positive orthant on the surface of a hypersphere." (I983, p2). 
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Theoretically the 'ideal type' model is related to both MDS and factor 
analysis, and also less directly to cluster analysis. However, conceptually 
the form of judgement that is implied clearly distinguishes it as a pistance 
model. Within Torgerson's 'ideal type' model, the similarity between objects 
is no longer described by a simple monotonically decreasing distance 
function. The distance between an object and its nearest 'ideal type' is 
effectively weighted more heavily. The 'hyperspace' mathematics underlying 
this model are fairly involved, but Torgerson (1982) has now developed an 
algorithm which implements the 'ideal type' model. This form of analysis 
would be well suited to the analysis of data containing 'prototypes' which 
cannot be adequately described by either the simple distance or the content 
models. 
Following Tversky's (1977) criticism of the scaling models of similarity, 
Krumhansl proposed a spatial model with a modified distance function, "- the 
similarity between objects is a function not only of interpoint distance in 
a metric space but also the spatial density of points in the surrounding 
configuration." (1978, p446) The 'distance-density'model effectively adds 
parameters to the standard distance equation. These might be derived from 
prior experimentation or hypothesis, 
d(x,y) = d(x,y) + ao(x) + f3l3(y) 
where l3(x) and 5(y) are measures of spatial density in the neighbourhoods of x 
and y, and a and f3 are constraints that refll~ct the relative weight given to 
densities 5(x) and 5(y). . 
2.43.4 
Tversky's criticism of the geometric approaches to similarity has already 
been noted, and will be further detailed in the next section. However 
Krumhansl effectively annuls the feature theorists' criticisms of the 
dimensional model, by proving that spatial density effects are equally well 
able to explain data 'distortions' such as distinctiveness and asymmetry. 
She does not directly reference them, but Lingoes (1978) and others have 
developed, and implemented as programs, a whole series of 'regional' 
analysis models. These are capable of 'neighbourhood preserving' 
transformations and thus incorporate spatial density effects. Roskam (I968) 
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provides a detailed theoretical basis for 'distance-density' models. His 
compensatory distance model implies some of the properties of the distance 
models, but there are "subtle" differences in terms of "the uniqueness 
specified in terms of the boundedness property" (p672). Roskam's formal 
term, a 'boundary hyperplane subspace', describes a possible model of 
intransitive similarity judgements. 
Takane and Carroll's (1981) paper exemplifies the more recent 'parametric 
approach' to nonmetric scaling, and provides a more detailed testable model 
of similarity. Nonmetric data are viewed as incomplete data and are 
considered to convey only ordinal information about distances. An 
unobserved metric process conveying complete information about 
distances is assumed to underlie the nonmetric data that is elicited from 
the subject. Takane's aJgorithms permit the user to test different models of 
error that might occur in this hypothesised mapping of the underlying 
process. It is therefore possible to examine the effects of different task 
and context constraints upon similarity judgements; an important development. 
2.44 Content models of similarity 
The origins 
The philosophical origins of the concept of similarity implicit in what 
Ekman has termed the 'content' models are clear from our earlier review. It 
was also noted that the dominant use of the word in present (English) speech 
is to describe some form of attribute matching process. Gregson traces the 
first formal description of similarity in terms of set theoretic measures to 
the 'eccentric' English philosopher psychologist Smee. His treatise of 1851 
was entitled 'The process of thought adapted to words and language together 
with a description of the relational and differential machine'. This 
machine, which would appear to have anticipated the coming 'fifth-
generation' of computers, was intended to operate a rudimentary 
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propositional calculus. Smee described his machine as being "based on the 
laws of thought", and using a Boolean like algebra, it was intended to 
convert assertions of similarity into hierarchical classification schemes. 
The reinvention of ~mee's ideas in the psychological literature can be 
traced back to the models of statistical learning, and fundamental 
measurement theory of the 1950's. The most important source is the paper by 
Bush and Mosteller which attempted to describe the process of stimulus 
generalisation in terms of "a model based upon elementary concepts of 
mathematical set theory" (1951, p413). This work is cited as a source by 
both Attneave (I950) and Tversky (I977); although it is unfortunately not 
discussed by Gregson. Bush and Mosteller define a similarity index eta (= n) 
as the ratio of the meas'ure of the intersection to the measure of one of 
the sets. Their definition amounts to an operational evaluation of n, 
"Although there are several intuitive notions as to what is meant by 
similarity, one usually means the properties which give rise to 
generalisation. We see no alternative to using the amount of 
generalisation as an operational definition of degree of similarity." 
(1951, p413) 
Bush and Mosteller consider the case of similarity between two non-disjunct 
sets Sand 5', 
11(S to S') == m(S n S') 
m(S) 
where 11(S to S') defines an index of simi'arity of S to S', 
m( ) denotes the measure of any set or sub-set 
and S n S' denotes the intersection of Sand S'_ 
11(S' to S) = m(S n S') 
m(S') . 
2.44.1 
2.44.2 
They make clea~ the tacit assumption "that the measure of an element or set 
of elements is independent of the set in which it is measured" (p416). The 
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definition of 'measure' is important, in that other than within the 
animal-learning paradigm it must signify 'meaning' in some sense. The 
stimulus situation is denoted "by a set of stimuli which is part of the 
entire universe of stimuli" (p414). The properties and number of elements 
are explicitly left undefined. The 'measure' of a finite set is then the sum 
of 'weights' associated with each element, "Intuitively, the weight 
associated with an element is the measure of the potential importance of 
that element in influencing the organism's behaviour" (p414). Bush and 
Mosteller's index of n thus takes account of variation in the relevance 
of common elements, as well as the contribution of unique elements. It 
seemed 'regrettable' to Bush and Mosteller that their definition of 
similarity is non symmetric by definition, 
"However we do not care to make the general assumption that (a) the 
measures of all situations are equal and at the same time make the 
assumption that (b) measures of an element or set of elements is the 
same in each situation in which it appears." (p416). 
They cite the example of the 'set of elements' being a light bulb in a 
small box or in a ballroom. In our later discussion of Tversky's 'context' 
effect experiments we shall attempt to distinguish between 'local' and 
'global' context effects. The former can be defined purely in terms of the 
. 
attributes of the set of stimuli, whilst the latter is conceived of as the 
reference base from which subjects try to make sense of the experiment and 
its stimuli. It is clear that Bush and Mosteller were aware of the possible 
significance of such effects and also of the deeper representational 
implications of 'defining' complete sets of elements, "Further this pair of 
assumptions, (a) and (b), leads to conceptual difficulties." (p416). 
There have been numerous amendments suggested to Bush and MosteUer's basic 
formulation e.g. Noble (1957), Restle (1959). However all of these, 
including Tversky's (1977) contrast model, can be considered to be 
generalisations rather than conceptual improvements. Noble criticised the 
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original model of Bush and Mosteller for not being theoretically coordinated 
with any stimulus dimensions. His was the first content model to discuss 
cognitive objects as 'universes of elements' i.e. as an unordered set of 
elements. Unlike later authors, Noble at least tries to make some sense of 
such elemental decomposition, 
"Some will object to this tacit endorsement of the doctrine of 
identical elements. - Unfortunately no rules can be offered for the 
definition of elements. Like the matter of deciding what a stimulus is, 
or a trial, or what events are reinforcing, psychologists must resort 
to the usual analytic and pragmatic evaluative procedures which are 
common to all natural-science undertakings. - Once the elements have 
been reliably identified, however, the problem of equality of elements 
may be solved by randomization or counterbalancing techniques within 
the experimental design." (1957, p35) 
Restle first noted that the set theoretic notions allowed a description of 
similarity that might be conceptualised other than in 'distance' terms; he 
developed the implications of 'ordering' and 'betweenness' of sets. However, 
noting Attneave's suggestion of non-Euclidean rules for computing the 
distance between objects, Restle also attempted to define similarity as a 
distance. He defined this measure as the symmetric set difference, 
"Other things equal, the degree of dissimilarity between two sets 
depends on the measure of noncommon elements i.e. the symmetric set 
difference." (I959, p20) 
Restle describes his 'elements' as the "universe of stimulus elements, cue, 
etc." (p208). Unfortunately he does not regard the case of 'other things not 
being equal', but would appear to have been aware of the important 
philosophical problem of distinguishing between 'essential' and 'accidental' 
features of an object. Tversky's (I977) 'contrast' model, which ignores the 
problem, was the first to provide an index of similarity incorporating both 
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Common and uncommon elements. Restle notes that Bush and Mostel1er's index 
cannot be a basis of a distance measure because it is not general1y 
symmetric, although the mean of the two directional n's would be. An 
index equivalent to this mean was suggested by Galanter (1956). His distance 
measure is based on the ratio of the measure of the set difference to the 
measure of the union of the two sets, 
meA) + m(B) - 2m(A n B) 
GAB = -.:-..-;~-;......:------
meA) + m(B) - meA n B) 2.44.3 
Restle argues for a generalisation of this equation which has the "desirable 
properties of additivity when sets are ordered" (p219), 
D .. = mUS. US.) n (S· (IS·)] 
IJ I I I I 2.44.4 
m~O 
The 'contrast' model of similarity judgement proposed by Tversky (1977) is a 
further generalisation of Restle's model with the addition of extra 
weighting parameters, whose significance is detailed below. 
D(i,j) = af(i - j) + {3f(j - i) - efU n jl, 
a,{3,e ~ o. 
where f is a non-negative scale and a, {3, 0, are parameters which 
determine the weights a~sociated with the model components. 
2.44.5 
Tversky also describes another possible matChing function, the 'ratio' 
model. With parameter values of 1 and 0 this is equivalent to Bush and 
Mosteller's (1951) model, and is evaluated in Tversky and Gati (1982). 
f(A n B) 
S(a,b) = -------.-;-----
f(A n B) + af(A - B) + {3f(B - A)' 
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2.44.6 
The contrast model 
In his major review paper of 1977, Tversky argued that other than in 
ps·ychophysical direct magnitude estimation studies, the response processes 
involved in judgements of similarity are not as 'simple' as assumed within 
the scaling approach. Rather than thinking in terms of dimensional 
attributes as the basis of similarity, Tversky proposed that a stimulus be 
considered as a set of aspects or features, and then defined similarity in 
terms of common and/or different features. He intended that the 'contrast' 
model be, 
"- used to uncover, analyze, and explain a variety of empirical 
phenomena such as the role of common and distinctive features, the 
relations between judgments of similarity and difference, the presence 
of asymmetric similarities, and the effects of context on judgements of 
similarity." (1977, p327). 
Tversky considers that 'recognition, learning, and judgement presuppose an 
ability to categorize stimuli and classify situations by similarity'. His 
perception of the fundamental nature of this notion is indicated in a 
quotation from Quine, 
"There is nothing more basic to thought and language than our sense of 
similarity; our sorting of things into kinds." (Tversky, 1978, p79) 
The 'contrast' model assumes a two stage process, although only the second 
is developed. In the first stage, some internal representation of an object 
as a collection of features is formed by a prior process of extraction and 
compilation, 
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"When faced with a particular task (e.g., identification or similarity 
assessment) we extract and compile from our data base a limited list of 
relevant features on the basis of which we perform the required task. 
- the term feature usually denotes the value of a binary variable 
(e.g., voiced vs. voiceless consonants) or the value of a nominal 
variable (e.g., eye color)." (1977, p329-330) 
Tversky's implicit perceptual process is effectively a 'bottom-up' 
processing of the 'complex' into a smaU number of binary attributes. This 
contrasts sharply with the 'apperceptive' processes involved in models such 
as that proposed by William James; where some form of guidance of, or 
'feed-forward' to, the perceptual processes by judgemental processes is 
developed. Tversky only develops and tests. the second stage of the contrast 
model, the possible operations of the three parameters of equation 2.44.5 in 
matching object features. The theta parameter is concerned with features 
shared by objects i and j; alpha with the features of i that are not in j; 
and beta with those in j that are not in i. Tversky hypothesizes that in the 
assessment of similarity subjects will attend more to common features, 
whilst in the assessment of dissimilarity subjects will attend more to their 
distinctive features. Thus the relative size of the theta parameter may be 
used to model differences between similarity and dissimilarity judgements. 
In contrast, the 'diagnosticity' or salience of features is reflected in the 
relative size of the alpha and beta parameters. This leads to asymmetric 
judgements whose direction is determined by the relative salience of the 
stimuli. The less salient stimulus is seen as more similar to the salient 
stimulus than vice versa. Tversky has argued that the asymmetric effects 
explained by the contrast model are equivalent to Rosch's (1975) theory of 
prototypes, "- the variant is more similar to the prototype than the 
prototype is to the variant, because the prototype is generaUy more salient 
than the variant." (I 977, p333). However a set-theoretic formulation 
requires that the concept of prototypicality be treated in a relative sense, 
where objects are defined as being more or less prototypical than each 
other. This interpretation is not accepted by Rosch (1978, p31). 
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Tversky makes wide assertions as to the power and generality of the 
. 'contrast' model of similarity; even going so far as to claim that it can 
aid in .the comprehension of linguistic metaphor. These are strong claims for 
what is effectively a three parameter matching function. The processes that 
might be considered to be of most psychological interest are 'pushed back' 
into the prior perception of features; as are the true problems of 
representation. For instance, Tversky's claim that dimensional variables 
such as loudness might be represented as a sequence of nested sets is not 
convincing, given that he has already argued against the distance models on 
the grounds of the unrealistic nature of the judgement that they imply. We 
will later note Schonemann's (I977) criticism of Tversky's experiments in 
terms of the testing of 'subjective' dimensions that are defined ad hoc by 
the experimenter. He shows that given an experimen~al paradigm in which the 
experimenter makes an a priori determination of the attributes and their 
salience, it is difficult to see how functions such as Tversky's could ever 
be falsified as formal 'theoretical' models. 
The cri tical tests 
The most serious challenge to the conceptual basis of the distance models of 
similarity came in a Psychological Review paper by Beals, Krantz and Tversl<Y 
(1968). Their fundamental criticism of scaling was that, "- the 
: representation of stimuli by specific types of distance geometry is rarely 
questioned. The computational methods in use give a 'best' answer, 
regardless of whether the underlying model is appropriate." (I968, pI27). 
Their intention was, "from the standpoint of measurement theory", to study 
the "psychological meaning" of the properties of the scaling models, and the 
"structure of critical experiments that might test them". The conceptual 
origin of their ideas were the models of magnitude estimation and 
probabilistic choice behaviour of Luce et al (I963). Luce had claimed that 
although the assumption that psychological similarities are distances was 
strong, it was not necessarily true. He considered the 'mathematical 
tractability' that followed from coupling similarity with choice theory to 
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be a greater advantage. From this standpoint, Beals et a1 proposed three 
defining measures to be used in their critical experiments, 
a) Decomposability: the distance between points is a function of 
componentwise contributions 
b) Intradimensional Subtractivity: each componentwise contribution is the 
absolute value of the scale difference. 
d Interdimensional Additivity: the distance is a function of the sum of 
componentwise contributions. 
Subsequently experimental investigations of the properties of additivity 
were made in Tversky and Krantz (1969), and of both additivity and 
subtractivity in Krantz and Tversky (197.5). This last paper will be 
considered in detail as the same stimuli are later to be made use of in the 
experimental section. The study was concerned with evaluating the 
psychological dimensions of similarity between rectangles; a set of 17 
rectangles being used. Krantz and Tversky considered two alternatives as 
possible candidates of psychological dimensions of rectangles, the height 
and width combination, and the area (height x width) and shape 
(height/width) combination. Objectively, rectangles are uniquely 
identifiable in terms of either one of these combinations. They found that 
neither combination of stimulus dimensions were satisfactory, although the 
area and shape combination was found to fit the data slightly better. Krantz 
and Tversky claimed as a consequence of the 'interaction between attributes' 
that they found, that either more complex 'psychological' combinatorial 
rules must be specified or that a model satisfying additivity and 
subtractivity must be adopted. This latter course led on to the development 
of Tversky's 'contrast' model of similarity. 
Schonemann (1977) provided an insightful criticism of these experiments. He 
developed a proof that a simple nonlinear transformation of the 'objective' 
dimensions would satisfy the test conditions. Schonemann is also critical of 
their general approach, "Krantz and Tversky first define the subjective 
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dimensions ad hoc and then check on decomposability" (l977, p164, my 
emphasis). 
Takane's (l981) 'maximum likelihood' scaling procedures, which enable the 
investigator to test various models of measurement error, have already been 
referenced. Takane tested the original hypothesis of Krantz and Tversky 
against that of Schonemann, that the perceived shape difference increases as 
the area increases. (Further details of the experiments, together with 
illustrations of the stimuli and hypothesis configurations can be found in 
Section 4.21 and Appendix A). Takane found that although Schonemann's 
hypothesis fitted some aspects of his data well, it did not capture the way 
that, "- the configuration not only diverges along the area dimension, but 
also is curved in an interesting way; curves connecting the rectangles with 
the same area levels shape like arcs drawn from a common focal point -" 
(l981, p25). Takane's 'fan' hypothesis closely fitted the data. Moreover he 
provides the interesting interpretation that it results from the effect of a 
'third' dimension, which involves pairs of stimuli being contrasted with all 
other stimuli; effectively a global context effect. 
Axiom systems 
It is clear from the review of the general literature how the contrasting 
mod~ls of similarity are crucially dependent upon the axiom systems on whic~ 
they have been developed. The mass of theoretical exposition and 
experimental work that has been built up since the original Beals et al 
(1968) paper can be shown to be insubstantially grounded as a test of the 
appropriateness of distance models. Following Coombs' general model for the 
analysis of data, which was discussed in Chapter I, Roskam (I979) noted that 
there are two decisive steps in mapping an empirical set into a formal 
metric set. The first is to convert the elements of the empirical set into 
data; by assessing certain relations. The second is to propose a 
representative model and find the best fitting representation according to 
the model. We have argued already that the first stage, deciding what 
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constitutes 'data', is psychologically primary but that for many of the 
theorists in this domain the second stage, of data description, has been the 
principle concern. 
Bush and Mosteller's (1951') choice of an elemental set-theoretic 
representation is not controversial. The intention was to evaluate 
operationally their hypothetical similarity index, and not to coordinate it 
theoretically with any 'objective' stimulus dimensions. However it can be 
argued that the same mathematical representation in for example Tversky's 
'contrast' model is a severe constraint upon the potential cognitive 
representations that might be modelled. We have shown that the later 
set-theoretic formulations have traded mathematical completeness for the 
'conceptual difficulties' anticipated by Bush and Mosteller. Furthermore, 
their criticisms of the scaling approach can be shown to be in error in 
terms of fundamental measurement theory. In discussing the axiomatization of 
representation systems, Roskam writes "a specific representation is forced 
upon the data by axiom - a representation cannot be falsified." (p659). 
A fundamental problem of measurement is to decide how much incompatibility 
can be tolerated between data and model before the model, or the data, is 
rejected. It is for this reason that the scaling methodologies are all based 
on loss functions such as Kruskal's 'stress', which serve to indicate the 
representation that best 'fits' the data. The most that can be achieved in 
terms of refuting a particular model is that, "relations that follow 
from the model are difficult to believe or do not agree with some data or 
with established theories" (Roskam, 1979, p659). The 'critical experiments' 
that Beals et al put forward have been designed within a particular 
representational model that they have proposed axiomatically. It is 
inappropriate to seek to evaluate one representation model with proofs and 
tests based upon a quite different set of axioms. The similarity index is a 
measure of sameness in the 'eyes of the researcher' which mayor may not 
reflect the relation which exists in the 'mind of the subject'. 
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"The analysis of similarity indices provides another view, - of the 
data, which must subsequently be interpreted in terms of the structure" 
of "reality." (Roskam, 1979, p208). 
In psychological terms, this means that if Beals et aI's 'component 
decomposability' into what are effectively u!"ordered sets of the objects' 
elemental parts is not acceptable, then their critical tests do not have to 
be accepted. 
Other tests 
The earlier paper of Beals et al (1968) questioned the underlying 
assumption~ of the scaling or distance models of similarity, and proposed 
critical tests of their validity. Tversky's major review paper of 1977 
introduced the 'contrast' model of similarity, and a series of experiments 
intended to illustrate its generality. Although we have already questioned 
whether simple matching functions may provide useful psychological 
explanations, some of Tversky criticisms are nevertheless well founded. For 
" instance, he pointed out that most 'distance models' of similarity had 
generally not addressed the problem of the distinction between 
similarity and dissimilarity judgements in a thoughtful fashion. Similarity 
and dissimilarity are often referred to as the simple complement of each 
other, and most of the MDS programs perm,it this transformation to be made o~1 
, 
the raw data. Coombs' view that "(We) may use similarity and dissimilarity 
at will" (I964, p433, Coombs' emphasis) exemplifies this cavalier 
approach. Tversky's experiments demonstrated that similarity and differenCe 
judgements are not perfectly negatively correlated. This fact had been 
commented on by Dearborn (1910) and in other earlier studies concerned with 
the perceived similarity of handwriting styles. However it appeared to have 
been ignored by the later literature. The feature matching modei can account 
for this effect, in that common features can be given heavier weight relative 
to distinctive features in similarity judgements than in difference judgements. 
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We have already noted that Tversky provided evidence of asymmetry in 
similarity judgements, and put forward a 'focussing' hypothesis, involving 
prototypes, in which the direction of the asymmetry is predicted from the 
relative salience of the stimuli. He also deals with the problem of 
'context' in making similarity judgements. Tversky writes that similarity 
depends on context and frame of reference, and that these are taken to 
"correspond to changes in the measure of the feature space". The example is 
given of how when asked to assess the 'political similarity' between 
countries, 
"the subject presumably attends to the political aspects of the 
countries and ignores, or assigns a weight of zero, to aU other 
features" (I 977, p340). 
Thus the 'contrast' model accounts for context effects on similarity 
judgements by assuming that the measure or weight given to the various 
features changes in different contexts. 
Besides the effect of such explicit or implicit instructions, the similarity 
of objects is also taken to be influenced by the 'effective context', i.e. 
the set of objects under consideration. It is in describing this later 
effect that Tversky comes closest to committing himself to the specification 
of any of the pre-judgement (i.e. pre-matching) processes. In discussing the 
relation of similarity to grouping or clustering activities, he proposes the 
'diagnosticity' hypothesis, 
"The diagnostic factors refer to the classificatory significance of 
features, that is, the importance or prevalence of the classifications 
that are based on these features." (1977, p342). 
The example is cited of the feature 'real' having no diagnostic value in the 
set of actual animals, but "having considerable diagnostic value if the 
object set is extended to include legendary animals -" (p342). Various 
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experiments are detailed showing the effects on similarity judgements of 
manipulating the set of objects; effects which Tversky claims cannot be 
explained by the distance models. 
Krumhansl's (1978) 'distance-density' model, which was developed in response 
to Tversky's criticism, has already been described. The principle contention 
of her paper is that all the results obtained by Tversky are equally 
consistent with her model, and that they therefore cannot be used to 
invalidate the application of geometric models on experimental grounds. 
Whilst noting the "extreme flexibility" of the feature matching models, 
Krumhansl notes that it is necessary to make additional assumptions about 
how Tversky's 'context' effects actually affect the assigned weights, 
"The model itself does not specify what factors influence how the 
weights are assigned." (I978, p4.5.5). 
Krumhansl also makes some fundamental criticisms of what are effectivelY the 
representational assumptions of the set-theoretic models. She references the 
work of Lakoff and Rosch, and points out that theories of semantics based on 
category membership are ul'1able to account for many effects in natural 
language. Category membership in terms of 'family resemblance', a network 
of overlapping attributes, may provide a more adequate description than anY 
feature or set of features. 
Tversky had argued that the dimensional assumptions might be inappropriate 
for semantic stimuli which vary in terms of discrete qualitative features. 
However a difficulty associated with feature-based models of similarity is 
that it has been found that a given property may be adjudged to be more 
'central' or important to the meaning or appearance of one object than 
another. Krumhansl also points out the known indeterminacy in semantic 
description that dates back to the work of Smith, Shoben and Rips (1974). 
She points out the possible necessity to distinguish between 'defining' 
and 'characteristic' features of an object involved in a similarity 
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judgement, 
"It may happen that a defining feature of an object, while necessary, 
may be less salient than a characteristic feature of the object." 
(I978, p460). 
As Krumhansl notes, theories of semantics based on category membership are 
unable to account for the 'fuzzy' character of category boundaries, and that 
the equivalent set-theoretic similarity models will therefore also be 
inadequate. Rosch (1978, p31) also makes a sim ilar com ment, although less 
pointedly, in introducing a chapter by Tversky describing the contrast 
model. 
In a later paper, Tversky and Gati (I982) report on a series of 4 x 4 
factorial experiments. These involved judgements of binary feature 
manipulations of plant shapes and schema~ic faces. The data from these 
studies is shown to fail the dimensional tests of 'triangle' and 'corner' 
inequality; axiomatic statements concerning permiSSible inter-stimulus 
distances within a dimensional space. They also informally describe an 
experiment involving six 'highly similar' eJipses and one circle. They found 
that the eJipses were judged more similar to the circle, than the circle to 
the elipses. It is claimed that these results are in contradiction ,to the 
predictions of Krumhansl's (1978) distance-density model; although it is not 
clear that this is so. Tversky and Gati also criticize Krumhansl because she 
inferred variations in spatial density from MDS analysis rather than 
experimental manipulation. However it could equally well be contended that 
their simple manipulations involve a limited perspective as to what 
constitutes psychological 'space'; and certainly do not constitute a 
critical test of the distance-density model. It is interesting to note that 
in this most recent publication, the 'contrast' model is reformulated, and 
explicitly described, as a dIssimilarity fUnction. Within a set-theoretic 
. formalism, this is of course merely a nominal change. However it would seem 
to further indicate the underlying analytic emphasis of the model. 
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Metaphor and similarity 
The treatment accorded to metaphor is a fundamental source of theoretical 
disagreement between the model to be developed in this thesis and the 
'feature-comparison' models of similarity. Any truly general theory of 
similarity must at least implicitly be capable of adequately dealing with 
metaphoric relations. We noted earlier in this section, that the proponents 
of some feature models have explicitly proposed that such models are capable 
of being extended to provide an explanation of the comprehension of metaphor 
(e.g. Tversky, 1977). It is contended that such an extension is only 
possible if metaphor is reduced to a form of 'condensed-simile', that this 
is invalid, and that there is a qualitative difference in the 
comprehension processes involved between metaphor and simile. 
The essential distinction between the various treatments of metaphor (and 
similarity) found in the literat~re follows directly from the different 
possible perceptions of the description and explanation of physical reality. 
The 'relativist' view is that the objective world is constructed on the 
basis of the constraining influences of human knowledge and language, and is 
thus not directly accessible. The central, and opposing view, of 'logical 
positivism' takes reality to be literally describable, and assumes that 
the medium of language can perform this precisely and unambiguously. Ortof'lY 
uses this distinction between 'constructivist' and 'non-constructivist' 
perceptions of language to relate alternative approaches to metaphor, 
"metaphor as an essential characteristic of the creativity of language; and 
metaphor as deviant and parasitic upon normal usage" (1979, p2). 
Current theories of similarity implicitly, or explicitly in the case of 
Tversky (1977), adopt the 'comparison' view of metaphor. This may be 
considered as a special case of the alternative 'substitution' view of 
metaphor, and means that metaphor is considered as no more than 
condensed-simile. Referencing Tversky's argument, Mccabe declares the 
concern with the contrast between metaphor and simile to be futile (1980, 
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pll). However her main finding is difficult to accommodate with the 
treatment of metaphor accorded by the feature models of similarity, 
"Contrary to much prior research on metaphor, context is paramount in 
determining the quality of a metaphor - the quality of a metaphor is 
essentially unrelated to the similarity of its tenor and vehicle." (1980, 
p128). We would argue for a conceptual distinction between metaphor and 
simile and a reanalysis of Mccabe's data by the author lends support 
to this supposition (details are contained in Appendix F). A comparison was 
made of the correlations between her subjects' evaluations of the similarity 
between a metaphor's tenor and vehicle concepts, and judgements of its 
quality in and out of context. For these tasks, there appears to be a 
distinct difference between the operations that her subjects made on the 
marked and unmarked metaphors. 
The model of similarity developed in this thesis corresponds in several 
important aspects to Black's (1962) interactionist treatment of metaphorical 
understanding. It is grounded in the same relativist conception of 
knowledge, with the same emphasis on the notion of 'dynamic systems' of 
ideas, rather than them being considered only as lists of 'static' features. 
Black's functional analysis of how strong metaphors work is essentially 
a development of I.A. Richards' (1939) 'interaction' view. Black describes 
the representational aspects of strong metaphor as cognitive devices for 
'showing how things are', and describes the interpretive response 
required of the reader in order to realise what lies behind the words used. 
The fundamental correspondence that can be made with the proposed functional 
model of relational judgement, concerns the processes involved in the 
estimation of the worth or 'goodness' of a metaphor. Such an evaluation may 
be viewed as being a function of the difficulty involved in creating and 
running the components of the metaphor. The sudden onset of comprehension 
is taken to be indicative of an abstractive, 'holistic' process rather than 
a conscious ly analytic feature match. The complex semantic nature of the 
elements would appear to rule out the fast but trivial perceptual models 
akin to template matching. 
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Discussion of the low level feature matching properties of metaphors and 
their comprehension misses the vital spirit of metaphor, both in its 
creatio!, and understanding. Matching the components of an analogy is 
equivalent to 'feature' matching, matching the 'components' of a metaphor is 
equivalent to merging disson'ant 'frames' of knowledge. It is not possible to 
understand or evaluate a metaphor by analytic decomposition. However just 
such a 'breakdown analysis' of analogies is their most useful function. In 
putting forward his 'feature' theory of similarity estimation, Tversky 
likens analogical and metaphoric processes. It was noted earlier, that the 
essential simplicity of the treatment accorded to metaphor perhaps indicates 
the superficiality or empty structure of the feature analytic theories. All 
the real problems of interpretation and evaluative judgement concerning 
metaphor are avoided, "The natura of this process is left to be explained" 
(Tversky, 1977, p349). It seems quite inappropriate, at least to the present 
author, to consider the comprehension of powerful metaphors simply in terms 
of the matching of features in an asymmetric similarity function. 
2.45 The concept formation literature 
It was noted earlier that the 'universal' nature of similarity has caused it 
to be differentially defined and used in many sub-domains of psychology. 1he 
major source for this review has been papers, explicitly directed at some 
, aspect of 'similarity', from 'The Psychological Review' and 'Psychometrika'. 
However within the 'Journal of Experimental Psychology' literature concerned 
with perception and concept formation, there exists an equivalent concern 
for such issues as 'features", 'attributes', 'dimensions', etc. With the 
significant exception of Tversky's set-theoretic work, there is little 
cross-referenc;:ing between these two domains. Within this sub-literature 
there exists a constant debate concerning the usefulness of the 
feature-dimensions distinction. Gardner was one of the first to note that 
although in the abstract it is easy to maintain the distinction between 
dimensions and features, 
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"- the nature of stimulus generation does not completely determine the 
nature of the processing: dimensionally defined stimuli can be 
processed as features, and feature-defined stimuli can, under some 
circumstances at least, be processed as dimensions." (1978, pl05) 
Interestingly enough Brooks (1978), in the same volume, also proposes an 
analytic-synthetic processing distinction. He takes analytic concept 
identification to mean a "- process whose direct effect is to separate 
aspects of the stimulus and evaluate their ability to predict category 
membership. The product of such a process is what is commonly referred to as 
a rule _". Non-analytic concept identification involves the category 
membership of an item being "- inferred from its overall similarity to a 
known individual or low-level cluster of individuals, where similarity is 
judged on the basis of aspects or configurations of the stimulus that are 
not weighted for their criteriality for the particular concept being 
considered." (1978, p180). Brooks distinguishes between his use of the term 
'non-analytic' from 'configural'. Configural judgements are taken to use the 
same type of information as analytic judgements" whilst non-analytic 
judgements are effectively 'similarity to special cases' and use different 
forms of information. This theory resembles Torgerson's (1965, 1983) 'Ideal 
Type' model; of similarity to prototypes. 
Our main argument against this whole sub-literature concerns their use of 
the term 'dimension'. On examination of the experimental material which is 
intended to distinguish in some way between the processing of features and 
dimensions it is seldom found to use other than 'bipolar' dimensions. Some 
researchers (e.g. Brooks) explicitly claim that their results might be 
extrapolated to a 'continuum upon the dimensions'. However most apparently 
fail to realise that their implicit redefinition of 'dimension', by choice 
of experimental material and design, renders unrewarding any critical 
comparison. Rosch (1978) claims that "features may be defined as 
pseudodimensions", and instances 'automatic' and 'standard' as levels on the 
pseudodimension 'transmission'. She continues, 
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"When the perceiver determines whether he will treat an attribute as a 
dimension or as a feature, however, he is constrained in his processing 
of the stimulus by the information properties of those modes" (p7.5). 
However by making it difficult and unrewarding for subjects to process such 
'dimensional' stimuli in anything but an analytic fashion, these experiments 
would appear to minimise any possible processing distinctions. In the next 
chapter, it is intended to discuss some of. the representational aspects of 
similarity judgements. It will be argued that 'analytic' judgements may be 
considered to be concerned with the 'features' of objects, whilst 
'synthetic' judgements are concerned with relational or dimensional aspects. 
It would seem obvious that any study in which the subject is aware that 
only binary attributes are involved, whatever else it is doing, cannot claim 
to be fully tapping the potential for relational thought. Also, although 
Brook's subjects performed above the level of chance, he reported that their 
response to the experiment was one of "- giggles and irritation together 
with a protest that they didn't know what they were doing." (1978, p172). 
Judgements of similarity in 'natural' circumstances do not produce this 
response. 
2 • .5 Summary 
It has been noted that the concept of similarity occurs in various roles and 
in many fields of the psychological literature, although both the previous 
review of the psychological literature and this critique concentrate on its 
role as a measure of the individual's cognitive structure. We have shown 
that there is some confusion in the use of the term, and that it is 
generally taken to have only a restricted meaning. In Section 2.2 we 
outlined the problems consequent on its present more limited meaning in 
general speech, but the restricted use in the literature must also be partly 
due to the added 'experimental appeal' of the more easily mathematised 
analytic perspective. We noted in Chapter 1 the means-end reversal of 
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experimental methodology being developed around mathematically tractable 
theories. Evidence for this in the origins of the content models can be 
found when Restle (1959) writes of his desire to "help in unifying the 
mathematical approaches to psychological problems", and that "the 
categorical approach has a firmer logical foundation and the advantage that 
raw data in psychological experiments are usuaU y categorical". (p219) 
Inappropriate mathematisation is a phenomenon that has occurred repeatedly 
in the history of psychology. In 1929, Boring claimed of Herbart's work that 
it, "- exhibited the not uncommon case in science, in which inadequate data 
are treated with elaborate mathematics, the precision of which creates the 
illusion that the original data are as exact as the method of treatment." 
(referenced in Flugel, 1933, p16) After detailing some of the problems here, 
we shall attempt to put forward tentative solutions in the development of a 
more general model of similarity estimation li the next chapter. 
An essential distinction can be drawn between the categorical and the 
relational representations of knowledge implicit in the various theories of 
similarity judgement. Shepard et al criticises the 'second order 
isomorphism' ideas of structural models of internal representation, where 
"any structure assigned to individual units of information or internal 
representations themselves generally take the rather restricted and 
primitive form of a simple list of discrete attributes." (1975, pI25). 
Our contention is that the reductionist approach to similarity estimation, 
exemplified by the 'contrast' model, is misdirected. Realistically complex 
similarity judgements are likely to involve qualitatively different 
psychological processes than those that might be sufficient for 'matching' 
simple single items. It is argued that the implicit mapping of the internal 
representation of knowledge of the attribute models provides an inadequate 
framework for any possible extension to more complex structures or 
processes. 
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The 'content' models effectively 'simplify' the judgement task to a problem 
of choice and weighting amongst a series of binary attributes. Their 
main concern has been the derivation and testing of simpl~ combination 
rules, and little attention is paid to the meaning of psychological 
similarity; stimulus similarity is accepted a-priori in informati·on 
theoretic terms. Whilst the mathematical proofs are extremely elegant, the 
simple representational notions underlying them are relevant only for 
decompositional forms of analysis. Similarity is taken to be a purely 
intensive relation concerned with the classification of sets of objects 
in terms of their properties or relations. Despite Tversky's claims, the 
'contrast' theory of similarity is unable to deal with the more complex 
extensive relations between concepts, or with the possible complex 
relational processes involving them, e.g. metaphor comprehension. The 
criticism is made that the 'content' models are effectively proposing a 
radical increase in the mathematical complexity of models of similarity 
judgements, with no commensurate increase in psychological validity. 
Hierarchical or additive clustering schemes are repeatedly pos.ited as 
superior alternatives to continuous dimensional representations in that they 
may more fully reveal the discrete or categorical nature of data. There are 
obviously many instances where a hierarchical representation will result in 
the minimum loss of structural information. However, an instance is detailed 
in the applied studies of Chapter 5, where even in such a case a dimensional 
representation, or the difficulty for subjects to conceive of the stimuli 
dimensionally, may still be psychologically the most interesting analysis. 
In terms of their formal mathematics, it is clear that both dimensional and 
hierarchical formalisations can be equally.well mapped into a theoretically 
. more general network model. However it is still a matter·of judgement which 
is the best representation for a particular psychological process (Holman, 
1972). Rips et al (1973) suggest that it is not the representational aspect 
of these models that may distinguish them, but the types of processing that 
they imply. We shall take up these issues in the next chapter. The debate 
has, in any case, been softened somewhat by the recent development of 
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procedures that combine the most attractive aspects of both representational 
systems. Shepard writes, "- the different methods of analysis may be better 
suited to bringing out different but equally informative aspects of the 
underlying structure" (Shepard, 1980, p397). This open-minded approach is 
obviously attractive, but suffers from the inherent danger that the analysis 
becomes mere data-reduction or a process more akin to 'picture-painting'. 
Beals et a1 (1968) claimed that the geometric models of cognitive space are 
too simplistic, and that the MDS models may adequately represent only the 
most simple associationistic models of memory. It is obviously naive to 
think that the totality of complex psychological processes might be 
reduced to only two or three 'dimensions'. The view that the dimensions (or 
factors) thrown out by the various data analysis methodologies reflect some 
fundamentally 'true' psychological dimension, is obviously untenable outside 
the most basic psychomotor domains. They are essentially a product of the 
experiment, and are in effect virtual phenomena created by the 
experimental subjects' perception of their task. However within the context 
of a properly designed experiment, it is possible to usefully manipulate 
such a small number of global variables, and successfully overcome the 
'grain' or level of description problems raised in Chapter 1. Torgerson 
(1965) first suggested such a 'virtual' dimensional analysis, in studying 
the effects of experimental instructions upon stimulus material that might 
have been considered unsuited to analysis by a distance model. He showed 
that although what he termed 'cognitive similarity', "- do(es) not appear to 
be inherently spatial or dimensional in nature - it does seem that such 
structures can always be imbedded in an appropriate space." (1965, p390). 
A danger of course is that such a dimensional interpretation might be 
invented, and that the results would be expected, but fail, to have the 
properties associated with distances. The practical usefulness of such 
'virtual' dimensions is examined in Chapter 5 in the context of an 
applied study. This involved students taking part in a microprocessor course 
being required to make dimensional similarity judgements concerning 
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important conceptual terms; which might in this case have been more easily 
manipulated in terms of hierarchic groups. Some appropriate 'movement' on a 
critical dimension may be more significant, in terms of the purpose of the 
study and interpretation, than the equivalent detailed change in cluster 
configurations. Both dimensional and hierarchical representations obviouslY 
capture elements of the data that might be missed by the other. The 
theoretically important issue, in terms of our argument becomes one of 
determining the possibility of particular individuals in an experiment 
having been required to 'operate' in an unsuitable 'mode' of thought, and 
whether this is brought out in the subsequent anal yses. 
The facility of a similarity models to be able to explain. intransitive 
judgements is considered of some importance. Tversky (1977) and Krumhansi 
(1978) indicate how the set-theoretic and dimensional models respectively 
might account for local context effects such as prototypicality. The idea of 
similarity relations having to be transitive is a consequence of thinking 
of them in a frame-free context. This of course is entirely appropriate for 
many of the subject domains that have concerned the psychometricians, but is 
claimed here to be less valid where general semantic knowledge is involved 
in the judgement task. Intransitive relations would follow from global 
context effects where one or more of the referents acting as datum might 
encourage the use of an alternative reference frame, or even a different 
processing strategy. In the language of schema matching theory, this would 
be akin to the effects of an element of 'top down' processing being 
incorporated into what had previously been solely considered as a 
'bottom-up' process. The importance of such context effects is that they 
could easily be misinterpreted as data generation error. It is often noted 
that similarity is 'not a unitary concept' but, excepting Torgerson (I965), 
little attempt has been made to explain why different strategies might be 
employed. Such 'idiosyncratic' results would tend to be lost as noise, or 
discouraged by experimental conditions. A problem found throughout the 
literature is that the methodological constraints imposed on the subjects' 
"judgements interact with the fundamental axioms of the different models. 
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The last general issue that we will take up here, concerns the theoretical 
'status' accorded to the data elicitation methodology. We have already noted 
whilst reviewing them, that the psychometric models and their notation systems 
tend to precisely define the data but not the processes involved in its 
creation. The necessity for an adequate account of the subject's perceptual 
task, must be emphasised. For example, it is a difficult but not intractable 
technical problem to analyse data containing intransitive judgements, given a 
realistic prior model of its source. Takane's work using the new 'generation' of 
theory testing algorithms has already been commented upon, and is obviously an 
important development in the assessment of data creating processes. He writes, 
"- if the data are ultimately to be represented by some model -, it is 
certainly preferable that the initial data conversion process itself is 
in some sense consistent with the representation model of the data" 
(Takane, 1981, p75). 
The judgements required of subjects in psychological experiments are 
essentially rather simple in comparison with real 'life' judgements. They 
are made apparently more complex by the imposed requirements of speed, 
accuracy, etc. These can be viewed as cueing biases towards the adoption of 
an overly analytic approach to the task, with task simplifying heuristics on 
the part of the subject made acceptable. We will later examine further some 
of the issues concerned with the perceptual and representational ,aspects of 
Similarity, as it is an issue that must be taken seriously if new models 
such as Imai's (1977), which result from the view of perception as a 
transformational process, are to be seriously evaluated. The 
consideration given to the perceptual aspects of the data elicitation task 
provides a clear indication of the thought being given to the underlying 
assumptions of any particular model of similarity. 
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CHAPTER THREE A model of similarity judgements 
3.1 Overview 
It is not intended to present a model of similarity judgement in an 
equivalent sense to the feature decomposition systems because, as we have 
previously argued it would not make sense to formally specify a model in 
this restrictive sense for what is clearly a complex, emergent process. The 
problems associated with a too dominant analytic framework for psychological 
research were introduced in Chapter 1. It was noted that the lure of the 
analytic 'scientific' method may result in a bUnkered approach to theory 
construction and experimental design. Our intention is to define t~e 
proposed model in terms of different forms of operation on particular 
aspects of object representations. It is possible to describe the nature of 
the process, and to make formal predictions concerning the consequences of 
manipulations of important components. In the spirit of the argument thus 
far, the operation of the model can best be described in relation to the 
feature analytic models as a comparison between regarding a juggler's clubs 
whilst in the air, as against being on the ground. In the latter position 
they may well be easier to specify in terms of detailed attributes such as 
colour and form, but they have lost their essential relational structure. 
In the proposed model, it is suggested that the global properties of the 
referents are synthetically evaluated in terms of their contextual 
relations, whilst an analytic 'pattern matching' of local properties is 
made. The central argument is that similarity judgements must entail both 
analytic and synthetic components. The consideration of this argument 
entails an examination of the representation of the objects being 
considered. The first part of the chapter is therefore taken up with a 
re-evaluat,ion of the analytic-synthetic distinction, and its interaction 
with the problem of representation in psychological models. A model is 
then defined in terms of differential operations on the relational aspects 
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of the stimuli. Finally a set of testable criteria are developed, and the 
possibility of their verification is discussed in terms of both experimental 
and applied studies. 
3.2 The conceptual necessity for synthesis 
The term 'analysis' means a loosening or dissolving, and by extension, a 
division of a compound into its structural elements. As against this form of 
decomposition, 'synthesis' is concerned with the construction of connected 
wholes from separate elements. Kant first proposed that every analysis 
depended on a prior synthesis. His claim ~as that if neither nature nor the 
analyst has made a prior 'putting together' then there could be no 
'taking-apart'. Conceptual analysis was therefore considered to require the 
pre-discursive 'seeing' of formal structure, within which to make 
differentiations. Both modern analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology, 
, 
. have tended to either undervalue or even ignore synthesis. However· 
philosophers such as Rosen (1980) are now arguing against the analytic 
traditIon that has dominated twentieth century philosophy. The analytic 
methodology has been thought to be comparable in clarity and correctnesS to 
scientific thought, but Rosen shows that it is just as much a subjective 
activity as synthesis or intuition. His central claim is that a broader view 
of rationality must therefore also encompass synthesis and intuition. 
Rosen shows that there can be no formal definition of the difference between 
'form' and 'structure'; essential components of any model of similarity. 
This follows from the circ~larity in the definition of structure as a 
combination of forms. If a form lacks structure it is invisible to cognition, 
and therefore the analysis of form must make prior use of the concept 
'structure'. To avoid an infinite regress, Rosen argues that we must accept 
intuition, in this sense o·f the perception of form, as an atheoretic 
cogniti~e faculty. The ct?re of any general model of similarity, whether it 
be defined in terms of analysis or synthesis, must therefore include this 
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apparently metaphysical faculty; and an infinite level of mathematisation of 
the more amenable parts of the process cannot alter this. Rosen claims that 
it is only possible to have a 'notion' of intuition and not a 'concept', or 
formal theory. A consequence would be that it is therefore only possible to 
have notions of similarity. The attempts in the psychological literature 
to develop and test rigorous formal models of similarity can only be 
maintained by restr icting the domain of interest to fields where the 
necessary prior synthesis of structure can be ignored. However, there still 
remain deep conceptual problems even if the study is restricted to common 
concrete objects. Since Aristotle's time, it has been known that the 
problem of 'logical priority' shows that the unity of substance cannot be 
reduced to the discursive list of its 'element-predicates'. For example, 
'man' is not composed of 'animal' plus 'two-footed'. Predication states 
. . 
. which properties are 'present' in or belong to, the substance, or which 
properties are 'absent' or do not belong to it. As Rosen argues, even in 
apparently the most simple case, it is first necessary to intuit the 
substance in order to then make predicated assertions about it. 
Brooks (1978) writes of the 'pervasive contrast' made between analytic and 
nonanalytic thought, 
"When successful, analytic processes are supposed to be precisely 
focussed and relentlessly powerful; in failure they stand in gross 
violation of common sense. - Successful nonanalytic processes are often 
held to be the source of deep wisdom of insight and humane qualities; 
but in failure they represent stubborn, unenlightened illogicality." (p169). 
A rigid distinction between analysis and synthesis is shown by Rosen to have 
been given up in several areas of the psychological literature. They are 
regarded only as a difference in stress and purpose, for example the idea of 
'analysis by synthesis' is common in models of perception. The essential 
argument of this thesis follows Rosen in that it is claimed that it is not 
sufficient to provide only an account of the analytic cognitive 
processes involved in making judgements of similarity. 
8.3 
3.3 The representation problem 
Psychologists often fail to consider in detail the logical restrictions 
imposed by the representation systems upon which their theories are based. 
Given an unsolved conceptual problem of representation, psychologists may 
choose to ignore it by restricting the domain of study. It is not our 
purpose here to offer a solution to the problems of representing knowledge, 
but only to detail the important aspects of representation formalisms as 
they might affect relational judgements. For instance it is necessary to 
define the 'complexity' of stimuli in the development of any general theory 
of similarity judgement. This can only be developed in the context of an 
assumed knowledge representation, upon which it is dependent. Within the 
framework of a set-theoretic conception of memory structure, Zajonc (1955) 
formalJy described complexity in terms of the depth of embedding of the 
successive levels of inclusion of a concept. Deese (1962) provided a 
contrasting definition within a dimensional model of memory. He regarded 
complexity as the measure of the amount that an object is 'thought about'; 
effectively the number of associative relations made to it. 
This section is intended to indicate the possible differentiation of the 
models in the literature, in terms of their treatment of the relational 
aspects of objects within knowledge systems. The intention being to link 
this distinction to the equivalent operational distinction between analytic 
and synthetic cognitive processes. Theories of semantic memory have 
generaHy been concerned with providing models of how people search throUg~ 
their structured knowledge to find information. Information has been assumed 
to be coded in terms of features (Rips, Shoben, and Smith, 1973) or in termS 
of networks (Collins and Quillian, 1969). At the level of representation 
these two apparently dissimilar models may be mathematically isomorphiC in 
that net relations can take the form of, amongst others, set relationships 
(Hollan, 1975). The possibility of distinction is in terms of their 
operational processes. Whilst it is difficult to envisage how the Rips et al 
model might operate in other than a strongly analytic mode, the similarity 
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and proximity relations within networks may more easily be envisaged as 
involving synthetic cognitive processes. 
Critics of cognitive psychology have often claimed that significant problems 
of knowledge representation are glossed over, and that arguments concerning 
the differences in psychological theories are conducted at the wrong level 
e.g. in terms of methodology (Putnam, 1981). It was suggested in Chapter 1 
that attempts to describe complex cognitive processes within an overly 
strict formalism may lead'to such a 'wrong level' of description. Lakoff has 
shown that set theoretic conceptions of object categories are not flexible 
enough to accord with the way that individuals actually categorise their world, 
"On the standard objectivist view, we can understand (and hence define) 
an object entirely in terms of a set of its inherent properties. 
But, as we have just seen, at least some of the properties that 
characterize our concept of an object are interactional. In addition, 
the properties do not merely form a set but rather a structured 
gestalt, with dimensions that emerge naturally from our experience." 
(I980, pI22) 
Part of our argument against the feature analytic models of similarity 
judgement is that they lead to the acceptance of just such an over simple 
model of the attributes of an object. 
Qualities and relatives 
An important aspect of Aristotle's 'differentiae of Genera' is the 
distinction made between relatives, "- all such things as are said to be 
just what they are, of or than other things, or in some other way 
in relation to something else" (Categories, 6a36), and quality such 
as states and conditions. In the modern literature a relation is regarded as 
a connection, or ordering, of two or more things. It is conventionally 
thought of as a dyadic propositional function, but may also be used to refer 
to a propositional function of two or more variables. Quality defines how 
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objects are constituted, the characteristics that they possess and by which 
they may be recognised. In dealing with the metaphysical problems of 
reality, philosophers have conventionally distinguished between primary 
qualities which exist independently of an observer, and secondary qualities 
which exist only as content in consciousness; the latter of course being the 
concern of psychology. Aristotle uses 'quality' as an abstract noun to refer 
to 'qualities as ascribed to things'. Objects are considered to be described 
by a qualification word, "By a quality I mean that in virtue by which 
things are said to be qualified somehow" (Categories, 8b25). He 
distinguishes four kinds of qualities: states and conditions; natural 
capacity e.g. health and hardness; affective qualities; shape and external 
form. An important issue that we have already noted, is that Aristotle 
considered similarity to be a necessary aspect of quality; and used this to 
distinguish 'quality' from 'substance' and 'relatives' in his theory of 
categories. 
Within this delineation of category systems, Aristotle quite clearly 
accepted that something might be considered either as a quality or as a 
relative, depending on the way that it was being considered: "Moreover, if 
the same thing really is a qualification and a relative there is nothing 
absurd in its being counted in both genera" (Categories Iia 37). In the 
modern psychological literature, Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) also 
attempt to distinguish between the relations and properties of objects. 
Whilst noting that'relations may be thought of as properties, they comment 
upon the difficulty of actually defining them at all, "What it is that makes 
a relation seem natural is even more slippery to define than the naturalness 
of a property - we must rely on intuition to ,suggest the restricted notions 
of 'property' and 'relation' that we require." (p323) 
Essential and accidental properties 
Aristotle first formalised the 'commonsense' notion of the distinction 
between essential and accidental properties of things. The philosophical 
debate has been continued in terms of attempts to define the 'internal', or 
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essential, and the 'external', or accidental, properties of objects. Related 
ideas also occur in the psychological literature. Following Miller and 
Johnson-Laird (1976), Osherson and Smith (1978) distinguish between a 
concepts core and its identification procedure. The core is taken to 
be "concerned with aspects which explicate its rel~tion to other concepts, 
and to thoughts, while the identification procedure specifies the kind of 
information used to make rapid decisions about membership" (p318). This idea 
of a context-dependent 'core' which serves most, but not all, memory 
requirements is also found in other theories of category development. 
The holistic tradition and configura] properties 
Kohler and other Gestaltists argued against the 'bundle theory' view of 
experienced units being the summation of small elements of experience; for 
example that a tune is made up of the serial addition of the individual 
notes. 'Bundle theory' has obviously been a powerful orientating factor for 
theories of classification and feature recognition, in that it is the 
essence of ideas of discrimination processes in perceptual theories. In 
contrast the notion of transposability has been a central theme in the study 
of gestalt phenomena. Certain forms retain their 'characteristic form' even 
if aU their parts are changed, for example a tune" transposed into another 
key .. The similarity between the two forms is seen to involve the set of 
relationships that inhere in the whole rather than in the parts of the 
tune. 
Shepard has noted that a consequence of computer models of abstract 
information processing, has been the tendency to assign associative 
connections between largely structureless units of information, "any 
structure assigned to individual units of information or internal 
representations themselves generaJJy take the rather restricted and 
primitive form of a simple Jist of discrete attributes." (Shepard et aI, 
197.5, p12.5) In the recent literature, Gardner (1978) has given the most 
thoughtful consideration to these important representational issues, when 
he distinguishes between the component and the holistic properties of the 
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stimulus. The component properties, or attributes, of stimuli are either 
dimensions or features. Dimensions are defined as variables with mutually 
exclusive levels, and features as variables that exist or not. This 
distinction between features and dimensions has already been, taken up in 
reviewjng the psyc.hological1iterature, together with the consequent 
problems of the use of 'pseudo-dimensions' in experimental practice. The 
critical point of Gardner's analysis is that the holistic properties of the 
stimulus may include emergent configural properties, which coexist with 
the component properties of the object. 
Procedural knowledge 
Discussion of the nature of knowledge in terms of its fundamental attributeS 
may often appear to overemphasise its static aspects. In the debate as to 
what should constitute the essential object or 'idea' of cognition, it is 
often argued that its dynamic nature must also be considered. The 
static-dynamic or content-process distinction can be traced back at least as 
far as Brentaho (1874) within the psychological1iterature, although it is 
clear that the debate itself is merely a reincarnation of the old 
philosophical distinction between 'knowing that' and 'knowing how'. His 
o influential work is seen as the foundation of 'act psychology', as distinct 
from the then dominant 'content psychology' based on simple associationist 
conceptions. Brentano conceived of the mind as an active creative agency and 
contended that the essence of experience are mental 'acts'. True mental 
activity in Brentano's terms occurs when a person 'sees' a colour; the 
sensations exist but are themselves not mental. Brentano conceived of the 
mind contemplating its own activity in that the objects of an 'act' might be 
another 'act'; effectiv'ely the notion of 'process as data'. In a more recent 
exposition of these ideas, 'Anderson (1976) regards 'declarative and 
'procedural' knowledge as parallel encodings, with distinct cognitive 
operations on the different encodings. 
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The necessity for coexisting representations 
The point that this brief analysis has been intended to emphasise, is that 
although it is obviously useful for theorists to set up distinguishing 
categories within their representation systems, their boundaries cannot be 
precisely delineated. Furthermore it appears important to the 'operation' of 
the models that the category distinctions between the representational 
entities be not too strict; i.e. that there be a plurality of encoding 
within memory. This point appears to be more fundamental than the obvious 
fact that a less precisely defined model may be more easily 'tuned' to fit a 
particular set of data. The most obvious argument is that a multiplicity of 
possible cognitive operations requires theories to invoke 'paraUel' 
representations. However it should be noted that recent discussions of the 
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representation problem within the AI discipline have explicitly tended to 
blur the distinction between declarative and procedural knowledge. Accepting 
a duality of encoding, the critical problem for the knowledge 
representation is considered to be how to make it possible for "shifting 
between levels of knowledge to occur smoothly" (Winograd, 1975, p209). 
Fodor (I976) has discussed in some detail the constraints that possible 
internal representations may have on particular cognitive processes, and on 
the general nature of psychological investigations. 
"- information must be represented somehow, and some forms of representation 
may be better than others; better adapted, i.e., to whatever task the 
organism is engaged in. - The key appears to lie in flexibility. Human 
beings apparently have access to a variety of modes of representation, 
and can exert a relational control over the kinds of representation they 
employ." (1976, p194) 
The important point that Fodor makes is that the deployment of computational 
resources, e.g. the mode of representation of information, and its 
consequent forms of processing, may itself be viewed as a computational 
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problem which "human beings are, apparently, pretty well equipped to solve" 
(p194). The consequences for psychological experiments are obvious, they are 
likely. to reveal only "the subjects capacity to figure out the experimenter's 
goals -" in terms of "the local special-purpose strategies that subjects 
devise" (p194). It is the intention of this thesis to explore this interaction 
between possible representations and processes within the context of 
judgements of similarity. 
In terms of the argument that we are attempting to present it appears most 
useful to consider a continuum of possible representations. Although it is 
tempting to attempt to differentiate between analytic and synthetic 
cognition purely in terms of process complexity, or the abstract nature of 
the entities being considered, upon considering the possible effects of 
different representation schemes, it would appear best to consider these 
processes as different forms of operation on different aspects of a 
representation. This cognitive differentiation might be most aptly described 
in terms of 'richness'; the analytic operations entail simple matching of a 
limited number of object attributes whilst the synthetic operations give 
rise to a more complex comparison of objects and the patterns of their 
relations. 
A relational formalism 
It is obvious that mathematically the distinctions made between the elementS 
and aspects of the various representation systems are not clearly distinct. 
There can be no formal distinction between relations and properties in 
that all properties may be con~trued as relational properties, in terms of 
some 'universal', and equally an abstraction of a relation can be treated as 
a property. Models of similarity must therefore accept a fundamental 
indeterminism in the mode of description of cognitive objects. However it is 
clear that properties and relations may usefully be regarded as more or lesS 
valid descriptions of how objects may be regarded within a particular 
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Context. Moreover the properties of the representation system have profound 
implications for the possible cognitive processes that can be made 'within' 
a particular representation. ~igure 3.1 shows an abstraction of a knowledge 
net, with all aspects of the cognitive objects represented in relational 
terms. In this context, qualities may be considered as local relations, 
extensional relations such as context as global relations, and intensional 
relations such as configural properties as being intermediate on the 
'local-global' continuum. Discussion of the 'complexity' of an object 
within this framework can now be made in terms of the differential regard 
paid to the various levels of the object's relations. The major implication 
of this claim is that the local 'properties' of an object are processed 
analytically, whilst the global relational entailments are acted upon by 
synthetic processes. This is in contrast to many present associative models 
of memory in the literature, where strictly deterministic analytic 
operations are made throughout the relational networks (e.g. Anderson and 
Bower, 1973). However it would be in accord with 'spreading activation' 
models of human memory (e.g. Collins and Loftus, 1975), and also 'other 
models of complex cognitive activity such as the 'interactionist' theories 
of metaphor comprehension (Black, 1962); to which we will later attempt to 
link this exposition. 
3.'" A summary of issues 
Before giving a definition of similarity in process terms, and detailing how 
its important components might be tested,this is an appropriate point to sum 
up the argument thus far in terms of the problems not adequately dealt 
with by current similarity models in the literature. The general, or in 
Gregson's terms 'literary', models have been shown to suffer from a lack of 
precise formulation (cf Section 2.42). In contrast, the formal models can be 
seen to be making very precise statements about the least interesting parts 
of the problem. Figure 3.2 is an attempt to make explicit the difference 
between the classes of models. It is obvious that both entail some form of 
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Figure 3.2 A comparison of process implications between the 'literary' and 'forfl1~1' 
models of similarity. . 
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judgement process. In the represe~tational terms that we have outlined, 
judgement in the literary models entails some estimation of 'fit' between 
patterns of relations. However for the formal models, judgement becomes a 
comparatively simple matching operation on discrete attributes or 
dimensions. It was indicated in the earlier review of the literature that 
several of the formal models allude to the complex perceptual processes 
necessary for the existence of the attributes and dimensions that their 
operation implies. However such processes are always excluded from formal 
consideration. This of course avoids the necessity to confront any problems 
of representation. In this respect, it would appear that the 'literary' 
epithet might be more fittingly applied to the formal models. 
There are three important issues that must be adequately dealt with by any 
general model of similarity: 
The true complexity of the stimulus must be accepted in that, 
"- a stimulus is not just a vacuous entity; it has properties, and the 
properties have a great influence on the type of process that can be or 
is carried out by the humans we use in our experiments" 
(Gardner, 1978, pIOO). 
The component properties of the stimulus, whether features or dimensions, 
are usuaUy all that is considered. However regard must also be paid to the 
global and configural properties, which coexist with the local component 
properties. Differences between classes of stimuli that have not been made 
expticit in a particular model of similarity may make one form of processing 
more efficient than another. The actual choice of stimulus may predispose 
the subject to use a particular form of processing, or may limit processing 
to a particular analytic or synthetic mode. A formal 'mathematical' model is 
presently only attainable with unacceptably simple models of knowledge 
representation. For example, the restrictions on the set theoretic 
representations means that they may only deal with intensional and not 
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extensional relations. They therefore cannot deal adequately with the 
development of prototypes, or the relative importance of different aspects 
of the stimulus; aspects of cognition which have been shown by Rosch (1978) 
and others to be of crucial importance (cf Section 2.44). 
Task definition must be accepted as an important determiner of cognitive 
processing. The adoption of different cognitive processes, or the 
differential efficiency of processes, may be the consequence of apparently 
unimportant aspects of the task set to the subject. For example, constant 
reference may be found in the literature to the disparities found between 
judgements of 'similarity' and 'dissimilarity', although a satisfactory 
theoretical reason for this is seldom provided. (e.g. Schiff mann et aI, 
1981) 
Ignoring the context in which the judgements are made causes the 
experimenter to miss the true variety and complexity of human cognition. It 
is necessary to accept the intrinsic conflict between contextualism and 
systematic description. Although a phenomenon may apparently vary from 
context to co'ntext in a way that apparently defies fixed rules, it is often 
still possible to derive a systematic model of the concept. As for example, 
is accepted with the notions of subjective probability and utility within 
the field of decision theory. 
The sum of our argument then is that models of similarity must incorporate 
some perceptual element, that judgements of similarity must be seen as a 
balance between analytic and synthetic processes, and that a misplaced 
rigour in the attempted formalism will tend to be counterproductive in ter fl1S 
of a model'S validity and generality. 
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3.5 A functional model of similarity and its consequent process effects 
"In imperfect similarity, however, the only specific implication is -
likeness of nature in the relations." Herbert Spencer (I881, p259) 
A statement of the model 
Judgements of similarity involve an operation of correspondence 
between objects of cognition, and are always made within some context. 
The operation of correspondence is made in terms of a projection of 
the object's functions within the the individual's meaning space. 
Aspects of the model 
• The projections of the objects may be viewed as being more or less complex. 
• Simple objects would normally be regarded in terms only of their 
qualities. 
• More complex objects would also be regarded in terms of relations. 
• The purpose for which the correspondence is made, is considered to be' 
a facet of the context. 
• The context of the correspondence, and the complexity of the objects, wiU 
result in a bias towards different 'processing' strategies. 
• The strategies may be thought of as being either analytic or 
synthetic in function. 
• A consequence of the possible different operations, is that the context 
within which the correspondence is made determines the relative 
salience of the qualities and relations which define the individual's 
perception of the objects. 
• A local context would cause only the qualitive nature of the 
object to be attended to. 
• A more general context would also cause its relational aspects 
to be considered. 
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A development of the terms of the model 
The use of the term 'projection' by Wittgenstein was outlined in Section 2.3. 
Similarity judgements are taken to be made of an abstract projection of 
the entities in terms of their functions. It was noted that this notion of 
projection rules corresponds to the distance models of similarity, and that 
'function'in Wittgenstein's terms is equivalent to Herbert Spencer's phrase 
'likeness of nature in the relations', which was detailed in Section 2.42. 
We earlier invoked a comparison with a set of juggler's clubs in motion. 
Function here would refer to the system of relations operating on the clubs. 
Mor~ formally, and within the framework indicated by Figure 3.1, function is 
taken to refer to the global extensional relations of the cognitive objects 
such as context. 
In his development of a taxonomy of possible cognitive systems, Fodor (198;) 
uses the term 'isotropic' to describe' such global systems of relations. His 
argument is based on the philosophy o~ science due to Quine (1964), which 
demands that due regard be paid to the interconnectedness of ideas. Quine 
maintained that it is only the total system of assumptions in which a given 
statement is an element that can be subjected to experimental test. It is 
therefore not possible to fix the meaning of isolated statements. Our use of 
the term 'global' is taken to be equivalent to Fodor's phrase 'Quinnean or 
isotropic' in describing the functional interdependence of systems of 
relations. 
The distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements has a long 
philosophical history, and the necessity to introduce some aspect of 
synthesis in the perception of similarity has already been discussed. It 
is a relatively useful distinction found in various equivalent guises 
throughout the psychological literature, e.g. as visualiser-verba!iser, 
holist-serialist, leveler-sharpener, etc. Studies using these terms tend 
to concentrate on aspects of individual differences. Our concern here though 
is only the facilitation of more or less appropriate cognitive processes by 
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aspects of stimulus complexity and general context. 
The term 'synthetic' is preferred to 'holistic' as it does not have the same 
image orientated connotations; the terms not usuaJly being distinguished in 
the literature. Although it must be accepted that analytic categorisation 
processes are an essential part of human thought, our argument is that 
psychological models should not concentrate on the analytic to the exclusion 
of the equally important synthetic and abstractive thought processes. Models 
of the analytic cognitive processes have had a more respectable allure, as 
they are amenable to (apparently) explicit formal models and experimental 
manipulations. Analytic models are also relatively easy to specify in terms 
of explicit processes, states etc. However we noted in Chapter 1 such 
problems as that of the 'hidden executive' in AI production system models. 
In discussing possible factors that might affect judgements of similarity 
Tversky refers to tt_ the effective context (i.e., the set of objects 
under consideration)" (1978, p81). Context effects for the feature analytic 
models, have only the restricted meaning of the relative salience effects of 
attribute features; and would be defined as purely local relations within 
our model. It cannot therefore refer to contextual cueing of extensive 
relations which we have argued, and intend to prove, must also be taken into 
consideration. Although Tversky and Gati (1982) use stimuli such as the 
names of c~untries, which appear to be conceptually rich in terms of the 
context that they might imply, the experimental manipulations and 
instructions effectively cause subjects to concentrate on matching their 
Simple attribute features. (cf Section 4.22 for a discussion of Tversky's 
exper imental instructions.) 
We have already referred to the use by the philosophers of the 'qualities' 
and 'relatives' of objects in their categorisation schemes; and Gardner'S 
(I978) derivation of the equivalent 'content' and 'configural' aspects of 
the stimulus. A critical assumption of the proposed model is that complexity 
is a subjective perception involving the intensional 'qualities' and the 
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qualitatively different extensional 'relatives' of the object. In discussing 
the problems of testing experimentally the various probabilistic scaling 
models, Zinnes comments: "For interesting complex stimuli, subjects 
[perceptions] seem to change systematically over time." (Zinnes and MacKaY, 
1982, p47). Our argument would be that the subjects are not 'seeing' some 
new attribute each time that they are asked to make repeated or different 
judgements, but extending the system of relations that contribute to the 
meaning of the object for them. 
3.6 The operation of the model 
An important aspect of the proposed model is not original. We have already 
noted that the models proposed by Spencer, James and Kulpe implicitly 
involved a 'top-down' apperceptive component (cf Section 2.42). What is 
being attempted here, is an examination of the implications of incorporating 
such a process in both experimental and 'real-life' similarity judgement 
tasks. This must involve a consideration of the representational aspects of 
compared objects, particularly in terms of the conditions and expectations 
set up by actual experiments and task conditions. The most adequate way of 
describing the proposed model is as we have just outlined, in terms of 
process effects and interactions. It is sometimes useful to think in terms 
of the implicit 'executive' of a particular c~gnitive model (cf Section 
1.4). The decision criterion for the the executive of the feature 
matching, or 'content', models would simply involve the number of attributeS 
to compare, together with some arbitration rules to cope with partial· 
matches. In the same trivial sense that any analogue process may in theory 
be replicated by a digital simulation, then so it must in principJe be 
possible, at a certain level of reduction, to describe any comparative. 
judgement purely in terms of attribute matches. However we have already 
noted that in the case of judgements as complex as those we wish to deal 
with, that this description would then be at the 'wrong level' (cf Section 
1.4). It is argued that in executive terms, the modeJ proposed here must 
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operate at a qualitatively different level and with regard to more complex 
memory representations. The unit of representation of the process model is 
assumed to be at the level of complete 'frames'. For example ,in the study 
detailed in Chapter 5, it makes less sense to think of the pen pictures 
describing the children's school activities in terms of fragments, than as 
complete situations. 
We have already noted that Brooks (1978) provided one of the few reviews of 
the effects of the dominance of the analytic tradition on experimental 
design, and details its consequences. He introduced the notion of 
'nonanalytic' thought and develops various category formation experiments 
which facilitate the adoption of such cognitive processes. The important 
point is made that a wide range of human cognition cannot be described by 
strict rule systems entailing completely centralized and integrated control. 
In many cases a general rule can be overridden by information particular to 
instances. It is interesting to note that whilst developing an 
analytic-nonanalytic distinction, Brooks effectively distinguishes between 
forms of similarity judgement, 
"- there is no reason why analysis has to be so smart or nonanalysis so 
dumb. To me, the term analogy suggests a nonanalytic mechanism with 
a similarity device in which there is a contro! or editing stage to 
soften the blow of unrestrained physical resemblance" (p199). 
To exemplify the possible operation of such a mechanism Brooks instances the 
case of a chess master not knowing how three possible moves come 'into his 
mind', but knowing that they must then be analysed in terms of their worth. 
It would ~it best with the development of terms that we have attempted thus 
far if 'likeness' were substituted for the phrase 'physical resemblance'. 
The term 'resemblance' could then be used to describe the operation of 
Brooks' 'similarity device'. We might note that here there does not seem to 
be any important distinction between Brooks' use of 'nonanalytic' and the 
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term 'synthesis' which has a longer tradition; and also appears to suggest a 
more positive definition. The more substantial comment could also be made 
that the analytic-synthetic distinction within similarity judgements should 
not be arbitrarily assigned as a function of some executive mechanism 
switching modes, but be viewed as an intrinsic function of the representation 
necessary for particular operations. 
Eliminating the executive 
We have already outlined a local-global continuum of representation, in 
respect to which we wish to outline the operation of analytic and synthetiC 
processes. The most simple forms of analytic judgement can be thought of as 
operating only upon 'local' aspects of the representation. More powerful 
forms of analytic judgement than that exemplified by Tversky's 'content' 
model, would also operate on more complex relational aspects, e.g. 
configural part-whole relationships. The essential operation of synthetic 
processes can be described in terms of their greater concern for the global 
aspects of the object; for example the effect of active organizing schemata 
(Bartlett, 1932) on new items of knowledge. 
The crucial distinction made in this model, is that in the analytic case 
immediate correspondence operations may be made on the 'data' -
representations, whilst in the synthetic c~se the 'code' representations 
must first be evaluated. The synthetic processing of a representation that 
is not immediately available, but requires some prior evaluation, resembleS 
the workings of Minsky's (1975) frame theory. The necessity for a complex 
'unpacking' operation in order to evaluate the relevant relational aspects 
of an object, is of course the consequence of adopting a serial architecture 
model of human cognition. The parallel search operation implicit in the 
'spreading-activation' models might perform an equivalent function. The 
argument that Anderson (1983) presents can effectively be simplified to a 
dichotomy between planned 'serial' operations and automatic 
, 'parallel' ones. 
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An analytic evaluation concerned with either local or configural aspects 
might take the form of a simple arithmetic counting function. However a 
synthetic process would have to be modeled by a more complex proximity 
operation, functioning in some sense 'within' the representation. As a 
consequence of these process and representational implications of the 
different operations, a fundamental distinction can also be made in terms of 
their relative accessibility to the individual making the judgement. It 
would be reasonable to expect quite explicit protocols concerning reasoning 
strategies and the attributes being considered in the consciously 
immediately available analytic case. However the synthetic operations are 
only likely to be available for report or introspection in terms of 
'feelings' such as those reported by Dearborn (1910) following his 'ink 
blot' experiments (cf Section 2.42) • 
3.7 Experimental tests of the model 
The essential claim of the proposed model is that the analytic component of 
judgemental tasks is concerned with the qualitative aspects of the object 
and the synthetic component with the relative aspects. The most important 
parameters within the model, and which it is claimed will differentiaJJy 
effect the subjects's cognition, are the 'complexity' of the objects and the 
'context' within which the judgements are made. It is possible to 
formulate a general proposition concerning their interaction of the form, 
PI: An adequate description of the discernment of similarity cannot be 
made in terms of a single simple operation, e.g. the simple matching 
operation of the 'contrast' model. 
Also, more detailed experimental tests of the proposed model are entailed by 
the following proposition, 
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P2: As a consequence of content and contextual cues the individual will 
adopt different processing strategies, and pay differential regard to 
aspects of the objects being considered. 
Two experimental investigations of these effects are detailed in the next 
chapter, involving manipulations of object complexity and context. A set of . 
three applied studies are also developed in Chapter 5 in order to provide 
the breadth of evaluation discussed in Chapter 1. The two main analytic 
criteria used are the analysis of behavioural protocols and a psychometric 
analysis of the subject's derived cognitive 'space'. Behavioural protocols 
provide an indication of the information acquisition strategies being 
employed as a consequence of experimental manipulations. Statistical 
analysis of the similarities data that is elicited from the subjects 
.. . 
provides some indication of the prefered internal representation and 
cognitive process employed by the subjects. These will be discussed in 
more detail in the next chapter, in the context of the various forms of 
data obtained. 
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CHAPTER FOUR Experimental studies 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter details two studies intended to indicate how the feature 
analytic models of similarity estimation do not adequately describe aJJ 
possible aspects of the individual's estimation of similarity. The studies 
were designed to support the argument that a truly general model of such 
judgements must also encompass a synthetic approach t-<? the task. 
The first study was made to indicate the importance of global context for 
this form of relational judgement. The way in which subjects may create a 
general contextual interpretation of the stimulus set, as a result of their 
understanding of the judgement task, is contrasted with the 'local' context 
effects which are conventionaUy studied. The latter are only immediately 
related to the explicit stimulus features and therefore necessitate only an 
analytic form of judgemental processing. It is argued that a truly general 
context effect wiU also involve some change in the perceived importance of 
the relations of an object, and thus involve some form of synthetic 
processing. It was noted in the development of the functional model of 
similarity in Chapter 3, that the feature models cannot account for such 
perceptual differences, except in an ad hoc fashion by postulating 
additional feature components in the individual's object representation. The 
methodological problems consequent on the attempt to control for global 
context, by effectively setting experimental tasks within contexts that are 
personally meaningless to subjects, are also discussed in relation to this 
study. 
The second experiment is concerned with similarity judgements concerning 
two, three and four dimensional data matrices transformed into conventional 
bar charts or into appropriately graded cartoon faces (Chernoff and Haseeb, 
1973). The latter format was considered especiaJJy likely to facilitate a 
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more holistic form of comparative judgements. Use was made of video 
protoc?ls of the subjects' performance in order to confirm the predicted 
distinctive approaches being made to the task. 
The analysis of both these sets of data is made in terms of their 'fitting', 
or being adequately described by, the formal assumptions of dimensional 
models of psychological space. The purpose of these studies is therefore not 
only to elucidate possible processing and context effects in the similarity 
judgement tasks, but also to provide a set of theoretical 'benchmarks' for 
the various multidimensional scaling analyses. Because of the artificial 
stimulus formats, and the availability of video protocols of performance, it 
is possible to make use of the analyses of these simple data to 'calibrate', 
or at least find the most important parameters of, the various analytic 
techniques. For example, the importance of different levels of 'fit' to 
prior configurations, and the relative difference of group weightings on the 
derived dimensions. The more controlled experimental studie~ may be seen as 
providing 'external' evidence for the relative facility of the various 
psychometric techniques used to distinguish between judgements that are 
'known' to be the outcome of particular forms of judgemental processing. The 
same analyses may then be extended to the data elicited in the mor~ compte" 
settings of applied studies. 
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4.2 Experiment 1 - Context effects 
"A satisfactory theory of human cognition can hardly be established by 
experiments that provide inexperienced subjects with brief opportunities 
to perform novel and meaningless tasks." Neisser. (I976) 
4.21 Rationale 
This experiment investigates the effects of gJobaJ context in similarity 
estimation. As was noted in Section 2.5, researchers in this field have 
tended to treat context in only a very limited fashion. It is usually taken 
to mean simply the presence or absence of a limited number of redundant 
attribute features. In this study an attempt is made to investigate the 
effects on similarity judgements of the reference 'frame' that subjects may 
impose on their judgements in order to make some personal sense of the 
experimental task. The impetus for this study came from a pilot study using 
the Krantz and Tversky (1975) rectangles stimuli. Several subjects (who were 
not psychology students> felt unable to complete the judgement task without 
first asking what the rectangles 'were'. Dearborn (1910) had reported 
similar problems with subjects who though of his ink 'blot' stimuli as 
'birds', and wished to make their judgements of them as such. Gregson also 
refers to the probably under-reported event of subjects being either unable 
or unwilling to comply with experimental instructions, 
"- the studies - have not been consistently successful. - subjects have 
had to be discarded because they 'did the wrong thing' and followed 
implicit instructions of their own devising - ." (J 975, p66) 
The purpose of this experiment was simply to provide groups of subjects with 
different meaning 'frames', which might be expected to make some personal 
sense to them, in a controlled fashion. As this stimulus set is ideally 
suited to the investigation of area and shape biases, frames were chosen 
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that might be expected to emphasise these effects; subjects were asked to 
'think ~f' the rectangles being used as either skylights or as mirrors. 
The Krantz and Tversky study was discussed in Section 2.44 together with the 
critique by Schonemann (1977), and the reanalysis by Takane (1981). The· 
various constrained solutions for the rectangles stimulus set are shown in 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2. Krantz and Tversky were concerned that the rectangles 
should appear 'squat', to overcome a possible area illusion of tall 
rectangles appearing bigger than shorter ones of equal area. However 
Schonemann (1977) and then Takane (1981) have shown that the most 
significant problem with this stimulus set is the effect of perceived shape 
differences increasing as area. increases, as is represented in Figures 4.3 
and 4.4 respectively. Full size copies of the stimulus material are 
contained in Appendix A, but some idea of their relative shape can be 
gained from Figure 4.5. The stimuli appear more to resemble mirrors and 
skylights when rotated 90 degrees, and so were used in this orientation for 
all three groups. The dimensions of the stimuli were created by Krantz and 
Tversky to fit orthogonal coordinates in log width x log height dimensions. 
All the studies, including this one, have found unconstrained scaling 
solutions that approximate to this log x log space. For this reason the 
later constrained ALSCAL analyses are made in terms of both the actual 
physical coordinates and also their log transform. 
The 'rectangles' stimulus set was designed to test 'additivity' and 
'multiplicitivity' effects in similarity judgements. Both the original data. 
set, and replications of the experiment, are frequently employed to test the 
various MDS algorithms in terms of their ability to 'test' various models of 
judgement. However all the studies with this stimulus set have been partly 
confounded by the problem of large inter-subject differences. Takane (1981) 
points out this problem, and circumvents it by requiring a single subject to 
make paired similarity judgements for several hours a day over the course of 
a week. The obvious danger with such a long drawn out procedure is that the 
individual's judgements may be b~ing 'worn down' to a personally meaninglesS 
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Constrained solution under 
the area (horizontal) and shape 
(vertical) factorial hypothesis. 
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Figure 4.2 Constrained solution under 
the width (horizontal) and height 
(vertical) additivity hypothesis. 
Figure 4.3 Schonemann's hypothesis that the perceived shape differences increases as the area 
increases 
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Figure 4.4 . Takane's proposed alternative hypothesis to Schonemann's 
7 
Figure 4.5 Takane's unconstrained two-dimensional solution for his data 
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consistency. A possible reason for the degree of individual differences 
found in other studies with these stimuli is that subjects may be attaching 
different personal meanings to the word 'rectangles'; in order to maintain 
concentration for the hour or so that they are required to make judgements. 
The unconstrained solution obtained by Takane for his singJe subject is 
shown in Figure 4.'. Neither Krantz and Tversky nor Takane discuss the 
alternate hypotheses, i.e. the 'area-shape' factorial hypothesis or the 
'width-height' additivity hypothesis, from other than a measurement 
theoretic viewpoint. However it is clear in the context of our argument, 
that they could imply quite different cognitive operations on the part of 
the· subjects. Thinking of the rectangles in terms of their component 
attributes of height and width could be considered equivalent to an analytic 
cognitive operation, whilst regarding them in terms of their relative 
ratios, i.e. area and shape, as a synthetic operation. Due to their greater 
familiarity, the skylight and mirror 'frames' would be expected to 
facilitate synthetic processing of global relational structures, and 
consequently fit better the area-shape hypothesis. 
The experimental investigations are thus made in terms of the general 
proposi tion, 
PI: The instructions to subjects to consider the rectangles as 
'rectangles', 'skylights' or as 'mirrors' will cause them to 
consider the same set of physical stimuli in different ways. 
and the following experimental hypotheses entailiAg dimensional salience 
effects, 
HI: Subjects given the instruction to think of the rectangles as 
'skylights' will pay relatively greater regard to the area of the 
rectangles; as would be evidenced by a relatively greater 
dimensional weight apportioned to the 'area' dimension in a 
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constrained scaling analysis made under the 'area-shape' 
hypothesis. 
H2: Subjects given the instruction to think of the rectangles as 
mirrors wilJ pay greatest regard to the shape (i.e. the 
width/height ratio) of the rectangles; as would be evidenced by a 
. greater dimensional weight apportioned to the 'shape' dimension 
in a constrained scaling analysis made under the 'area-shape' 
hypothesis. 
H3: Subjects thinking of the rectangles as 'rectangles' would be 
more likely to make analytic judgements concerning the separate 
aspects of the stimuli, and less likely to think of the stimuli 
synthetically in terms of dimensions. This would be reflected in 
relatively higher 'stress' levels, and lower RSQ values, for the 
'rectangles' group in constrained scaling analyses. 
4.22 Method 
Stimulus material This consisted of 17 rectangles made from thin black 
card mounted onto small plain white index cards, each completed card being 
then covered in transparent protective film. A random four digit number was 
printed on the back of each card for identification purposes. The relative 
proportions of the sets of 17 stimulus cards were as detailed in Krantz and 
Tversky (1975). The proportions of nine of the stimulus items can be seen in 
Figure 4.5, and examples of full size stimulus material can be found in 
Appendix A. 
Design The experiment is of a 'between subjects' design with three 
groups, the 'rectangles' group, the 'skylight' group, and the 'mirror' 
group. 
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Subjects and sessions Five subjects were randomly assigned to each 
group; this being a convenient number for applying a group correction factor 
in the intended MAXSCAL-4 analysis (Takane, 1981). The subjects were all 
second and third year students at the City of London Polytechnic taking a 
variety of Social Science courses. It was necessary to run the experiment in 
two separate sessions because of the amount of space required by each 
subject. The sessions were held consecutively so that subjects might not 
communicate with each other. Subjects who had to 'sign up' as being 
available at the time of both sessions were randomly assigned to either 
session, and within sessions to one of the three groups. They were each paid 
£ 2 for taking part in the experiment, which took one hour to complete. 
Procedure The three groups were required to make judgements of 
similarity concerning the stimuli. The 'rectangles' group received a set of 
instructions which implied that they were to treat the stimuli as 
'rectangles'. In the other two groups, subjects were asked to think of the 
rectangles as representing either mirrors or skylights, the 'mirrors' and 
the 'skylight' groups respectively. It was emphasized that whilst making 
comparisons they should think of the 'mirrors' (or 'skylights') as they 
would normally be used. In the original Krantz and Tversky experiment, a 
paired dissimilarity measure was used. It is interesting to note that their 
implicit model of similarity as a form of partial identity is made clear in 
the experimental instructions used, 
"- if the rectangles are almost identical, that is, the dissimilarity 
between them is very small, mark X -" (1975, p14) 
In this experiment, the reference ranking procedure for eliciting similarity 
judgements was adopted (Young, 197 5)~ and is detailed in the instructions 
below. This method has been shown by Young to provide accurate and stable 
similarities data. Even more important for the purposes of this experiment, 
it was found that subjects much preferred it to the paired similarity task, 
because it appeared to 'make sense' to them whilst they were carrying it 
out. 
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From trial studies it was known that subjects found it difficult to sustain 
concentration for more than about 50 minutes in this form of task, and that 
after that order of time the quality of the data obtained becomes so low 
that it leads to progressively increasing 'stress' levels. Both analysis 
programs are capable of staJjle solutions even with large amounts of 'missing 
data'; and particularly so when the analysis is constrained, or 'fixed', in· 
terms of an initial, i.e. hypothesised, stimulus configuration. Therefore 
the analyses were made using only six of the seventeen stimuli as referent 
items, but with all seventeen stimuli present in each case. Each subject 
received the same item first, chosen from the eleven non-referent items. 
This 'referent' was intended only for practice, and was not made use of in 
the subsequent analyses. The following numbers in the referent item list for 
each subject consisted of a randomized ordering of the same six referent 
items, followed by four others from the subset not used. These w~re added SO 
that no subject would feel 'left behind' by others finishing before them. It 
was emphasized that the subjects should proceed at their own pace, and that 
they were not expected to finish all the items. 
Instructions ( The phrases in square brackets represent the different 
i~structions given to the mirror and skylight groups. ) 
You will find a set of cards in front of you. Each card has a black ' 
rectangle drawn on it, and on the back of each card there is a number 
printed. These numbers have been chosen quite randomly, and are only 
intended to identify the cards. [[ou are asked to think of the rectangles as 
representing mirrors (skylights).] Please spend a few minutes now looking 
through the cards [, as you do so thinking of them as they would be us~d as 
mirrors (skylights)]. I suggest that you make comparisons between the cardS 
to see how they vary • 
. ( The subjects were allowed three minutes to look through the cards here, 
and then the randomized sequence sheets were distributed. ) 
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You have now been given a piece of paper containing a list of numbers, 
and will have to repeat the following instructions several times: 
1. You should find the card which has the first number printed on it 
and place it on the left 'of your table, with the rectangle [mirror 
(skylight)] facing upwards. 
2. From the remaining cards, you should choose the rectangle [mirror 
(skylight)] that you think is most similar to the one that you first 
. put down. [Please remember to imagine the mirrors (skylights) as 
they would normally be used whilst you think about them.] 
3. You should now place this card next to the first one with its 
number facing upwards. 
You now have to repeat steps 2 and 3 until all the cards have been arranged 
from left to right across the table. You should complete the task at your 
own pace and please remember that there are no right or wrong answers; I am 
only interested in how you think about it. 
( The subjects were then verbally instructed to turn over the reference 
cards, and tQ write down aJl the numbers from left to right in a booklet. 
They were asked to cross off the first number in the Jist and to shuffle the 
cards thoroughly. The subjects were then told to repeat steps 1, 2 and 3 
using each number in turn from the Jist. It was emphasized that they should 
proceed at their own pace, and that they were not expected to complete the 
task using all the numbers on the list. Also it was reemphasized that, 
there were no right or wrong answers. ) 
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4.23 Results 
. 
Programs Analyses were made using the general non metric scaling program 
ALSCAL version 4.01 (Takane et aI, 1977) and the maximum likelihoods scaling 
program MAXSCAL-4 (Takane and Carroll, 1981). As with the other scaling 
programs capable of an 'individual differences' analysis (e.g. INDSCAL), one 
of the main output plots provided by the ALSCAL program is of individual 
dimension weightings (e.g. as in Figure 4.6). It is important to note that 
although stimulus space plots are conceptually in some true dimensional 
space, the plots of the individual subjects' dimensional weights must be 
interpreted as the end points of vectors. The angles of the vectors indicate 
the relative dimensional weighting, and the length of the vectors the 
average dimensional weighting. The sampling distributions of these 
parameters is unfortunately unknown. This together with the effects of the 
complex group norma1iz~tion and centering operations made on the data 
matrices have thus far m~de it impossible to determine a valid significance 
test for group differences in angUlar variation. 
The RSQ value output by ALSCAL is a group measure indicating the proportiort 
of variance accounted for by the model being tested. This value is regarded 
as the most appropriate measure of the degree of fit between the 
hypothesized model and the data, as the various 'stress' measures can be 
seriously effected by the number of, and the disparity between, data 
matrices (Takane et al 1977). In the case of the various analyses made here, 
the RSQ values reported may be interpreted in terms of the proportion of 
variance in the data accounted for by the particular hypothesis on which the 
solution is 'fixed' or constrained. 
. . IJ 
The MAXSCAL-4 program fits the simple un weighted Euclidean distance mode :1 
a method of maximum likelihood. It provides several statistical criteria for 
model evaluation, in particular the AIC statistic; a chi-square goodness of 
fit to hypotheses representing structural assumptions about the stimulus 
configuration. The possible analyses using constrained solutions that may be 
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made with the series of programs are quite unlike those obtained by using 
'fixed' configuration analyses with other scaling programs, e.g. INDSCAL and 
ALSCAL. Equivalence rather than absolute constraints are imposed on the 
position of the stimuli, e.g. that 3, 4 and .5 should have the same V-coordinate 
and that 1, 2 and 3 should have the same X-coordinate. It is therefore 
possible to constrain the relations of only a subset of stimuli, or even to 
constrain aU but one. (This last form of analysis is made later in one of 
the applied studies, as it is useful for evaluating hypotheses concerning 
group differences in perspective of the stimuli subset; particularly where 
the data is 'noisy' in terms of large individual differences.) Only the 
SMACOFF programs of De Leeuw and Heiser (980) also permit such scaling 
analyses to be made. 
The asymmetric chi-square statistic (the AIC statistic) derived from the 
maximum likelihood analysis of MAXSCAL-4, can be used for the identification 
of the best fitting model. A large value of this log likelihood statistic 
indicates a poor fit of the observations to the model. The model is 
therefore chosen which has the minimum value of AIC. The 'models' in this 
instance being the hypotheses underlying the constrained solutions e.g. the 
'area-shape' hypothesis of Figure 4.1 or the 'width-height' hypothesis of 
Figure 4.2. 
• 
Data Krantz and Tversky produced an individual differences scaling 
analysis of their data which indicated a wide range of individual 
differences in terms of dimensional weights. Out of their seventeen 
subjects, three appeared to be 'using' only the area dimension and three 
only the shape dimension. The distribution of subject weights for the 
different dimensions in this experiment is as indicated in Figure 4.6. Of 
the fifteen subjects only one, who had received the 'skylight' frame, 
appeared to be making judgements using primarily one dimension; the area 
dimension in this case. From this figure it is possible to see the 
difference in terms of assigned dimensional weighting between the 
'skylight' and 'mirror' groups. Detailed tables of the ALSCAL analyses are 
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Area 
o .25 .5 
S = skylight frame 
m = mirror frame 
r = r~ctangle frame 
S 
r." 
o 
.75 
Figure 4.6 Dimension weights from an ALSCAL analysis of the 'rectangles' datil 
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shown in Table 4.2 and that for the MAXSCAL-4 analysis in Table 4.3. A 
subset of the ALSCAL analyses is contained in Table 4.1 below. This contains 
the dimension weights, SSTRESS and RSQ values for the three subject groups 
in terms of the area-shape hypothesis only. 
Skylight 
Mirror 
Rectangle 
Dimension weight 
Area Shape 
.69 
• .50 
• .59 
.61 
.83 
.7.5 
SSTRESS RSQ 
.17 
.17 
.24 
.89 
.89 . 
.78 
Table 4.1 ALSCAL sub-group ~nalyses - area-shape hypothesis (.5 
subjects in each group, 17 stimuli, 'fixed' on Jog x log 
stimuli configuration) 
Each horizontal1ine in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 indicates a separate analysis, 
testing the data of a particular group with a particular hypothesis. It was 
not possible to test either Schonemann's hypothesis, or the distinction 
between a log and a linear solution with the MAXSCAL-4 program, because of 
the detailed operation of the 'constrained solution' option. Within each 
group (i.e. 'skylight', 'mirror', 'rectangle' and combined) an evaluation 
was made of each possible hypothesis. For the ALSCAL analyses, the results 
are indicated in terms of SSTRESS, RSQ values and the appropriate 
dimensional weighting. The results of the MAXSCAL-4 analysis are reported as 
per the convention of Takane and Carroll, 1981. The log likelihood figures 
-21n(L), are included only for completeness in that model comparisons are 
made only in terms of the corrected AIC statistic. 
As can be seen from Table 4.1, hypotheses HI and H2 are confirmed in 
that, as predicted, the average dimensional weighting for the 'skylight' 
group are highest for the area dimension, and those for the 'mirror' group 
highest for the shape dimension. It had also been predicted in H3 that 
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Hypothesis SSTRESS RSQ • hI Dimensional Wetg 
Area-Shape Width·Bei 
Combined groups 
area-shape linear .270 .751 .53 .73 
area-shape log. .199 .855 .55 .75 
Schonemann .230 .819 .60 .70 
width/height linear .311 .728 .68 .6~ 
width/height log .. .212 .807 .67 ,61 
Skylight 
area-shape linear .246 .800 . 68 .60 . 
area-shape log. .174 .892 
.69 .61 
Schone mann .200 .866 
.74 .56 
width/height linear .286 .771 .78 .4~ 
,64 
width/height log .199 .832 .70 
Mirror 
area-shape linear .252 .775 
.48 .80 
area-shape log. .172 .890 .50 .83 
Schonemann .208 .853 
.59 .75 
width/height linear .291 .766 .64 ,6
1 
,6~ 
width/height log. .192 .843 .67 
Rectangle 
area-shape linear .308 .675 .45 .79 
area-shape log. .242 .779 .48 .80 
Schonemann .276 .734 
.56 .73 
width/height linear .350 .649 .62 ,M 61 
width/height log. .240 .753 .65 
Table 4.2 ALSCAL analyses of the 'rectangles' data (17 stimuli,S subjects in eaeP 
sub-group, 2 dimensional analysis) 
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Group Hypothesis AlC statistic 
Combined1 groups area-shape -21n(L) 7761 
AIC 7785 
(dJ.) (8) 
width-height - 21n(L) 7860 
AIC 7883 
(d.f.) (12) 
Skylight area-shape - 21n(L) 2586 
AIC2 2610 
(d.f.) (8) 
. 
width-height - 21n(L) 2567 
AIC2 2603 
(d.f.) (12) 
Mirror area-shape - 21n(L) 2402 
AIC2 2426 
(d.f.) (8) 
width-height - 21n(L) 2497 
AIC2 2533 
(d.f.) (12) 
Rectangle area-shape - 21n(L) 2642 
AIC2 2666 
(d.f.) (8) 
width-height - 21n(L) 2727 
AIC2 2763 
(d.f.) (2) 
1 These Ale values are not comparable with the sub~roup values 
2 Small sample correction applied; 5 subjects in each sub-group 
Table 4.3 MAXSCAL-4.1 analyses of the 'rectangles' data (constrained solutions, 
17 stimuli) 
119 
the rectangles group would be more likely to perform operations which would 
effectively be an analysis of the 'separate' aspects of the stimuli. 
MacCallum's (I981) Monte Carlo evaluations of SSTRESS levels indicate thata 
value of .23 signifies 'moderate' error. This is exceeded in the case of the 
rectangles group for both hypotheses, indicating that these data fit a 
dimensional analysis less well than for the other two groups. Further 
evidence for the confirmation of H3 is provided by the fact that the RSQ 
values for the 'rectangles' group are substantially lower than the 
equivalent values for the other groups. Informal observation of the subjects 
indicated that subjects in the 'rectangles' group were more prone to make 
some form of pre-judgemental clustering of the stimulus material. Such a 
qualitative difference in strategy adopted would explain their poor 'fit' to 
a dimensional analysis. This observation profIlPted an analysis of s4ch 
. changes in processing style in the next study; using video recordings of the 
subjects' behaviour. 
The MAXSCAL-4 program does not produce an index of dimensional weighting as 
such. However this may be adjudged from the relative proportions of the 
dimensions on the plotted output, in relation to the total 'sizef of the 
output configuration. Figures 4.7 to 4.9 attempt to show this effect for the 
'skylight', 'mirror' and 'rectangles' groups respectively. These plots have 
b.een superimposed on a log plot of the original stimuli proportions, i.e. 
upon rescaled versions of the configurations shown in Figures 4.1 and 4.2. A 
scale factor for the MAXSCAL-4 plots was chosen that would cause the 
distance between stimuli 3 and .5 of the 'skylight' analysis to 'fit' the 
underlying representation of the original sti,muli. This scale factor was 
then applied to both dimensions of all three'output configurations. The 
final superimpositions were made by centering the output configurations on 
the position of stimulus item 17. Also drawn on these plots are elipses 
indicating the 9.5% credible intervals for the positional value of each 
stimulus point. (The validity of this mapping procedure, and of the 
consequent interpretation of group dimensional weighting in terms of the 
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Shape 
Area 
Figure 4.7 MAXSCAL-4 analysis of the 'skylight' group (Ellipses indicate 95% 
confidence regions) 
121 
Shape 
Area 
Figure 4.8 MAXSCAL-4 analysis of the 'mirror' group (Ellipses indicate 95% 
confidence regions) 
122 
Shape 
Area 
Figure 4.9 MAXSCAL-4 analysis of the 'rectangle' group (Ellipses indicate 95% 
confidence regions) 
123 
relative proportions of the plot dimensions, had been confirmed to the 
author by Dr Toda ina personal communication, January 1984.) 
The analysis of the skylight group indicates an approximately equal 
weighting between the dimensions of 'area' and 'shape', in that the output 
plot is balanced in terms of both dimensions of the underlying 
configuration. For both the mirror and rectangle groups, the 'shape' 
dimension is given a relatively higher weighting and thus HI is 
confirmed. H2 is also confirmed by this analysis in that the weighting 
on the 'shape' dimension is relatively higher for the 'mirror' group than 
the other two. The elipses indicating 9596 credible intervals start to 
overlap on the 'area' dimension for the mirror group, and the amount of 
overlap for the 'rectangle' indicates a large degree of error in terms of 
dimensionat' judgement. This provides further confirmation of H3 in that 
the 'area' dimension for the 'rectangles' appear to have collapsed. 
4.24 Discussion 
This experiment was concerned with the evaluation of the general propositiOI1 
that subjects would consider the same set of physical stimuli in different 
ways as a consequence of instructions to regard the rectangles in different, 
and in more or less personally re1evant, ways. In that the data was found to 
prove the three detailed hypotheses, this proposition is taken to have been 
supported together with the ideas concerning cognitive representation and 
process in Chapter 3. There the importance for judgements of similarity of 
the perceived relations of the objects, in addition to their detailed 
attributes, was argued. The intention of this experiment was to effect 
general context manipulations that might bring out the claimed 
differentiation between the an,alytic operations on the attributes of objects 
and the synthetic operations concerning their relations'. The purely analytiC 
'feature' models could not account for the perceptual differences found here 
except in the ad hoc, and hence unsatisfactory, fashion of postulating 
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additional feature components in the individual's object representation; 
e.g. mirrorness, skylightness, houseness etc. 
It could be argued that the general proposition and these results are 
intuitively obvious. Nevertheless the implications for studies employing 
similarity judgements are important. Inter-subject differences, and the 
intransitivities within an individual'S judgements, may not be the 
consequence of some arbitrary 'noise' parameter, but of the quite logical 
adoption of some personally relevant global perspective. The important 
distinctions found between the 'rectangles' group and the other two groups, 
make it clear that efforts to override the 'world-knowledge' frames that 
individuals may bring to a task by effectively Imposing a ste'rile framework 
for the judgements, may be confounded by the individual subject's 'effort 
after meaning' (Neisser, 1976). These results also have implications for 
applied experimental studies making use of similarity judgements. In such 
studies, the referent items are likely to be· even more complex than those 
used in 'pure' experimental studies. An inadequate task framework which does 
not take account of reasonable interpretative schemes likely to be used by 
the subject is, therefore, more likely to produce apparently idiosyncratic 
results. It might be argued that if a pronounced context effect can be 
induced with such abstract stimuli as these, then the effect would be even 
greater under 'natural' conditions. 
12.5 
4.3 Experiment 2 - Strategy and complexity effects in similarity jUdgelJlen! 
4.31 Rationale 
The philosophical analysis outlined in Chapter 2, and a reading of the early 
experimental psychology literature, indicate that making similarity 
judgements should not be seen as a simple unitary process. It is proposed 
that the individual may adopt a variety of strategies, ranging from the 
analytic comparison of features of the stimulus, to a synthetic 
consideration of its functional relationships. The actual form of process 
adopted being dependent upon the individual's perception of the task and the 
stimuli. The conceptual basis of this study is the 'projection rule' model 
of similarity due to Wittgenstein. Here similarity is taken to be an 
abstract projection of the compared entities in terms of their functions. 
These ideas were discussed in Section 2.3 and are represented in Figure 
2.1. There it was shown that particular transformations of letter 
sequences into a symbolic arrow format might result in perceptually quite 
different representations~ It was argued that the transformations, by 
different 'grammars' in Wittgenstein's terms, would facilitate particular 
forms of cognitive processing. 
In the notation of Figure 2.1, the 'meanings' in this study are provided by 
numeric matrices of different dimensionality. The 'grammars' are represented 
by the transformation of these matrices into the format of either bar-chartS 
or 'Chernoff faces' (Chernoff and Haseeb, 1973); a form of cartoon 
representation. Examples of both of these formats are shown in Figure 4.10, 
. and further examples are contained in Appendix B. Chernoff applied elaborate 
transformations to his to-be-encoded data in order to counteract the known 
biases of human observers for various facial attributes. The dominance of 
aspects of the eye and central facial features in relation to general facial 
outline, ear shape and position, etc were important to Chernoff; who was 
attempting to encode fifteen <?r more dimensions, but not of significance in 
our present more limited use of the format. The studies that he details were 
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primarily concerned with the detection of transient effects in the complex 
changing patterns of seismic data; often involving twenty or more truly 
continuous dimensions. Geologically naive subjects showed an ability to 
detect patterns that would normally have taken several years of training to 
develop. Chernoff claimed that this was due to their ability to process in 
parallel the relations between the features of the facial data 
representation. 
Studies using cartoon faces may also be found in the psychological 
literature, although many involve relatively trivial use of the format. Such 
studies typically involve only two or three binary 'dimensions', and 
subjects making paired comparison judgements between stimuli which contain 
varying numbers of additional redundant features (e.g. Tversky and Gati, 
1982). Subjects are even asked to pay close (analytic) attention to the 
presence or absence of such features e.g. Naveh-Benjamin and Pachel1a 
(1982). Such experimental manipulations contrast markedly with those of 
Chernoff, who was effectively requiring subjects to find discontinuities 
within an ordered set of data points. 
Tversky and Krantz (1969) used three dimensional binary manipulations of 
faces to test interdimensional additivity effects. As might be expected with 
such stimuli, the subjects employed clustering strategies and, "support(ed) 
the hypothesis that a simple combination rule can describe mental processing 
of independent impressions -" (p127). They attempt to suggest that such 
combination rules might form the basis for the "interactive or Gestalt 
effects (that) are important in impression formation" (pI27). A more 
interesting use of the format is found in the study by Takane and Carroll 
(1981). They used lines of varying curvature to represent the shape of the 
eyes and mouth on cartoon faces; the stimuli being coded in terms of five 
different values on each of these two dimensions. In this case the subjects' 
similarity judgements clearly fitted a .dimensional analysis. Takane found 
two additional statistically significant dimensions which he descdbes in 
terms of the skew-symmetry of the mouth and eyes of the stimuli. The 
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subjects were effectively attributing values of 'happiness' and 
'surprise' to the cartoon faces. 
In the light of this literattJ.re it was predicted that the bar-chart format, 
with its discrete attributes graphically signalled, would cue and facilitate 
analytic judgements. The dominant cognitive operation would be expected to 
be the local processing of the information represented by individual bars in 
the chart. Conversely the cartoon face format was expected to facilitate 
synthetic processing. The literature referenced by Chernoff, and his own 
studies (Chernoff and Haseeb, 1973), suggest that due to the individual's 
developmental experience, the dominant cognitive operation expected of 
cartoon faces is in terms of a global perception of the interrelations 
between aspects of the face. Our argument, arrd the design of the 
experiment, is not directly concerned with the relative ergonomic efficiencY 
of the different display formats. However the additional manipulation of 
stimulus dimensionality is intended to serve as a simple measure of· . 
complexity. The correspondence between analytic and synthetic judgement 
processes and a parallel-serial 'processing' distinction has already' been 
argued in Chapter 3; in particular, the representational implications of 
'complexity' in Section 3.5. The literature (e.g. Anderson, 1983) suggests 
that as the stimulus complexity is increased, it would be expected that the 
synthetic, or parallel, forms of processing would become relatively more 
effective. 
Observation and interviewing of subjects in Experiment 1, and also in other 
trial studies, indicated that subjects were adopting different judgement 
strategies. In this experiment, video recordings were made of the individual 
subjects' card sorting protocols whilst completing the reference ranking 
similarity estimation task • .If the bar chart group behaved as predicted, 
. then their analysis of the separate aspects of the stimuli should be 
apparent in terms of their forming and manipulating' sub-groups or clusters 
of items. There is no obvious behavioural correspondent of the hypothesised 
cognitive operations of the face group; the synthetic interrelation of 
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aspects of the stimuli. However given the physical constraints of the 
reference ranking task, it would be expected that subjects making judgements 
in terms of the cartoon-face format would place the cards directly in some 
order of dimensional 'distance' from the reference item. It was intended 
that the behavioural protocols should provide an insight into the judgement 
processes being employed. Given that group differences in perspective could 
be made apparent, this would then make it possible to argue more strongly 
that the form of hypothesised judgement processes can be inferred from the 
'fit' of data to the qssumptions of the abstract data analysis models. 
The transformation of the numeric matrices 'into bar-chart .and cartoon-face 
format is expected to cause subjects to use different processing strategies 
for each format, when making judgements of similarity. The dependent 
measures for the assumption of different processing strategy by the two 
groups are the classificatory analysis of the behavioural protocols whilst 
completing the reference ranking task, and the 'fit' of the resultant 
similarity judgements to a dimensional analysis. The cartoon-face format is 
expected to facilitate synthetic processing and the bar-chart format 
analytic processing. It is predicted that, 
HI: The bar-chart group will make use of sub-groups and clusters of 
stimuli cards in the task. The cartoon-face group are expected to 
order the cards more directly, and accurately, in terms of some 
dimensional distance; and hence provide data that fits better the 
original dimensions of the stimuli set when subjected to a scaling 
analysis. 
H2: The increase in stimulus complexity, in terms of information 
dimensionality, will have less effect with the format which 
facilitates synthetic processing. The cartoon-face format 
is expected to result in a more accurate mapping of the 
original data matrix with increasing dimensionality, relative 
to the bar chart format. 
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The dependent measures for this hypothesis are that the dimensional 
weighting following a scaling analysis of the similarities data will be 
relatively higher for the cartoon face format, as the dimensionality 
increases, and that the differences in behavioural protocol predicted in 
HI will also become more pronounced. 
4.32 Method 
Stimulus material. Two, three and four dimensional data matrices were 
encoded into Chernoff face and bar ~hart format, as shown in Figure 4.10. 
Details of the source data matrices, and further examples of the encoded 
formats are contained in Appendix B. Each aspect of both stimulus formats 
were encoded in terms of five discrete values as Takane's (1981) experiment 
with similar stimuli had shown that this is a sufficient number for subjects 
to effectively perceive a variable as a continuous dimension. The 
.• cartoon-face and bar chart stimuli were mounted on small white index cards; 
each card then being covered in transparent protective film. It was of 
course necessary to have the numbers on the front of the cards in this 
experiment·, and a further index card bearing a random four digit identifying 
number was therefore attached to each card. This arrangement is made dear 
in Figure 4.11. Following the 'rules of thumb' of Kruskal and Wish (1978) 
for the validity of scaling analyses of varying dimensionality, 17 stimuli 
were employed for the two and three dimensional configurations and 2.5 for 
the four dimensional. As in the previous experiment, a 'missing data' design 
was employed using only five stimuli as the referent items in each case. 
Subjects and sessions. The subjects were all second and third year 
students at the City of London Polytechnic taking a variety of Social 
Science courses. Subjects were required to 'sign up' as being available for 
two one hour sessions on consecutive days and were thenrandomly assigned to 
the two groups. They were paid £ 2 for each session attended. 
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00 
Reference stimulus number 15 
Figure 4.10 An example of the cartoon face and bar chart formats (The other reference 
items, and the source data matrices for all the items are contained in Appendix B) 
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Design A mixed subjects design was employed. One between subjects 
manipulation was made; the two groups received data in either cartoon face 
or bar chart format. One within subject manipulation was made; each subject 
received data at 3, increasing, orders of dimensionality. 
Procedure The reference-ranking similarity estimation procedure was used 
as detailed in Section 4.2. This method had previously been found to provide 
stabl~ judgements and to make more 'sense' to the subjects than the 
alternative paired similarity measure. Also it most closely resembles 
Chernoff's use of an ordered pattern of stimuli, and might be expected to 
facilitate the synthetic pattern processing that he was able to establish. 
However its most important aspect in terms of this experiment, is that it 
provides the opportunity to gain some insight into the subjects' similarity 
estimation strategies by observing their behaviour as they place, sort and 
compare the stimulus cards. A video recording of their behaviour was made and 
a subsequent detailed analysis carried out. 
Due to the length of time necessary for the detailed c~n~lysis of such video 
protocols, it was possible only to use five subjects in each group. 
Experience in trial studies, and the first experiment, indicated that 
subjects are unable to make reliable judgements of this form for more than 
about fifty minutes. It was therefore necessary to split the experiment intO 
two sessions of one hour. This included a five minute rest period and five 
minutes for writing comments in the first session. Each subject was run 
individually. After the instructions for each subtask had been made clear, 
the subject was left to complete the reference ranking tasks with only a 
video camera overlooking the table on which they were to arrange the cardS. 
The proposed hypotheses are only concerned with group differences between 
the cartoon-face (henceforth 'face') and bar chart (henceforth 'bar') 
groups. Therefore 'order' and 'learning' effects were not examined; each 
subject being given the stimulus sets in order of increasing dimensionality. 
Within each set the subjects were given one practice referent item, and then 
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a random ordering of the same five reference items to be analysed. Because 
of the time constraints imposed by the dual sessions, it was necessary for 
subjects to make judgements concerning three of the three dimensional 
stimuli in the first session and a further two in the second session. 
Instructions. This set of instructions was arrived at after several 
trial studies where subjects were later questioned concerning their 
perception of the task, and how they had approached it. In these trials it 
was found that attempts to time the students, group trials where they might 
be made aware of their progress relative to other subjects, and any 
perception that there had to be a 'correct' answer encouraged analysis of 
the features of the stimuli and discouraged more holistic comparisons. The 
use of the 'country' frame for both groups in the experiment was partly 
intended to aid the subjects in making some consistent 'sense' of the 
experiment (cf the previous experiment), but also as a constant reminder 
that al1 aspects of the stimuli were to be thought of as being equaJJy 
important. The study by Takane and Carroll (1981) had shown that simple 
affective interpretations might dominate the judgements of the face group, 
for example the perceived 'happiness' of the face. 
You will find a set of cards in front of you, each with a bar chart 
[cartoon-face] drawn on it. You are asked to think of each card as 
representing a country, and that you are being given information about 
equally important aspects of each country. For example its population, 
land area etc. Please spend a few minutes looking through the cards 
now. You will notice that the different aspects of each 'country' vary 
quite independently of each other. 
[The purpose of the random identifying number was explained to the subjects, 
as being necessary to identify the cards. They were then allowed three 
minutes to look through the cards.] 
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Each of the cards has a different number printed at the top. These 
numbers have been chosen at random, and they are only used to identify 
each card. You will shortly be asked to take one of the numbered 
'countries' and place it on the left of the white card. You should then 
arrange all the other 'countries' according to how similar you think 
they are to the first 'country' that you put down. The 'country' that 
is most similar to the original should be put next to it, the next most 
similar next to that, and so on until you have arranged all the 
'countries' on the white card. You should complete the task at your own 
pace, and please remember that there are no right or wrong answers to 
it; I am only interested in how you think about it. 
[Because of the constraints imposed by the aspect ratio of the video systern, 
it was necessary for the cards to be ordered in two rows. This was explained 
verbally to the subjects, and examples of the resulting scene is shown in 
the photographs of Figure 4.11.] 
4.33 Results 
A qualitative analysis of the video protocols was made. In order that the 
hypothesized ranking strategies were not be 'read into' this necessarily 
subjective task, the categories were identified and 'named' by a research 
clerk who was unaware of the experimental hypotheses. Cross checking of thiS 
analysis was made by an independent judge, and no substantial source of 
disagreement was found with the original categorisations. There were found 
to be five clearly differentiable methods of going about the task, which 
were named 'dealing', 'table sorting', 'scenic', 'grouping' and 'hand 
shuffling'. 
Dealing took place when the subject dealt the cards onto the table in 
their original sequence, without apparently studying the cards at all. The 
actual arrangement of the cards in relational sequence did not begin until 
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all the cards were in view on the table. 
Table sorting involved the subjects spreading aU the cards out onto the 
table, then placing individual cards in sequence without any obvious overaU 
strategy. The subjects did not appear to make explicit comparisons between 
. 
pairs of cards. 
Scenic arrangement involved the subject putting the cards down at some 
'judged' distances from the reference item; apparently depending on how 
similar to it they thought each card to be. 
Grouping occurred when cards were placed in groups with other cards 
having apparently similar properties, before being placed in final sequence. 
Hand shuffling involved the subjects sorting through the cards in their 
hands, before laying any card down on the table. 
Examples of the 'scenic' and 'groups' strategies are shown in Figures 4.11 
to 4.13. Figures 4.14 and 4.1.5 indicate the different strategies employed by 
the two groups as they approached each sub-task, and also the effects of 
stimulus dimensionality. The categories have been ordered in Figure 4.16 in 
terms of the hypothesized differences in strategy that would be employed by 
the two groups. As predicted, there are substantial differences; the 
bar-chart group are clearly taking a more analytic approach in forming 
clusters whilst the 'scenic' strategy, primarily adopted by the faces group, 
can be interpreted as a placement in terms of some 'distance' from the 
referent item. Thus H I is confirmed in terms of the behavioural 
protocols. There is also an ordered interaction with the degree of stimulus 
dimensionality, in that the differences in strategy become more pronounced 
with increasing dimensionality. This is as predicted by H2. 
A dimensionql analysis of the reference ranking data was made using the 
ALSCAL program, with the initial configuration 'fixed' on the constructed 
values of the stimuli sets. Figure 4.16 shows the dimensional weightings 
. of the two groups for the two, three and four dimensional stimuli. The 
dimensional weightings in this case, can be taken as an indication of the 
accuracy of judgement on a particular dimension. There is an obvious 
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Figure 4.11 A 'scenic' strategy being used with the cartoon face format 
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Figure 4 .12 A 'groups' strategy being used with the cartoon face format 
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Figure 4.13 Two stages in the use of a 'groups' strategy with the bar charts 
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Figure 4.16 Dimensional weightings for 2, 3 and 4 dimensional stimuli: by subject g 
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'collapse' in weighting for the second and third dimension for the bars 
group, when making judgements concerning four dimensional stimuli, and thus 
H2 is supported. This would seem to be the consequence of simple 
analytic combination rules being employed by the bars group. The predicted 
difference in dimensional weightings of HI was only found with the 4 
dimensional stimuli, despite the clear difference in strategy being employed 
by the bars group as evidenced by the video protocols. HI can thus be 
considered to be only partially supported by.this analysis of the 
similarities data. 
4.34 Discussion 
The main experimental hypothesis of differential cueing of judgemental 
processes by the two stimulus formats was supported, and the predicted forms 
of card sorting strategies were :fiound. As might have been expected, the 
synthetic form of judgement process was found to be the most accurate with 
the more complex multidimensional stimuli; where the hypothesized analytic 
form of processing would be most disadvantaged. The experimental findings of 
the differences in strategy employed by subjects whilst making similarity 
judgements, further supports our contention concerning the necessity to 
incorporate some aspect of synthesis in any general model of similarity. As 
the non-analytic forms of processing entail quite different underlying 
representations, it may also be claimed that the simple representation 
systems implicit in the feature models of similarity are not able to account 
for all possible forms of object representation. 
Within the constraints on subject numbers imposed by the 'hand' analysis of 
the card sorting protocols, it was decided not to randomize the presentation 
order of stimulus dimensionality. All subjects in both groups therefore 
received the appropriate format in order of increasing dimensionality. This 
would appear to leave the experiment open to the suggestion that the results 
might be the consequence of some order effect. However the claim made for 
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this experiment was only that the two encodings of the information matrix 
. , 
would lead to different cognitive processes. Any order, practice or fatigue 
'effects brought about solely by the manipulation of information format or 
matrix dimensionality would not weaken this claim. Their differential 
presence 'would count against the claims of the feature models in that they 
do not possess any explanatory representation or process for them, whilst 
the proposed model does. 
The prediction was made in HI of better performance, in terms of 
dimensional recovery for the faces group. That this is not found, except in 
the four dimensional case, despite the clear differences in strategy being 
employed, is probably an example of the 'robust' nature of the scaling 
algorithms being a mixed blessing. We have already commented on a major 
problem for studies attempting to compare hierarchical cluster analyses with 
dimensional scaling analyses; namely that the two sets of algorith~s are 
optimizing on quite different aspects of the data, and will therefore be 
differentially affected by the same pattern of data error. It would appear 
that for low dimensionalities, the forms of error introduced by the _'Groups' 
strategy appears to be of the same order to the scaling algorithms as normal 
judgement errors within the 'Scenic' strategy. The 'power' of the scaling 
algorithms was thus found to be such that significant differences in adopted 
strategy by subjects may be hidden, and this has important implications for 
studies dependent upon the elicitation of estimates of similarity. As a 
result of stimulus format and complexity, subjects may be taking quite 
different perspectives on similarity judgement tasks, both with respect to 
different forms of task, and also with the assumptions of the experimenter. 
Except with high (relative to that used in most experimental situations) 
dimensionality stimuli, this may not become apparent using conventional 
analyses. 
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CHAPTER FIVE Applied studies 
5.1 Overview 
The importance of a theory providing a useful model of similarity judgement, 
other than within tightly controUed experimental paradigms was argued in 
Section 1.4. Three studies are detailed here in which the previously 
developed experimental methodology is applied to 'real-world' problems. The 
rationale for the inclusion of these studies is to demonstrate both the 
applicability of, and the necessity for, a synthetic component in any model 
of perceived similarity. The studies represent areas of investigation where 
attempts to ellcit information in a manner requiring an analytic form of 
judgement is shown to be more or less inadequate. In each case, the 
comparative success of methods requiring subjects to make synthetic 
relational judgements is demonstrated; in terms of eliciting information 
useful to the purpose of the applied investigation. 
The first study assumes, but also seeks to fa~ilitate, a dimensional 
representation of the problem domain. The intention being to study group 
differences in perceived relations within such a framework. It is concerned 
with the perception of pain following different medical treatments for 
severe burns, and different forms of surgical operation. This study is 
important to our argument, in that it represents an attempt to elicit 
similarity judgements in an operative knowledge domain, where the effects of 
language as a mediational representation are not dominant. In the second 
study, the development of an appropriate 'meta-language' by students taking 
a microprocessor course is investigated. It is shown that even novice 
programmers are capable of perceiving relations between important computing 
concepts in other than an. analytic fashion. The importance of this finding 
is discussed in terms of the possible differentiation between mistakes as 
failures of knowledge, and mistakes as a mistaking of the problem. The third 
study deals with the appreciation of possibly contentious arguments in 
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texts, and represents an attempt to 'tap' individuals' judgements of concept 
relations in a knowledge domain where the definition of concepts is not 
axiomatic. 
The discussion relating to each applied study is made primarily in terms of 
the relative efficacy of eliciting a dimensional representation of the 
relational aspects of the particular objects, as against the use of a 
corresponding analytic judgement task. A discussion of the significance of 
these findings in terms of our general argument is deferred to the final 
section of this chapter. 
5.2 The perception of pain 
.5.21 Rationale 
The majority of the studies detailed in Chapter 2 have been to a great 
extent dependent upon the mediating role of language, which may provide an 
analytic framework for the decomposition of the stimulus items. It was 
suggested in Section 2.22 that the 'feature' theories concerned with the 
estimation of relational similarity have concentrated on the easily 
mathematised, analytic aspects of the judgemental task, to the exclusion of 
its possible synthetic aspects. It is claimed that the latter would allow 
the individual to create a general framework, within which they may make 
some personal sense of the tasks required of them. This first applied study 
illustrates the advantages of a synthetic, or dimensional, approach within 
certain domains. It is intended to exemplify the usefulness of effectively 
imposing a holistic framework upon the individual required to make 
particular relational judgements. The study detailed here was made in two 
parts, the first was concerned with the subjective perception of 
post-operative pain fol1owing two alternative treatments for severe, but 
local, burns, and the second with two different forms of incision in upper 
abdominal operations. 
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Clinical evidence regarding the relative speed of healing resulting from the 
use of the different treatments would lead one to expect clear group 
differences in perceived pain in the first part of the study. The more 
recently developed treatment entails covering the burn with a thin plastic 
film, alleviating the necessity for frequent dressing changes. The healing 
time for the 'bandage' group has been shown to be significantly longer than 
for the 'fUm' group (Neal, WhaUey et aI, 1981). No clear differences 
between the various forms of incision, in terms of pain and perception, are 
reported in the clinical1iteraiure. However a horizontal incision might be 
expected to be more traumatic than a vertical one, in that it involves 
cutting across a greater number of nerve fibres, and was thus expected to 
cause greater pain with bodily movements for a longer period. In the first 
part of the study it was intended to contrast the relational comparison 
method with the alternative questionnaire technique described below. In the 
second part it was intended to show that even with the most intense form of 
pain, the relational method would still provide an interpretable dimensional 
structure within which the hypothesized group differences could be made 
apparent. 
Numerous researchers in this area have commented on the difficulties 
experienced in eliciting useful1inguistic descriptions of experienced pain, 
whether for individual diagnostic feedback or for exploring group 
differences. Although some researchers (e.g. Huskisson, 1974) have attempted 
to obtain analogue comparison measures between the pain currently 
experienced and some previous state, the dominant methodology employed at 
present involves checking words from a lengthy questionnaire. In the context 
of our argument, this represents an attempt to force the patient to 
analyticaUy decompose their experienced pain. Although some success with 
the questionnaire technique has been reported in the literature (e.g. 
Melzack, 1975), it has generally been found to only be of use with 
individual patients; who effectively have to be trained how to respond with it. 
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· The technique employed in the present study required the subjects to relate 
the pain they were feeling to a set of commonly occuring painful events. It 
would be predicted from the relational model developed in Chapter 3 that 
this more holistic form of comparison would both be more meaningful to the 
patients, and also cause them to make more accurate judgements concerning 
their perceived pain. Our argument then is that this elicitation method 
should result in a com mon stable dimensional structure which would enable 
group differences in subjectively perceived pain to be made apparent. 
5.22 Method 
Task The reference ranking similarity elicitation task was used in both 
the 'burns' and the 'incision' trials. Because only a small number of 
stimuli were employed, and there were no time constraints, complete data 
sets were obtained, i.e. each of the stimuli were used as the reference item 
in turn. The common painful experiences used as the stimulus items in each 
trial are listed in Appendix C. These were all signified by single words or 
short phrases e.R.~h~adache', 'tooth filled', 'your pain' etc, andwere 
typed onto small index cards for use in the ranking task •. After the 
reference ranking task the patients in the 'burns' trials were also required 
to complete the Melzack Pain Questionnaire (also contained in Appendix C). 
Both parts of this study employ a 'between-subjects' design •. 
Subjects and sessions. The eighteen subjects in the 'burns' trial were 
all outpatients at the Leeds General Infirmary, and were randomly assigned 
to either the control group receiving the conventional gauze burns dressing, 
or to the experimental group receiving a newer 'plastic film' treatment. 
The reference ranking task and the questionnaires were administered one weeK 
after each patient's treatment had commenced. The various tasks were 
individually administered whilst the patients were waiting for treatment, 
and no pay~ent was made for completing the forms. The twelve subjects in the 
'incision' trial were all patients at the Leeds General Infirmary undergoing 
major upper abdominal operations. Patients were randomly assigned to the 
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groups to receive either the vertical or the horizontal operational 
incisions. The reference ranking task was individually administered to each 
patient one week after their operation, and again no payment was made. 
5.23 Results 
ALSCAL analyses were made, and a two dimensional plot of the group space of 
the stimulus items for the burns trial is shown in Figure 5.1. It is 
possible to interpret the dimensions as being related to the 'intensity' and 
'duration' of the painful experiences. The individual patients' dimensional 
weightings are shown in Figure 5.2, a clear difference between the two 
groups of patients being apparent. As predicted, the 'bandage' group show a 
markedly higher weighting for the 'duration' dimension. The Melzack 
questionnaire has been developed around various factor analysis studies, and 
for analysis, the groups of words are grouped into three categories of 
'sensory', 'effective' and evaluative terms. Comparative an~lysis of the 
data for the two burns groups revealed no significant group differences for 
any of the factor categories. Analyses were made using the Student t 
test: 
Film Bandage 
Sensory 
Mean 5.83 5.33 t = .36, P (-3.60 ~ 1..1 ~ 2.60) = .95 
SO 1.72 2.94 
Affective 
Mean 2.17 2.33 t = .19, P (-1.75 ~ 1..1 ~ 2.08) = .95 
SO 1.72 1.21 
Evaluative 
Mean 2.67 2.33 t = .62, P (-1.50 ~ 1..1 ~ 0.86) = .95 
SO 1.03 0.82 
Table 5.1 Comparative analyses of the questionnaire data in the burns 
study 
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DURATION 
• burn 
• headache 
• tooth filled 
• sore throat 
• GP visit 
• injection 
Figure 5.1 Two dimensional analysis - bum~ patients (ALSCAL-4 individulli 
differences analysis, 18 patients, 8 stimuli, STRESS = .247, RSQ = .549) 
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Figure 5.2 Subject weights for the bandage and plastic film bums treatments 
(ALSCAL-4 individual differences analysis. 18 patients. 8 stimuli. STRESS = .247 
RSQ = .549) . 
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DURATION 
• slipping on ice 
• lore throat 
• injection 
• backache 
• headache 
• broken nail 
hB • toothaC 
Figure 5.3 Two dimensional analysis - vertical and horizontal incision patientS 
(ALSCAL:""4 individual differences analysis, 12 patients, 8 stimuli, STRESS ::= .iSS 
RSQ = .841) 
, 
150 
0.75 
0.5 
o 
DURATION 
INTENSITY 
.25 .5 .75 
. . 
Figure 5.4 Subject weights after operations involving vertical and horizontal incisions 
(ALSCAL-4 individual differences analysis, 12 patients, 8 stimuli, STRESS = .188, 
RSQ = .841) 
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DURATION 
DURATION 
• Operation 
INTENSITY 
INTENSITY 
Vertical 
Incision 
Horizontal 
Incision 
Figure 5.5 MAXSCAL-4.1 analyses of the Incision data (ellipses indicate 95% 
confidence regions) 
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The group space of the stimulus items for the incision task is shown in 
Figure .5.3, and the equivalent individual dimensional weightings in 
Figure .5.4. Again a two dimensional interpretation in terms of intensity 
and duration is possible. The higher dimensional weightings of the 
horizontal incision group on the duration dimension is as predicted. This 
figure also indicates a generaUy higher weighting on the intensity 
dimension for the vertical incision group. Using a conventional individual 
difference analysis, it would be necessary to introduce a control group in 
order to find out whether the group difference found is a consequence of the 
'horizontal' group emphasizing duration, the 'vertical' group emphasizing 
intensity, or a combination of these effects. However a MAXSCAL-4 maximum 
likelihoods analysis of the data confirms that the effect is an artifact of 
the first analysis. This is shown in Figure .5 • .5, where it can be seen 
that the intensity dimension for the horizontal incision group has partially 
'collapsed'. In this analysis, the seven commonly occurring painful events 
were restricted in terms of dimensional movement whilst the operation pain 
was allowed to 'move' freely • 
.5.24 Discussion 
TlJe results of these two types of trial indicate the greater appropriateness 
of holistic judgements concerning the individual patients subjective 
perception of pain, as against the analytic framework of the conventional 
questionnaire technique. As predicted, clearly interpretable group 
differences were found in the dimensional analyses of the similarities data, 
whilst the patients found it impossible to relate their experience of pain 
to the analytic terms of the questionnaire. Any general model of similarity 
judgements must be capable of making useful predictions in such extra-
linguistic domains, and these results must further count against the claims 
of the feature analytic models with regards to generality. 
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.5.3 Expert knowledge in a micro-processor course 
.5.31 Rationale 
The mental representation' of the concepts involved in a problem is 
recognized as influencing the individual's perception of a problem; and 
consequently how they might solve it. Shavelson (1972) show'ed how as 
students progressed through a physics course, their knowledge of the 
structural relationships of the discipline became more like that of experts. 
This study, as with others in the domain, made use of both dimensional and 
cluster analyses of individual's perceived similarity between concepts. In a 
review of methods for mapping cognitive structures, Preece writes that 
"problem-solving tests are, perhaps, too drastic as tools for the initial 
exploration of cognitive structure -" (I976, pl). The various elicitation 
methodologies "- tamper less with what they are seeking to measure". One of 
. the earliest studies concerned with eliciting knowledge representations, 
Wainer and Kaye (J 974), used a dimensional representation of the students' 
concept relations in order to examine changes in the perceived importance of 
central topics in an undergraduate psychology course. However, as we shall 
note in Section .5.41, most elicitation studies have been concerned solely 
with domains of 'hard' knowledge where a dimensional representation has 
appeared -inappropriate. 
As problem perception has now become recognized as a crucial component 
of problem ~olving performance, so investigations of the change in problem 
perception with the acquisition of expertise has also received increasing 
attention. Schoenfeld and Herman (1982) has extended Shavelson's work to 
show how students' perceptions of the structure of mathematical problems 
changed as a consequence of a course of study. Kahney (1982) has also 
indicated that novice programmers, in a high level AI language, may quite 
quickly develop the structural concept relationships of an 'expert', but not 
necessarily be able to tackle problems in the same way. The 'novice-expert' 
distinction is thus shown to involve more than a difference in a surface 
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expertise with the terms of a topic. The nature and individual perceptions 
of the problems to be solved using a particular set of concepts, or 
computing language, must be taken into account • 
. 
The intention of this study is to evaluate the importance of the development 
of appropriate meta-languages, within which the student may understand and 
solve a problem, e.g. the appreciation of the 'top-down' approach to the 
functional decomposition of computing problems in terms of 'data-flow'. Our 
general argument has been that in certain contexts individuals can and do 
think in more general terms than the feature models of similarity would 
imply or allow; in terms of 'synthesis' rather than 'analysis'. The 
acquisition of such an abstract representational ability might provide a 
meta-language within which the operation of even highly abstract relations 
may be discussed. Cognitive structure theorists such as Schroeder et al 
(I967) have suggested that abstract fun<;tioning in many cognitive domains 
would be dependent upon the development and use of superordinate dimensions. 
Such dimensions are not immediately related to the specific subject matter 
of the domain, but form a meta-language which may facilitate discourse 
about the sub-domain. The possibility is examined here of using the 
individual's facility in representing concepts dimensionally as a criterion 
for distinguishing operational from 'expert' knowledge. 
The study was intended to determine whether an individual's development of 
such meta-languages could be examined using data which was derived from 
their perception of similarity relations between items in the sub-domain. It 
was hoped that the extra-linguistic, and less intrusive, form of such a task 
would be useful in determining the nature of novice-expert differences. 
These differences might wel1 be masked in the alternative, feature 
dependent, memory or clustering tasks currently made use of in the 
literature. The prediction of our general argument, is that it would be 
possible, and useful, to elicit a meaningful dimensional representation of 
the course concepts from students, by biasing them towards synthetic rather 
than analytic judgements. 
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5.32 Method 
A pilot study was first conducted using eight computer 'professionals', mainly 
drawn from the Technology Faculty of the Open University. The intention was 
to check whether the elicitation methodology was viable, and to provide for 
the analysis of a stable 'prior' representation which would facilitate the 
later analysis of the students' data. The subjects were given thirteen small 
index cards each presenting a ke~ word or phrase related to an· introductory 
microprocessor course. Eleven of the words were derived from the detailed 
experimental course material. The two more abstract ideas of 'flow' and 
'control' were added as they were discussed in other course material, and 
appeared likely to suggest salient dimensions to the students. Details of 
the stimulus material are contained in Appendix D. After reading through the 
cards for a few minutes the subjects w,ere then requested to make similarity 
judgements between the items using the reference-ranking techniqu~. Whilst 
making the judgements, they were asked to think of the items in terms of 
their use in the microprocessor course; of which they were all 
know ledgeable. 
The novice-expert study was conducted using Summer School students engaged 
in the Open University foundation technology course, TlOl. As part of the 
summer school the students took a one day course which involved the use of a 
small microprocessor kit and a self-instructional text. [The study detailed 
here was in fact part of a wider investigation of the use of 'help' 
algorithms in the text using a study protocol recorder to monitor the pages 
of the text being used, and also the key depressions being made on the micrO 
kit, cf Whalley, 1982.] In the last half hour of the one day course, twelve 
students out of the class of thirty, were asked to complete the reference 
ranking task. Out of the thirteen stimuli, four were chosen as reference 
items, and each subject received the four reference items in a random 
sequence. The stUdent's had all completed the problems set for them, and had 
thus experienced fewer problems than the rest of the class. Out of the 
twelve students, four had not been able to start the ranking task with the 
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first reference item within five minutes, and were switched to a rating task 
employing the .same 13 items. [This questionnaire was also completed by the 
remainder of the students, although its analysis is not discussed here.] The 
'data' from these students is not included in the analysis reported. Two 
tutors on the course and the postgraduate student acting as demonstrator 
also completed the reference ranking task. 
5.33 Results 
The group space derived from an ALSCAL analysis of the prior study data ·is 
shown in Figure 5.6. The data fit the intuitively obvious dimensions for 
any computer language of 'flow-control vs. location-value' and 'active vs. 
passive'. It is not clear from this analysis whether the structure truly 
represents a 'folded' dimension, or whether it is an artifact '(cf Takane and 
Carroll, 1982). However it would make some sense to consider the structure 
as a folding of the dominant 'flow-value' dimension by the more abstract 
'active-passive' one. An individual differences analysis of the Summer 
school data set was made, using ALSCAL, 'fixed' on ·this prior configuration. 
The resultant dimensional weightings are shown in Figure 5.7 and it can be 
seen that the individual weightings are fairly widely distributed. It is 
useful to note the position of the two tutors who completed the task, as 
they may be seen to represent some 'true' value concerning the general 
orientation of the course. 
The prior study had indicated that subjects with some experience of high 
level computing languages (e.g. BASIC, but particularly PASCAL) weighted 
most heavily the 'flow-value' dimension. However this course was primarily 
intended to demonstrate the operation of the accumulator and data registers, 
as is indicated by the relative weighting of the tutors. One of the more 
interesting aspects of this study, is that it. provided independent 
confirmation of a misperception of the course's purpose by three of the four 
students who had had prior experience of a high level language. These 
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Figure 5.6 Two dimensional analysis of the professional programmers· judgementS 0 I 
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Figure 5.7 Dimensional weights of students and tutors (ALSCAL-4 analysis, 'fixed' 0
1
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the configuration of Figure S .6, 13 stimuli. 11 subjects. SSTRESS = .133 
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students are in the group emphasizing the 'flow-value' dimension, along with 
the demonstrator who also had only had experience of high level programming. 
The protocol recordings showed that these students effectively skipped the 
early sections of the course, in order to move on to the later flow and 
control experiments. However, although they knew far more about computing in 
general than the others, they continued to experience difficulties over 
detailed issues and had to turn back to the early section more often. 
5.34 Discussion 
The results of this study indicate that a majority of the 'novice' students 
were capable of forming a dimensional representation of the topic concepts. 
Examination of the individual differences found with respect to these 
dimensions suggests that they may be interpreted as a valid meta-language 
for this topic domain. 
The evaluation of dimensional structures such as those found here might aid 
the study of meta-language development. Such an evaluation would obviously 
need to be complemented by an analysis of the learner's verbal protocols, 
and a deeper study of the pedagogic factors which might facilitate the 
development of such reflective reasoning. Following Torgerson, it was 
earlier' suggested (cf Section 2.43>' that the dimensions 'found' in MDS 
analyses should be regarded as virtual in nature, and dependent upon the 
judgement task and its perception by the individual. Such an approach would 
seem particularly appropriate in this case. Although the detailed 
organisation of all computer languages is strongly hierarchical, discussion 
concerning computer languages, e.g. an intra-language comparison, are 
not necessarily so. The current emphasis on the acquisition of 'top-down' 
programming knowledge might be seen to reflect the view of programming as 
problem perception rather than problem solving. The skill that the novice 
has to acquire is the ability to recognise particular 'patterns' in the 
specified problem. Most investigations in this knowledge domain have relied 
on some 'pictorial' differentiation between the hierarchical structures 
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derived from experts and novices. However using such a hierarchical 
knowledge representation, it is extremely difficult to differentiate between 
development of detailed expertise, and the possible development of a more 
abstract language of discourse about this detailed knowledge. 
The success of the dimensional models of analysis in the identification of 
the development of such meta-dimensions is taken as a further indication of 
the importance of the consideration of synthetic reasoning in the 
individual's perception of similarity relations. These issues are discussed 
further in Section .5 • .5 • 
.5.4 The perception of argument in text 
"In retrospect, the distrust of some researchers regarding 'semantic' 
memory certainly seems justified. A more flexible and inclusive model 
of conceptual memory must deal with many more types of relations and 
with the effects of contexts of utilisation upon stored knowledge 
configurations ••• I would submit that the study of textual processing 
might be a more productive means of gaining insights into knowledge and 
memory in realistiC human conditions." 
de Beaugrande (1980, p77) 
.5.41 Rationale 
As was explained in Section 1.2, the original goal of this thesis was the 
intention to investigate and develop a methodology capable of mapping 
. changes in 'personal' aspects of knowledge. Conventionally, studies of 
individual differences in perceived knowledge have taken 'snapshots' of 
concept relations within a static, structural representation of knowledge. 
The 'learning from text' studies in this field have primarily concerned 
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themselves with knowledge domains such as Newtonian physics and simple 
statistics, where the definition of concepts appears to be axiomatic, rather 
than part of the problem (e.g. Shavelson, 1972). 
Recent work (e.g. Bisanz et aI, 1979) has dealt with the more personal 
perception of story grammars, but only with regard to simple, concrete 
concepts or story character development. The concern here is to tap the 
effects of individuals 'making' meaning jn terms of integr~ting various, 
possibly conflicting, sources of knowledge, which might include their own 
pre-existing knowledge ,and beliefs. Zajonc's (I9.5.5) ideas concerning the 
remodeling or 'tuning' of knowledge are relevant here, in that they involve 
reorganisation within an 'open' system. Some of the most interesting subject 
areas in these terms are the apparently 'hard' social-science topics such as 
economics and aspects of educational research. It is seemingly possible to 
construct value free theories and to deduce-'facts' in these fields, 
although in reality the significance of these facts is often entirely 
determined by implicit life goals. As for example in the topic of the texts 
chosen for this study, which concern the use of 'modern maths' in the infant 
and junior school curriculum. 
Text manipulation studies concerned with the effects of argument structure 
or course development would obviously be facilitated by a methodology for 
repeatedly 'tapping' into the individual's perception of concept or topic 
relations. The requirements of the 'tapping' task are that it cover a wide 
area of knowledge, and yet take up as little time, and be as non-directive 
as possible. The various forms of similarity relation tasks have a 
considerable advantage over the conventional essay and multiple-choice form 
of questioning in these respects. A problem for studies attempting to tap 
changing patterns of concept relations following prose learning, is that the 
ideas and arguments in complex texts cannot be described simply in terms of 
the relations between concrete or theoretically primitive concepts. 
Elicitation techniques and analyses that were proven at the level of word 
structure cannot be assumed to be as effective in the examination of 
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complex prose structure. Theoretical developments have caused the 'nodes' in 
semantic networks to effectively enlargen. Current conceptions of semantic 
memory allow for whole frames or' episodes as nodes. Although these may 
obviously be decomposed into their elements, we have argued in Chapter 3 
that the natural form of processing of such entities is as whole units. 
Given the desire to study learning from lengthy texts which have complex 
underlying structures, the researcher is confronted with the problem of 
constructing valid measures of understanding. Some of the problems involved 
in attempting to tap whether the reader has correctly perceived the author'S 
general argument structure and the assigned relevance of different topics, 
are discussed in Whalley (1982). It is extremely difficult to devise 
questions which measure how well the reader has integrated abstract 
conceptual issues, within the overly analytic (in the terms of our present 
argument) 'multiple choice' format. However it is also difficult to fit the 
writing and 'objective' marking of general essays within a formal 
experimental methodology. An intermediate task, which may solve both the 
practical and theoretical problems of experimental work with such m'aterial, 
is to require subjects to make similarity judgements concerning the' 
important conceptual terms of the text. 
For the domains of 'soft' knowledge that we have adopted, it is often not 
possible to attempt to identify, or to require readers to make judgements 
concerning, single concept nodes. Therefore in the study to be detailed, an 
attempt was made to cause readers to make relational judgements at the level 
of frames of experience; in this case in terms of short 'pen-pictures' 
. describing a wide range of possible classroom activities. All the 
pen-pictures are contained in Appendix C, but some idea of their form may be 
gained from the first: 
"Yasmin plays with a family of peg dolls she has made to go in the 
class Victorian dolls house and then writes up her diary about being a 
Victorian child." 
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The experiment deals with the readers' perception of argument in two texts, 
one making a case for, and one making a case against, the usefulness of 
'modern maths'. The detailed results in terms of the readers' perceptions· of 
text structure are not relevant here. However the success of the methodology 
as an experimental tool would further validate the general argument of the 
thesis, which emphasises the need to recognise the possibility of 
individuals adopting a holistic approach to judgements of similarity. 
5.42 Method 
Task The subjec.ts were asked to read a four page text either in favour 
of or against the use of 'modern-maths' teaching in the junior school. These 
texts were respectively derived from the first chapter of a book by two well 
known advocates of learning maths through play activities (Holt and Dienes, 
1973), and from a 'Black Paper' (Cox and Boyson, 1977) criticizing modern 
teaching methods. The texts spread over two A4 pages in the format used in 
the experiment, but are shown in a more condensed form in Appendix C. The 
subjects were told that they would receive a 'test' after reading the texts, 
and were asked to "underline the five sentences that you consider the most 
important in terms of the author's argument" whilst reading. 
Before and after they had read the texts, the subjects were required to make 
similarity judgements between the twenty-two pen-pictures describing infant 
and junior classroom activities. It was intended that the pen-pictures 
should be thought of, and related to each other, as complete 'frames' of 
experience. In order to discourage any piecemeal decomposition of the 
pen-pictures, the subjects were asked to spend five minutes before the first 
reference-ranking session "visualising the scenes as they might occur in the 
classroom". They were also asked to continue thinking of the activities as 
"complete scenes" whilst making their relational judgements. 'the reference 
ranking similarity elicitation task was used, as detailed in the studies of 
Chapter 4, each subject being required to complete the task twice during the 
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course of the experiment. An incomplete data design was adopted because of 
time constraints. From a subset of eight items, each subject was randomly 
assigned four for each 'tapping' to serve'as reference items. Appendix C 
. contains the 22 pen-pictures used in the reference ranking task, and those 
used as reference items are indicated. 
Design The intention ot" the study was to demonstrate the usefulness of 
this methodology for 'tapping' into changing patterns of conceptual 
relations. There were two parts to the study with two groups involved in 
each. In the first part, subjects were required to complete the reference 
ranking task before and after reading the text. One group received the 
pro-discovery method text (the pro-group), and the other the anti-discoverY 
.method text (the anti-group). In the second part, two different groups of 
subjects received in succession: the pro- or the anti-text; the reference 
ranking task; the anti"; or the pro-text respectively; and then another 
referencerank'ing task. (The~e will be termed the 'pro-anti' and 'an'ti-pro' 
groups respectively.) Subjects attending each session were randomly assigned 
to groups. There were five subjects in all groups except the anti- which had 
four (due to the illness of one subject assigned to this 'group). Both parts 
of the study are of a 'mixed' design. The 'before and after' tapping 
involves 'within-subjects' aspects and the comparison between groups 
receiving different texts, or the same texts in a different order, involves 
'between-subjects' aspects. Two data sets were obtained from each part of 
the study. In the first these correspond to a 'tapping' before and after 
reading a particular text, whilst in the second they correspond to a 
'tapping' after the first text has been read and then again after' the 
second. 
Subjects and sessions The subjects were students at City of London 
Polytechnic taking a variety of courses; none were taking part in any 
educational studies courses. Subjects who signed up as being available were 
, . 
randomly assigned to either of two sessions. The first session, with the 
pro- and the anti- groups, took about forty minutes; for which the subjects 
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were paid £ 1.50. The second session, with the pro-anti and the anti-pro 
groups, took about one hour; for which the subjects were paid £ 2. 
5.43 Results 
A combined ALSCAL analysis was made of the four data sets. Therefore the 
relative positions and movements between each elicitation for each group 
are directly comparable, in that they have been subjected to the same 
normalization procedure before plotting. An 'individual differences' 
analysis was made with the configuration 'fixed' on the configuration 
obtained from an earlier study. This permitted stable analyses to be made 
with relatively small amounts of data, and also allowed comparisons to be 
made with a 'known' dimensional structure. The pilot study had involved a 
group of student teachers, who were broadly in favour of the 'discovery' 
methpd; making paired similarity judgements concerning all items in the set 
of pen-pictures. Within this configuration, pen-piCtures describing 
'discovery' maths activities were relatively highly weighted in terms of the 
maths dimension. In this analysis then, a high or low dimensional weighting 
on the 'maths' dimension may be interpreted as signifying more or less 
agreement respectively with the idea that the 'discovery' maths pen-pictures 
entail important mathema~ical ideas. 
The previous trials using the pen-pictures indicated that subjects usuaJJy 
perceived three dimensions of variation in them: maths versus play; reading 
and writing versus activity based; and solitary versus group activity. Only 
the first two were relevant to the argument in the texts being studied in 
this case, and no apparent differences were found on the third. The figures 
(i.e. Figures 5.8 to 5.11) shown here then only represent the first two 
dimensions. It should be noted that the axis of the figures indicating the 
dimensional weightings have been foreshortened. The figures effectively 
represent the critical portion of what is normally an A3 sized plot. The 
thin Jines represent the orientation of each subject's first elicitation 
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Figure 5.8 . Dimensional weights for the group reading the pro-disco~ery method te"t 
(ALSCAL analysis, SSTRESS = 0.119, 22 stimuli). 
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Figure 5.9 Dimensional weights for the group reading the· anti-discovery method te"C 
(ALSCAL analysis, SSTRESS = 0.119, 22 stimuli). 
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Figure 5.10 Dimensional weights for the group reading the anti-discovery method text 
followed by the pro-discovery method text (ALSCAL analysis, SSTRESS = 
0.119, 22 stimuli). 
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Figure 5.11 Dimensional weights for the group reading the pro-discovery method text 
followed by the anti-discovery method text (ALSCAL analysis, SSTRESS = 
0.119,22 stimuli) 
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session to the origin of the plot, and the thicker line that of the second 
elicitation to the first. These plots must of course be interpreted as 
representing vectors, and the movement of vectors, rather than as points in 
some space. 
The results of the first part of the study are shown in Figures .5.8 and .5.9. 
These indicate the relative 'movement' of the anti- and pro- groups after 
reading the texts with respect to their original viewpoint. Although the 
differences between individuals are fairly large, the pro- text produces the 
greater shifts towards the maths dimension. The results obtained from the 
groups reading both texts are more interesting, and are shown in Figures 
.5.10 and .5.11. For the anti-pro group there is a small movement towards the . 
maths dimension, but for the pro-anti there are very large shifts away from 
the maths dimension. It would seem that there is an interaction effect, in 
which the arguments against the discovery method are enhanced by a prior 
exposition in their favour • 
.5.44 Discussion 
The studies referenced earlier in Section 5.41 indicate that individual 
differences in perceived knowledge can be made apparent by 'snapshots' of 
concept relatiolJs within a static structural representation of knowledge. 
f . 
However important detail may be lost by ignoring the processes involved when 
the individual uses knowledge and makes meanings. It is o~ly 
possible to consider loosing the 'personal' aspects of knowledge in the more 
abstract scientific disciplines. Studies such as that by Shavelson (1972) 
had an implicit model of teaching as simply the process of transferring the 
cognitive structure of the teacher to that of the learner, via the teaching 
medium. Prior knowledge is regarded as a more or less suitable framework 
upon which learning can be organised, or in some conceptions as the model of 
.~ ~', 
organisation likely to be imposed on new information. This naive 
'instructional' model is clearly an inadequate description of learning from 
text, especially beyond the secondary level. 
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Although the obvious efficacy of 'Black-Paper' rhetoric mayor may not be of 
concern, it is clear that the present methodology can be of some use in the 
investigation of such effects of argument structure. For example, it would 
be interesting to know if the interaction found was ameliorated by greater 
prior knowledge on the part of the readers, or the presence of a 'balanced' 
introduction to the texts. However, the most important finding for our 
present argument is that a stable, interpretable dimensional analysis could 
be made of the various data sets. The way in which this further supports our 
general argument is taken up in the next section. 
5.5 General discussion 
These three applied studies were made in order to further indicate how the 
purely analytic models are unable to adequately describe all forms of 
cognitive processing involved in similarity judgement tasks. As a 
consequence, it would be possible to refute the claim that the feature 
. analytic models represent general models of similarity. 
The correspondence between distance models of similarity and dimensional 
scaling analyses was established in Chapter 2, and the rationale for taking 
a good 'fit' to such dimensional analyses to indicate the effects of 
synthetic judgement processes was further developed in Chapters 3 and 4. In 
all three applied studies, stable, interpretable dimensional structures were 
found. Notwithstanding our own caveat concerning the virtual nature of 
experimentally elicited 'dimensions' (cf Sections 2.43 and 5.34), this is 
taken to signify synthetic cognitive processing on the part of the subjects, 
whilst making relational comparisons between objects. If operations in terms 
of discrete attributes were available to the subjects, and were preferred by 
them, then these results would not have been obtained. The feature analytic 
models of similarity judgement cannot account for this data. 
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These findings thus offer further proof of the lack of generality of the 
feature models of 'similarity, and lend support to our contention concerning 
the necessity to incorporate some aspect of synthetic cognitive process in 
any general model of similarity. 
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CHAPTER 6 Conclusion 
6.1 A summary 
"The capacity to 'think' in a rewarding sense seems to require not a 
little skill in keeping data, and several lines of thought, actively in 
mind long enough for their mutual implications to be developed 
associatively, logically, or both. This capacity, characteristic of 
contemplation or meditation in its literary and religious context, has 
tended to be neglected by psychologists." Reeves (I969, p20) 
The underlying argument of this thesis, is that psychologists have chosen to 
examine a fundamentally important concept, that of similarity, with a 
distorting perspective. The underlying conceptual issues are not dealt with 
adequately, and only those experiments are made which fit the overly 
simplified representational assumptions of the dominant models. In a review 
of the psychological literature, it was noted that many of the early 
researchers appeared to be more aware of the epistemological problems 
confronting the reductionist approach to similarity, than is shown by the 
authors of the present day 'general theories' of similarity. 
The fundamental idea involved in the model developed in Chapter 3 is that 
the global properties of referents are synthetically evaluated in terms of 
their contextual relations, whilst an analytic 'pattern matching' of local 
properties is made. Our discussion then centres round the argument that a 
truly general model of similarity must incorporate aspects of both analYSis 
and synthesis. The feature models are shown to be based on an over simple 
representational model, and to consequently exclude from formal 
consideration all but the analytic cognitive operations. The experimental 
studies of Chapter 4 were designed to further highlight the inadequacies of 
the feature models of similarity. The empirical findings clearly indicate 
that global context effects, the perceived complexity of objects, and the 
interpretations made by subjects of their task cannot be ignored. The 
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applied studies of Chapter 5 were intended to show that synthetic relational 
. " judgements may in some cases be more appropriate than analytic forms of 
. 
judgement. Stable, interpretable dimensional structures were found in these 
experiments, indicating the ability of the subjects to conceive of the 
particular stimuli in terms of their. relational aspects. The corresponding 
analytic forms of judgement were shown to be less satisfactory. 
An attempt was made in the early chapters to accommodate as wid'e'a range of 
views from the relevant philosophical and psychological1iteratures as 
c,' _ ,_ :w.' 
possible. However there must remain many other areas of psychology which 
have not been covered, and yet contain reasoned argument concerning the role 
and nature of similarity in human cognition. An example is Freud's 
discussion of the 'condensation' process of dream-thoughts. H~re the 
distinction between similarity, consonance, approximation and the possession 
of common attributes is considered; processes which clearly correspond to 
those discussed here. Equally relevant are the problems that AI researchers 
have had to confront when trying to extend simple, feature checking, 'match' 
procedures to the immensely more complex comparisons required between 
knowledge and context sensitive schemas. 
It is not possible here to remedy the relative inattention paid by 
psychological res~arch to the important cognitive processes of contemplation 
and meditation. However in the next section an attempt will be made to 
encompass some of the implications of the acceptance of a notion of 
similarity that encompasses aspects of both analysis and synthesis. 
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6.2 Prospects and implications 
"The verdict is not so suddenly arrived at, the proceedings only 
graduaUy merge into the verdict." 
Franz Kafka (The Trial, 1970, p232) 
It was noted in the development of the functional model, that a fundamental 
indeterminacy is apparently necessary in any knowledge representation 
system. The same aspect of an object may be treated as either 'attribute' or 
'relation' depending on whether the object is the subject of analytic or 
synthetic cognitive operations. The objects chosen as the source of the 
experimental stimuli were necessarily rather simple, in order both that the 
link between behavioural protocols and elicited similarity judgements could 
more readily be argued, and also that the experiments parallel those found 
in the literature. A consequent shortcoming of the empirical investigations, 
is that they do not fuUy test aU the representational and procedural 
implications of the model developed in Chapter 3. It is possible to envisage 
an appropriate development of this study in the richer domain of the 
relation between judgements of similarity and the comprehension of metaphor. 
Given that it could be argued that the distinction between analytic and 
synthetic cognition corresponds to the distinction between the comprehension 
of simile and metaphor, then experiments cou.1d be made with more complex 
linguistic stimuli. Similarity judgements made concerning, for example, a 
set of common household items should be differentiaUy effected by their 
simultaneous use in some metaphoric context. 
Several issues were noted in the review section that are important for the 
further development and testing of general models of similarity, although 
all ar~ presently at an early stage of development in the literature. The 
transformational models of perceptual processes such as that proposed by 
Imai (I977) would be a useful component of any general model of similarity 
that attempted to take into account the global changing nature of relations. 
Takane 0981, and cf Section 2.43) has detailed the paraUelism between the 
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initial data conversion process in the analysis models and the individual's 
representation system. The atheoretical treatment conventionally accorded to 
intransitive judgements was noted in Section 1.3., and an ideal analysis of 
similarities data would permit the investigator to model and test 
theoretical predictions concerning the way that such errors of judgement 
might arise. The attempt by Takane to incorporate a model of possible. 
judgement processes within the data analysis procedure is a significant step 
in this direction. 
The correspondence between synthetic and analytic modes,of cognition and the 
developing conceptions of 'cognitive architecture' were noted in Chapter 3. 
The distinction made by Anderson (1983) between automatic and planned 
operations would clearly be important for models such as 'the one proposed 
here which are described in terms of the representation of objects and the 
possible operations on such representations. A development of Torgerson's 
ideas concerning the treatment of the dimensions ~esulting from MDS analysiS 
was also considered in Sections 2.43 and 5.34. It was suggested that the 
'dimensi'ons' may most usefully be regarded as pure artifacts of the task, 
and the individual's c~nception of it. A consequence of adopting this 
approach, is that it allows the use of this analytic technique to escape the 
dominating influence of its long psychophysical tradition. Its use may then 
be extended to examine a wider sphere of cognitive activity. 
Just such a use is det~i1ed in the last study of Chapter 5 where an analysis 
was made of successive mappings of subjects' concept relations. It was, noted 
in Section 1.2 that the original goal of this thesis was the wish to 
va'1idate and empirically test a methodology with which investigations of the 
growth of human knowledge might be made. Within the field of linguistics, 
Saussure' (1960) developed the important distinction between 'synchronic' and 
. ' 
'diachronic' language studies. Synchronic studies would correspond to the 
attempt to tap an individual's pattern of concept relations at one instant 
in time. Proponents of the diachronic methods of study would argue that this 
must be a conceptually inadequate description of the individual's reality, , 
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and that language, and thus knowledge, can only be examined within the 
context of its growth and development. 
In Chapters 2 and 3, some of the criticisms made of cognitive psychology by 
philosophers such as Putnam (1981) and Fodor (1983) were detailed. 
EssentiaUy they are claiming that cognitive psychology has adopted an 
inappropriate model of the mind; the 'mind as a computer' metaphor. The 
arbitrary level of symbolism from which the models of AI and cognitive 
psychology start is taken to indicate that they are reaUyonly models 
of syntax rather than semantics. In the light of this criticism, the attempt 
to incorporate synthetic judgements within the general scheme of cognition 
can be seen to follow from a view of the mind as an 'interpreting engine' 
rather than as an 'inferencing engine'. The scope of the argument was 
consequently broadened in Chapter 3 to encompass the distinction, made in 
relation to metaphor comprehension, between the 'constructivist' and 
'non-constructivist' perceptions of language. The correspondence between the 
proposed model of similarity and Black's (I962) functional analysis of how 
metaphors 'work' being noted. 
The studies detailed here were intended to show that the scaling 
methodologies, when based on an appropriately general model of similarity, 
may contribute to other than a static synchronic description of human 
knowledge. It is hoped that aU the developments o~t1ined might be brought 
together to further support William James' original contention that 
psychology, or in the case of our limited argument, models of similarity, 
"- must be writ both in synthetic and in analytic terms." 
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Appendix A 
The six reference stimuli used in the 'rectangles' experiments - the black borders indicate 
the size of the plain white index cards on which the stimuli were mounted. 
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" 
9 
186 
13 
187 
Appendix B 
Bar chart and cartoon face representations of refernce stimuli numbers 3,6,9 and 11 .... 
the black borders indicate the size of the plain white index cards on which the stimuli 
were mounted. 
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2 Dimensional 3 Dimensional 4 Dimensional 
Stimulus 
Stimuli Stimuli Stimuli 
No. Mouth Pupil Mouth Pupil Eye Mouth Pupil Eye Nose 
1 1 1 * 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 * 
2 1 3 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 
3 1 5 3 3 3 * 1 1 1 5 * 
4 2 2 * 4 4 4 2 2 2 3 • 
5 2 3 5 5 5 2 2' 2 2 • 
6 2 4 1 5 5 * 2 2 2 4 
7 3 1 2 4 4 3 3 3 3 • 
8 3 2 4 2 2 4 4 4 3 
9 3 3 * 5 1 1 * 4 4 4 2 
10 3 4 1 1 5 4 4 4 4 
11 3 5 2 2 4 * 5 5 5 3 
12 4 2 4 4 2 5 5 5 1 
13 4 3 5 5 1 5 5 5 5 
14 4 4 * 1 5 1 5 1 1 3 
15 5 1 • 2 4 2 * 5 1 1 1 
16 5 3 4 2 4 5 1 1 5 
17 5 5 5 1 5 4 2 2 3 
18 4 2 2 2 
19 4 2 2 4 
20 2 4 4 3 
21 2 4 4 2 
22 2 4 4 4 
23 1 5 5 3 
24 1 5 5 1 
25 1 5 5 5 
* = reference item in the reference ranking task 
Table B.l Parameter values given to the cartoon faces and bar charts 
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• 
The two representations of stimulus number 3 
The two representations of stimulus number 6 
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J 
The two representatiuns of stimulus number 9 
The two representations of stimulus number 11 
191 
Appendix C 
The 22 'pen pictures' describing scenes in a junior school classroom. 
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1. Yasmin plays with a family of peg dolls she has made to go in the class Victorian dolls 
house and then writes up her diary about being a Victorian child. 
2. Diane and Jane go round the class asking each child what colour toothbrush they use. 
They record the results on a graph and at the end of the day they show the graph to 
the rest of the class and explain what they have found out. 
3. John is making a calendar and flicks through the months saying each one to himself, 
"January, February, March ....... 
4. Nicola has listened to her teacher telling a story about a hamster and she is now 
writing her own hamster escape story. 
S. Whilst Alison is painting a picture Jane flicks paint at her. The blue merges into the 
red, and Alison changes her picture into a rainbow where lots of colours blend 
together. 
6. Sahara and Nigel are cutting out equilateral triangles from sticky paper and fitting 
them together to make different patterns. Then they write about what they have done. 
7. The class rabbit was allowed to roam freely around the room for fifteen minutes and 
the children were encouraged to observe her movements and activities. They talked to 
each other and exchanged ideas while this was going on, and were then asked to write 
as accurate a description as possible of her. 
8. Simon is making a balsa wood model of a boat that Robinson Crusoe could have used. 
9. Angela and Betty write out the seven times and eight times tables and check their 
answers together. 
10. Joane is painting a picture of her house chattering to herself as she goes along about 
where her room is and where the stairs go, etc. 
11. Serena is trying to work out the surface of the class guinea pig by cutting out a paper 
cylinder that fits closely round it. 
12. Claire and Angela are reading the same story book and talking to each other about the 
bit they liked best. 
13. Mark and Jane measure the distance that their balsa wood plane flies before and after 
moving the wings and then tell their teacher what they have found out. 
14. Judy and Ken measure the length of a classroom wall and a piece of paper to the 
nearest centimetre. Then they calculate how many times the piece of paper would fit 
along the wall, and check their answer by trying it. 
IS. Lisa and John are talking into a cassette recorder, describing a moth that they have 
found and brought into school. 
16. Jim draws round the top of a box on squared paper and works ou~ its area by counting 
squares. He then measures the sides and calculates the area again. 
17. Kevin has read a poem about a boy blowing bubbles who imagines himself to be inside 
one. He then spends some time blowing bubbles and catching them before writing a 
story about the life of a bubble, trying to describe its colours and reflections. 
18. Nigel works through a page of greater-than and less-than problems, ringing the ones 
with the correct answers. 
19. Mike and Jane talk about all the things that they do in the morning before going to 
school, and ~hen draw out a flow chart recording all their actions in the correct 
sequence. 
20. Lyn weighs each of the toys in a basket and works out how much weight she will need 
to balance them when they are all put on one side of the scales. 
21. Francis practices being a tiger for the school play growling at other children and 
wriggling across the floor. 
22. Paul lays out four rods and below each rod he lays two other equal rods. He ends up 
with eight rods. 
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Appendix 0 
The common painful experiences used in the burns and incision trials. 
The Melzack pain questionnaire. 
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Common painful experiences used in the 'bums' trial 
Backache 
Headache 
Receiving an injection 
Sore throat 
Tooth being filled 
Toothache 
Visiting your GP 
'Your pain' 
Common painful experiences used in the 'incision I trial 
Backache 
Breaking a nail 
Falling on ice 
Headache 
Receiving an injection 
Sore throat 
Toothache 
'Your pain' 
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What does the pain feci like? 
Some of the words helow descrihe the pain. Circle only those words th'lt best nescribe 
it. Lcave Oll~ any category thut is not suitable. Usc only a sin~lc word in each appropria tl' 
ca tegory - I Ill' (lIlC thaI. applies hest. 
Flickcrinl{ 
Quivering 
Pulsing 
Throbbing 
Beating 
Pounding 
5 
Pinching 
Pressing 
Gnawing 
Cramping 
Crushing 
9 
Dull 
Sore 
Hurting 
Aching 
Heavy 
1 :~ 
I,'earful 
Frightful 
Terrifying 
17 
Spreading 
Radiating 
Penetrating 
Piercing 
? 
.. 
Jumping 
~'lashing 
Shooting 
6 
Tugging 
Pulling 
Wrenching 
10 
Tender 
Taut 
Rasping 
Splitting 
14 
I'unishing 
Gruelling 
Cruel 
Vicious 
Killing 
18 
Tight 
;o./umb 
Drawing 
Squeezing 
Tearing 
Ilow doe~ the pain c,hange with time? 
:~ 
Pr;cking 
Boring 
Drilling 
Stabbing 
Lancinating 
7 
Hot 
Burning 
Scalding 
Searing 
11 
Tiring 
Exhausting 
15 
Wretched 
Blinding 
19 
Cool 
Cold 
Freezing 
,! 
Sharp 
Cutting 
Lacerating 
8 
Tingling 
Itchy 
Smarting 
Stinging 
12 
Sickeninl{ 
Suffocating 
16 
,\nnoying 
Troublesome 
~liserable 
Intense 
Cnbearable 
20 
~agging 
:-.iauseating 
_\lJonizing 
Dreadful 
Torturing 
Which word or words would you use to describe the pattern or your pain? 
Continuous 
Steady 
Constant 
How strong is the pain? 
2 
Rhythmic 
Periodic 
Intermittent 
3 
Brief 
~lomentary 
Transient 
People agree that the following 5 words represent pain of increasing intensity. They arc: 
2 3 
~1ild Discomforting Distressing 
1. Which worn describes the pain at its worst? 
2. Which word describes the pain when it is least? 
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~ 
Horrible 
5 
Excruciating 
Appendix E 
Accumulator· 
Address 
Content 
Control 
Flow· 
Instruction 
Location 
Loop 
Memory 
Program 
Register 
Subroutine· 
Value· 
·Used as reference items in the expert-novice study 
The micro-processor course concepts used as stimuli items in the reference ranking task 
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Appendix F 
A reanalysis of Mccabe's metaphor data 
Mccabe (1980) obtained measures of similarity between tenor and vehicle, quality in ! 
context (QIC) and quality out of context (QOC). A reanalysis of this data was made with 
the metaphors split into un-marked (metaphor) and marked (simile) categories. Corre-
lations (Pearson's r) were made between measures for each group, and then Z scores 
calculated for the difference between context conditions and between groups using 
Fisher's transform (Meddis, 1975, p152). 
Z = 2.62 1 QOC .44 } P <.02 SIMILE Z = 0.99 QIC .13 p> .10 
Z = .73 
.88' } p>.10 QOC Z = 2.89 
METAPHOR P <.02 
QIC .38 
1 Statistically significant at ~he 5% level (2-TAIL) 
2 Statistically significant at the 2% level (2-TAIL) 
J 
Figure F.1 Correlations of judgements of quality with rated similarity between tenOr all . 
vehicle 
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Appendix G 
Terms equivalent in meaning to 'similarity' in modern German and Arabic 
languages 
Of the major European languages, the German terms 'gleich' and 'ahnlich' 
most obviously offer the analytic-synthetic distinc.tion that has been 
proposed. This is indicated in their English translations: 
ahnlich resembling, similar, like, alike, analogous to, 
corresponding, a method similar to; 
er wird der Mutter ahnlich - he takes after his mother 
gleich like, same, identical, equal, coincident, even, level, similar, 
constant, uniform; 
zu gleichen Teilen - equally in equal parts 
As in Sanskrit, there exist many Arabic terms for similarity that are used 
only within precisely delineated contexts. However the sense of our argument 
may be noted in the following translations: 
sawiya to be equal or similar, to be balanced 
mudahah similarity, resemblance, Hkeness, correspondence, analogy 
matala to resemble, to represent, mean, signify, stand for 
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